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Abstract 
In this thesis I use original empirical data to examine the impact of the political experience 
of MPs before they enter parliament on their careers once inside the House of Commons. 
The contribution I make to knowledge is twofold. First, I build on existing literature in the 
field by developing a stand-alone classification of pre-parliamentary political experience 
that distinguishes between experience gained on the local level, for example as a local 
councillor, and experience gained on the national level, working for an MP or in the head 
office of a political party. Second, I empirically operationalise this classification and support 
it adopting quantitative research techniques. Using a cohort study of those MPs first 
elected at the 1997 general election, I find that those MPs with national-level pre-
parliamentary political experience are more likely to reach cabinet-level frontbench 
positions while MPs with local-level experience are more likely to remain backbenchers or 
reach only the lower levels of government. I highlight the ways in which national-level pre-
parliamentary political experience interacts with other political and personal factors to 
provide a small group of MPs with a preferential parliamentary career path relative to their 
colleagues. I conclude by placing my findings in the context of comparative research on 
political parties, reflecting that certain types of party structure privilege specific types of 
pre-parliamentary political experience. I also consider the findings in light of debates on 
political representation and professionalisation, and highlight directions for future research 
in this area. 
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Introduction 
 
One of my criticisms of a lot of politicians of all parties is that they're 
career politicians. Since they were 11 years old they dreamed of being 
an MP, being the prime minister, and so they'll do A-Level politics, 
politics degree, get a job with an MP, work for a thinktank, become an 
MP, prime minister. And my criticism is what life experiences do you 
have? The reason most MPs aren't popular is that people can see 
through that. 
(Labour MP Sadiq Khan in Mullinger 2011) 
 
Not everyone likes politics. Of those who do, only a small percentage will have an interest 
in running for elected political office. Within this group, only a few will take the step of 
actually running for office and of these electoral candidates, only some are successful. 
Among the elected, few make it to the top jobs within the legislative body in question. This 
final distinction, understanding the dynamics between those elected politicians who reach 
the apex of political life and those who do not, is the focus of this thesis. 
 
Of the many thousands of individuals who have sat on the benches of House of Commons 
as Members of Parliament (MPs) over the years, precious few are remembered. Only a 
small minority enter our consciousness as leaders, great or otherwise, and mark 
themselves out as historical figures of note. These individuals are mostly drawn from the 
frontbenches, either as Ministers or Secretaries of State, their shadows, or indeed as 
Leaders of their parties and Prime Ministers of their country. Why is this the case? Why do 
some MPs reach these roles whilst others do not, and are there systemic patterns visible in 
this process?  
 
Writing in 2009, Michael Kenny asks ‘is there a political elite in Britain today, and through 
what criteria is this to be gauged?’ (2009, p.349). What marks out the successful? In 
Ancient Rome, individuals running for public office would wear white robes to signify their 
intention, the Latin word for which is candide – making them, in contemporary English, 
candidates. Modern politicians are not so easily picked out, but this thesis will contend that 
in many ways, the thing that differentiates the politicians who make it to the top from 
those who do not is politics itself. More specifically, the way that MPs have interacted with 
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the political system prior to their election, and gained pre-parliamentary political 
experience, can help to explain their subsequent political careers. 
 
The personal and social backgrounds of MPs have interested scholars of British politics for 
decades, resulting in a significant body of work on the subject (Rush 1969; Budge and Farlie 
1975; Mellors 1978; King 1983; Kavanagh 1992; Rush 1994; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; 
Norris and Lovenduski 1997; Best et al. 2001; Jun 2003; Rush and Giddings 2011; Hill 2013). 
This work has largely focused on the sex, age, education, and occupational background of 
MPs, and occasionally on parliamentary candidates overall. This fascination with the lives of 
politicians before they became national-level politicians is not isolated to Britain, with 
studies covering multiple European countries, the devolved legislatures within the UK, as 
well as the United States (US), all being present in the literature (Farlie, Budge, and Irwin 
1977; Gallagher 1985; Canon 1990; Borchert and Zeiss 2003; Fox and Lawless 2004; Lawless 
and Fox 2005; Keating and Cairney 2006; Lawless 2012). 
 
Initially, this literature was broadly interested in the ways in which certain groups of 
society, notably women, ethnic minorities, and those from working-class backgrounds, 
were less present in political life than men and those individuals from wealthier 
backgrounds, for example. By the 1990s, studies in this field argued that certain 
occupations were better suited to pursuing a political career than others, and thus those 
individuals who held those occupations were more likely to make it into politics, with Paul 
Cairney later dubbing this the ‘politics-facilitating’ classification (Rush 1994; Norris and 
Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997; Best et al. 2001; Cairney 2007). This classification was based 
on the idea that various resources, both monetary, temporal, and political, were required 
to mount an attempt at election to parliament, and that occupation was one way in which 
these resources were distributed unequally throughout the population. The classification of 
these different types of occupation remained largely untouched prior to Cairney’s 
intervention in 2007, which calls for a re-think of the ‘politics-facilitating’ category (2007). 
He argues that there are now two types of ‘politics-facilitating’ occupations; those which 
are merely conducive to politics, including traditional professional jobs, the law and so on, 
and those which have a direct link to politics, such as working for an MP or a political party. 
Cairney terms these brokerage and instrumental occupations, respectively. 
 
 
 13 
 
The core argument of the thesis 
This thesis builds on the literature focusing on political recruitment and political careers in 
two main ways. Firstly, it argues that conflating political experience with occupational 
experience obscures the fact that the majority of MPs will have political experience that is 
not necessarily their primary occupation, usually the thing measured by these 
classifications. For example, only 14.5% of the 2010 House of Commons had occupational 
experience classified as ‘political’ or as a ‘political organiser’ (Criddle 2010). However, this is 
highly unlikely to mean that all other MPs had no political experience; rather it is likely that 
their experience was of a different type, and not their primary occupation. The existing 
brokerage-instrumental classification belies this, and it is for this reason that I argue 
political experience should be considered as a stand-alone category, separate from 
occupation. Within this category, I make a distinction between political experience gained 
on the national political level, experience analogous to much of the existing instrumental 
category, such as working for an MP, working in the head office of a political party, for a 
think-tank, and so on, and experience gained on the local level, as a local councillor, a local 
party organiser, or just as a local party activist. 
 
The second way in which the thesis contributes to existing scholarship is by developing its 
scope of analysis. Much of the work detailed above is interested in the backgrounds of MPs 
because it is perceived to matter who our MPs are, based on a sometimes tacit, sometimes 
not, assumption that this will affect how they do politics, and that it is potentially 
undemocratic for political representatives to be largely drawn from the same societal 
groups (Phillips 1995; Lovenduski 2005). Only in passing is it considered that pre-
parliamentary background may well affect political careers beyond the point of getting into 
parliament, and affect MPs’ career path within the legislature itself. For example, Vernon 
Bogdanor notes the limited number of post-war Prime Ministers with local council 
experience, and Colin Mellors comments that although the trend of recruiting local 
councillors to become MPs is strong, and (at the time), growing, these individuals rarely 
make it into leadership positions (Mellors 1978, pp.98-99; Bogdanor 2009). However, these 
analyses are not focused specifically on the question of pre-parliamentary political 
experience and as such, do not address it systematically. 
 
These concerns are developed into three focal research questions; first, does pre-
parliamentary political experience affect career trajectory within the UK Parliament? 
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Second, does local and national pre-parliamentary political experience have the same 
effect on career trajectory? And third, how would the patterns seen in the UK apply to 
different types of political system and political party in comparative research? 
 
To answer these questions empirically, I operationalise and apply the stand-alone 
classification of political experience to original data collected by myself that details the 
personal, social, occupational, and political backgrounds of those 242 MPs elected to the 
House of Commons for the first time at the 1997 general election, as well as their post-
election careers. Using a harmonised scale of frontbench appointments and quantitative 
research methods, cross-party analysis is permitted. I find that pre-parliamentary political 
experience does have an effect on career trajectory in the UK Parliament, and that 
different types of political experience have different effects. Most notably, I find that those 
MPs with political experience gained on the national level are more likely than their 
colleagues with local political experience to be elected at a younger age, gain promotion 
into springboard offices, and to reach cabinet-level frontbench office. Respectively, these 
conceptual and empirical contributions to the literature comprise the bulk of original 
scholarly contribution of the thesis. 
 
Arguably, such findings are of interest in and of themselves, particularly to scholars with an 
interest in the House of Commons, and perhaps to non-academic political practitioners, 
particularly those looking to pursue a career in politics – this potential relevance is 
addressed in greater detail in the concluding chapter of the thesis. It is also arguable that 
uncovering patterns such as those which this thesis and the existing literature focuses on is 
a key element the work of political science as a discipline; elucidating political processes 
and looking beyond the day-to-day workings of political life to chart longer-term trends, or 
those which are hidden from public view. In this tradition, I contribute to the literature on 
comparative party politics by examining in chapter six the potential application of the 
conceptual framework developed for the British case to broader comparative work in 
future, a further contribution to existing scholarship. Specifically, I ask whether patterns of 
pre-legislative political experience differ by political system, by political party type, or on an 
individual-level basis, addressing the third research question above. However, there is 
additionally another more normative case to be made as to why this research, and its 
findings, matters. 
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Why care? 
This thesis is about representatives, individuals elected to institutions with a representative 
function, and the normative case of the importance of this thesis lies within this literature 
of representation. A concern with political careers and political recruitment more broadly, 
takes on greater resonance when contextualised within more normative discussions 
relating to these ideas. To quote Anne Phillips, this section will address the question of 
‘why should it matter who our representatives are’? (1998, p.224). 
 
Representation, at root, is the idea that something is in the place of another, ‘the making 
present in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact’ 
(Pitkin 1967, pp.8-9). Saward notes that in political science, the discussion of where, how 
and when this occurs tends to be situated largely, although not exclusively, within elected 
legislatures (Saward 2006). Much of the recent existing literature which looks at both the 
under- and over-representation in political institutions of certain groups focuses on the 
representation of women, often asking what effect the low numbers of women elected to 
legislatures across the world has had on the representation of women’s political interests. 
This debate has occurred broadly along a demarcation of women’s descriptive and 
substantive representation (Celis and Childs 2008). Jane Mansbridge writes that in 
descriptive representation, ‘representatives are in their own persons and lives in some 
sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent’ (1999, pp.628-629). This 
type of representation is also known as mirror or microcosmic representation. The second 
term to be defined is substantive representation. Joni Lovenduski defines this as simply ‘the 
representation of [a group’s] interests’ (2005, p.18). Arguably, these concepts can also be 
used when discussing the representation of any defined group in society, such as the 
disabled, ethnic minorities, or even men. 
 
Many arguments in favour of increasing women’s representation often relied in the past on 
the assumption of the existence of a deterministic link between the descriptive and 
substantive representation of women and that an increase in the former would 
automatically result in a greater manifestation of the latter, although it has been argued by 
contemporary gender and politics scholars that this argument, and the research which has 
been carried out in support of it, is based on a misreading of earlier texts (Childs and Krook 
2008, p.730). Critical mass theory, pioneered by Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) and 
developed by Drude Dahlerup (1988) borrows its terminology from nuclear physics ‘where 
 16 
 
it refers to the quantity needed to start a chain reaction’ (1988, p.275). Often misconstrued 
amongst scholars as saying that a specific marker, often given as 30%, would lead to 
women representatives actively pursuing women’s’ interests (generally seen to be 
traditional feminist concerns) through the formation of supportive coalitions, recent re-
readings of these seminal works have argued that they actually contained a more nuanced 
view of the relationship between the number of women present in a legislature and their 
subsequent behaviour (Childs and Krook 2008). Building on this, conceptions of how the 
link between the number of members of a group and their impact within a political body 
have been developed. Karen Celis and Sarah Childs have noted how when talking of the 
substantive representation of women, at least until relatively recently, feminist scholars 
would often consider women’s interests to be fairly transparent, certainly in areas 
considered to be naturally gendered in nature such as abortion rights. More recently, the 
development of this work to include analysis and discussion of women elected to 
parliament from parties of the right of the political spectrum has problematised this 
feminist shopping list approach (Celis and Childs 2012). That is, representatives are unlikely 
to be able to know the desires of a defined extra-parliamentary group to whom they also 
belong simply because of this fact. 
 
Thus, the argument for presence based on a desire for substantive representation is 
arguably no longer the core plank of claims for increased women’s representation. But how 
relevant would such an argument ever have been to the situation being examined in this 
thesis? It is posited in this thesis that there are some politicians who have spent their entire 
political lives at the national level who are more pre-disposed to successful parliamentary 
careers based on their pre-parliamentary political experience, more so than their 
colleagues who lack such experience and instead gained theirs at the local level. However, 
these individuals are not all white, not all male, not all privately or Oxbridge-educated, and 
they are not all borne of fantastic familial wealth. As such, the arguments above, rooted as 
they are in fixed characteristics such as race, sex, class, and so on, are harder to apply 
here.1 
 
However, many feminist theorists have thought beyond arguments that were reliant on a 
link between descriptive and substantive representation, and there are other arguments in 
the broader literature that can be adapted to address the question of why a concentration 
                                               
1
 Oxbridge is a portmanteau which refers to the universities of both Oxford and Cambridge. 
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of political power in the hands of a given group, based on any characteristics, is 
problematic and something worthy of concern. These arguments are broken into three 
sections. Firstly, the argument that it is unhealthy based on conceptions of justice, 
secondly, that it is democratically unhealthy, and thirdly, that it has a negative effect on the 
functional representation offered by the Commons. 
 
For many feminist writers, the justice argument is the most powerful and irrefutable 
argument in favour of equal representation along the lines of sex, but again, it is possible to 
extend the principle to other inequalities of representation (Allen and Dean 2008). To 
quote Anne Phillips, ‘no argument from justice can defend the current state of affairs’ 
(1995, p.65) and the thrust of this argument is straightforward – it is simply not fair, nor 
right, that women are so grossly underrepresented in parliament relative to their numbers 
in the overall population. Extrapolating these arguments to the case in hand is possible, 
within certain limits. For the justice argument to function here, it needs be inverted to 
focus on overrepresentation rather than underrepresentation. That is, the problem here is 
that a given group is dominating powerful positions, not that an equivalent opposite group 
is underrepresented. In any case, however, the argument stands – it’s simply not just for 
any group to dominate political power (or representation more broadly).  
A further argument can be made that such concentration of power is not democratically 
healthy, in that it will have negative knock-on effects which will affect people’s perceptions 
of how well they are represented by the Commons. Right now, these perceptions would 
appear to be in bad shape, with only 14% of Britons trusting politicians to be honest, and 
an academic literature building up around this idea of popular political discontent (Stoker 
2006; Hay 2007). This argument, relating to democratic health, requires a consideration of 
the interaction between representatives and the represented – how do these two groups 
relate to one another? It also requires an assumption that, at heart, a functioning 
democracy is an inclusive one. Phillips writes, ‘descriptive representation matters because 
of what it symbolizes to us in terms of citizenship and inclusion – what it conveys to us 
about who does and does not count as a full member of society’ (2012, p.517). Similarly, 
Jane Mansbridge provides two arguments that can be used to support representative 
claims that are also not linked to substantive representation. Firstly, she argues that 
increased descriptive representation will help to create a social meaning of ‘ability to rule’ 
for groups who have been underrepresented in the past and who may have had their 
ability to rule questioned (1999, p.628). Secondly, she argues that increased descriptive 
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representation will increase the de facto legitimacy of the legislature, particularly where 
there has been overt discrimination in the past (1999, p.628). These factors focus on the 
importance of inclusion and belonging in any definition of democracy (Childs 2008, pp.103-
104). Might a diversity of representation quite simply be good for politics? Such arguments 
from difference are based on the idea that women, or other groups, will ‘do politics’ 
differently to men (or whoever is dominant) and bring about change in the political system 
that is beneficial to all (Lovenduski 2005, p.24).  
 
The final strand of the argument being put forward here relates to functionality and skills – 
the idea that by concentrating political power in the hands of individuals with similar types 
of pre-parliamentary experience, expertise from elsewhere is being lost at a cost to the 
workings of the system. Variants of this argument seem to have faded from academic work 
in recent years, but older writings by authors such as Anthony Birch and Samuel Beer refer 
to this type of ‘functional representation’ (Birch 1979, p.109). In his review of both pluralist 
and guild socialist writings, the two groups Birch identifies as being the main advocates of 
this type of functional group representation, the clearest outlines of the core principles of 
this idea come from G.D.H. Cole and another author, writing under a pseudonym, called 
Candidus (1979, pp.106-110). For these two authors, representation of the individual was 
‘impossible’, with Cole writing that representation ‘is always specific and functional’, Birch 
noting that Cole felt it was ‘impossible to represent men as men, but possible to represent 
‘certain purposes common to groups of individuals’’ (1979, p109). For the purposes of this 
thesis, the relative merits of group or individual representation are largely moot, rather the 
point of citing such work here is to highlight that the idea that occupational groups, notably 
in industry, having formal representation and power to elect their own MPs, are not so 
ludicrous as modern political discourse might lead one to believe. That is, revisiting work by 
Birch and Beer foregrounds the fact that a) many have believed that occupational groups 
are deserving of formal representation within legislatures and b) that underlying this is an 
assumption, perhaps tacit, that this is because these groups, and their members, can offer 
insight and skills unavailable elsewhere.  
 
In order to extrapolate this, as with the arguments from justice presented above, it is 
necessary to shift the focus  from those being excluded to those being included – those 
who are overrepresented. In this case, this would be a group of politicians, all with similar 
or the same pre-parliamentary political experience, dominating executive-level positions. 
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What is being lost, politically, democratically, perhaps even in terms of policy, from this 
situation? The thoughts of G.D.H. Cole and those who agreed with him would suggest that 
quite a lot is being lost in terms of expertise, a functional specialism of sorts. Describing 
functional representation in 1982, Samuel Beer, in an argument that one could now 
imagine being used in a comment piece railing against professional politicians, writes;  
 
as control [of government] extends into the complex and technical affairs of the 
economy, governments must win the cooperation of crucial sectors and show 
sensitivity to their values and purposes. Not least it must elicit their expert 
advice…In various period of history the contribution of representatives has been 
thought of sometimes as primarily “reason”, at other times as “will”. For the 
proponents of functional representation in modern times, this contribution is 
especially “knowledge” (1982, p.73). 
 
Indeed, it is possible to find reflection of these arguments in modern media portrayals of 
politics and politicians. Writing in 2010, political commentator Jonathan Isaby asked ‘Does 
it matter that only three of the 23 Cabinet ministers have been councillors?’ when it 
transpired that the new coalition cabinet suffered from a distinct lack of local experience 
(2010). Another, more abstract complaint, seen in a 2008 editorial in The Telegraph asserts 
that ‘politics needs real people’, noting that ‘few senior British politicians have had a life 
outside politics and they can hardly be said to have made a success of running the country 
in recent years’ (2008). In their own way, these views are similar to those of Cole and 
others. They espouse the need for a diversity of experience, occupational and otherwise, 
and for reasons ranging from the practical, in terms of policy benefits and decision-making, 
to the more abstract, relating to perceptions of who should be involved in politics. To quote 
Beer once again, ‘the knowledge of those performing this function may well be necessary 
for the good governing of the wider community. They have special skills, experience, 
expertise which government must have at hand if it is to understand and control the 
complex and interdependent social whole’ (1982, p.73). 
 
A crucial point to make here is that this argument stands simply on the basis that there are 
skills, insights, and so on, that will be gained from, for example, being a local councillor, 
that will be missing if top parliamentary roles are dominated by those without such 
experience. There is no attempt here to make any comment about ideological differences, 
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or about deserving representation. That is not to say such arguments could not be made, as 
they likely could, but they will not be made in this thesis. 
 
Summary of the thesis 
The thesis addresses the research questions detailed above over the course of eight 
chapters, including this one. Chapter one addresses the existing literature in greater detail, 
moving onto chapter two which lays out a theoretical rationale for the research, asking why 
pre-parliamentary political experience could be expected to affect post-election career 
trajectory. Chapter three is the methods chapter of the thesis, outlining the methodological 
approach of the thesis, as well as introducing the variables which are utilised in the 
empirical analysis through basic descriptive statistics. Chapters four and five provide the 
empirical analysis of the thesis, highlighting the contribution to empirical knowledge on 
political careers that the thesis makes. Chapter six asks whether these patterns would be 
seen in other countries, and develops the concepts used in the thesis for use in broader 
comparative studies of political parties before discussing the outcomes which could be 
expected from such work. The final chapter concludes the thesis, summarising its 
conclusions and contributions to existing scholarship, highlighting its links to broader 
scholarly work, prior to offering suggestions for future research in this area. To close this 
chapter, I summarise the thesis as a whole, chapter by chapter. 
 
Chapter one 
I begin by examining the relevant literature in chapter one. This chapter is organised 
broadly along the lines of what we know about political careers in Britain already and then 
highlighting gaps in this work. I open by identifying existing trends in political recruitment 
and the characteristics of MPs highlighted by extant work (Rush 1969; Mellors 1978; Bochel 
and Denver 1983; Rush 1994; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997; Best et al. 2001; 
Rush 2001; Borchert and Zeiss 2003; Jun 2003; Keating and Cairney 2006; Cairney 2007). 
The House of Commons is shown to be increasingly socially homogenous, with the social 
extremes of Labour’s manual workers and Conservative landed gentry giving way to a 
largely middle-class group of legislators (Keating and Cairney 2006, pp.43-44), be male-
dominated (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Lovenduski 2005; Childs 2008), and to be 
witnessing a shift from occupations classified as ‘brokerage’, indicating a job that is 
‘conducive to politics’ to those termed ‘instrumental’, indicating a role which has a ‘direct 
link to politics’ (Cairney 2007).  
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It is with this classification that I take issue. I argue that occupation itself is no longer 
necessarily the point of interest here, but rather the political nature of these roles and the 
political experience that they bestow on individuals. The delineation in previous research of 
locally- and nationally-focused political experience is identified and supported, and the 
adaptation of this distinction for this thesis is discussed in chapters two and three. The 
chapter then considers studies of political elites in the more specific sense of cabinet or 
executive formation. These are limited in the British context, and none fully address the 
impact of pre-parliamentary political experience on career progression (King 1983; 
Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2007; Dowding and Dumont 2009; Berlinski, Dewan, and 
Dowding 2012). These studies, particularly Berlinkski et al, will be returned to in more 
detail in chapter three when discussing the methodology used in the data analysis (2012). 
For now, it will be foregrounded that these studies are; firstly, limited in scope to cabinet 
appointments only (i.e. not looking at shadow ministerial appointments), and secondly, 
consider political experience as part of occupational experience, belying crucial differences 
between different types of pre-parliamentary political experience. As such, these studies 
do not ‘follow through’ MPs and do not offer a holistic look at a political career from its 
outset, but rather focus their gaze on the institution or position as the unit of analysis. An 
alternative criticism, primarily of King’s work, is that it is too qualitative and lacks a 
systematic analysis of career paths (1983). 
 
Chapter two 
In the second chapter I build on the first by detailing the potential link between pre-
parliamentary political experience and political careers once elected to the House of 
Commons. I restate the existing classification utilised in the political recruitment literature, 
a classification which distinguishes between brokerage and instrumental occupations. This 
distinction is operationalised on available data since 1945, and this is shown graphically. 
Based on this operationalisation, I argue that this body of literature has told us two major 
things about British political life; firstly, that there is a great deal of occupational 
homogeneity across the three main parties in Britain, with most MPs having occupational 
backgrounds could be categorised as brokerage. Secondly, it is clear that there is an 
increasing minority of MPs with instrumental occupational backgrounds. The chapter then 
turns to political experience, making the argument that political experience should be 
considered as a stand-alone category when undertaking studies of political careers, 
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especially if the literature is using these studies to make claims about the political nature of 
pre-parliamentary life. Thinking about this political experience, I then consider what the 
utility of different types of experience, that based at the local and national levels 
respectively, is to a political career. Looking both pre- and post- election, I classify the 
potential benefits of different pre-parliamentary political experience as formal and 
informal. I end the chapter with a summary of the main arguments of the thesis, alongside 
a restatement of its research questions. 
 
Chapter three 
In chapter three I introduce the methodology and research design of the thesis, a cohort 
study approach. The aims of the chapter are threefold. First, to establish measures of 
political experience that are suitable to be operationalised in the subsequent data analysis. 
Second, to highlight other variables which need to be considered alongside political 
experience in the data analysis; and third, to introduce the data studied in the thesis 
through the outlining of some basic descriptive statistics at the same time as justifying the 
specific methodology used in the thesis, a cohort study of the 1997 general election cohort.  
 
In the previous chapter, chapter two, I established the conceptual framework of the thesis, 
arguing that political experience should be considered as a standalone category, not 
subsumed into occupational classifications, and also that any classification needs to 
distinguish between different types of political experience. The work of chapter three is in 
part to outline how this distinction can be empirically operationalised in the data analysis 
which follows in chapters four and five. In support of this, I survey the available British and 
comparative literature, noting the different ways in which political experience is both 
construed and measured across different political systems. Having established a series of 
suitable variables which will be used throughout the data analysis within the thesis, I 
consider which other variables should be included in the quantitative analysis, specifically 
which variables to include in the regression models seen in chapter four. Again, I draw on 
the existing comparative literature, as well as other adjunct literatures of relevance and a 
series of variables are highlighted and marked for inclusion. These variables are then 
introduced alongside the political experience variables through some basic descriptive 
statistics. 
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I additionally justify the use of a cohort study methodology, contextualising this choice in 
the real-world political climate in which the 1997 general election took place. The unique 
opportunities which both this election and methodology afford a study of political careers 
are highlighted, but additionally, the chapter warns of some of the limitations of such a 
methodology. Overall, chapter three acts as a bridge between the conceptual groundwork 
of chapters one and two, which establish the conceptual contributions of the thesis, and 
the empirical findings of chapters four and five. 
 
Chapter four 
Building on chapter three, in chapter four I empirically establish the relative importance of 
pre-parliamentary political experience as something that affects parliamentary success 
using regression analyses of the cohort data outlined in the previous chapter and 
operationalising the variables discussed there. I open the chapter by highlighting other 
factors that could be variously expected to have an effect on the career trajectory of an 
MP. Building on chapter three, I outline a set of variables to be included in the regression 
models, including variables which measure different types of pre-parliamentary political 
experience. The variables which measure this distinguish between political experience 
gained on the local level and that gained on the national level. These are based on the 
conceptual groundwork of chapters two and three.  
 
The analysis is split between an ordinal logistic regression model which looks at broad 
office achievement within the Commons, and further binomial logistic regression models 
which look specifically at achievement of frontbench and cabinet offices. There are some 
consistent findings across these models, namely that pre-parliamentary does have an effect 
on office achievement and career trajectory at all levels, but that this effect is not the 
largest in the model. Underlining the fact that those variables with consistently large 
effects, such as age at time of election and electoral majority, are unlikely to be unrelated 
to political experience, I lay the ground for a more nuanced analysis in chapter five. The 
empirical findings of the empirical analysis of the chapter, based on a cohort study 
approach, are original contributions to the existing literature which does not include any 
equivalent study, methodologically or conceptually.  
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Chapter five 
Taking a cue from chapter four, I argue here that the other factors identified as having a 
large effect on career trajectory in the House of Commons are unlikely to be unrelated to 
pre-parliamentary political experience. In this chapter I map the ways in which these 
factors combine to provide individuals with pre-parliamentary political experience gained 
on the national level a preferential political career path compared to their colleagues who 
cut their political teeth at the local level.  Moving chronologically from the stage of 
unsuccessful contestations of parliamentary seats at elections, and moving through to look 
at age at first election, electoral majority, first promotions and highest offices, I show how 
national-level pre-parliamentary political experience consistently provides politicians with 
opportunities to be elected younger, promoted faster, and end up in higher office than 
their colleagues with local experience.  
 
Chapter six 
In chapter six I turn to comparative political science and the literature of party politics, 
asking how the concepts developed in earlier chapters, borne out in the empirical analysis 
of chapters four and five, might be applied to the study of countries other than Britain. 
Drawing on the available comparative literature, previously discussed briefly in chapter 
three, a chronology of political experience is outlined, highlighting that different types of 
political experience are gained within three distinct sections of a career: pre-election, as 
part of the electoral process, and then post-election within a political institution. I propose 
that this chronology is likely to be of potential use to future comparative work in this field. 
 
Having established this chronology, the chapter moves to delineate between the various 
types of political experience which can be gained across a career, building on the 
distinction made in chapter two between experience gained on the national level and that 
gained on the local level. Arguing that such a framework is applicable to broader 
comparative work, I distinguish between local and national political experience, elected 
and unelected experience, and then partisan and non-partisan experience. Illustrating how 
this classification is applicable to multiple cases, I draw on available comparative work for 
support before turning to the empirical question of how these various types of political 
experience will affect careers at different stages across varying political situations.  
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Looking at the ways in which three factors may affect the impact of political experience on 
political careers, I move from macro-scale considerations such as political system and 
institutional design to political party type, and then to the micro-level effect of individual-
level characteristics. Addressing the ways in which political system and institutional 
structure will affect the collection and deployment of political experience in a polity, I draw 
on existing research which details the multi-level institutional movements of politicians in a 
political system, and furthers this work by considering how this will affect the ways in 
which individuals gain political experience. I argue that the location of the executive, the 
relative utility of intra-legislative experience, as well as professionalisation of local and 
regional legislatures will all change the incentives for a politician looking to gain the types 
of political experience which will best further their political careers.  
 
Turning to the effect of party on political experience, I adopt the unified party typology of 
Krouwel (2006), which synthesises the numerous other classifications in the literature by 
focusing equally on organisational, political, and other aspects including the genesis of a 
party. I do not undertake an assessment of Krouwel’s typology, however, as it is in the 
opportunity for simplification that it offers, rather than its potential verisimilitude, that its 
attractiveness lies. Delineating between cartel-, catch-all electoralist-, and business-type 
parties, I consider how these party types will affect the use of political experience at 
different stages of a political career, arguing again that differences between these types 
will result in different patterns of experience collection, as well as different career 
outcomes based on this. I root these discussions in case studies drawn from the existing 
literature, as well as the more theoretical literature which speculates on the potential 
future development of different party types.  
 
Finally, I examine the impact of individual-level personal characteristics on political 
experience, arguing quite simply that politics will be experienced in different ways for 
different individuals, based on personal or group characteristics, and as such, this is likely 
to affect their interaction with it and the ways in which political experience is gained. 
Drawing from a substantial feminist literature which has noted the ways in which men and 
women experience political life in different ways, the chapter speculates that these 
differences will affect pre-election experience, and then in turn post-election attainment, 
for individuals from different groups within society. Linking this back to the discussion of 
party type and institutional arrangements above, I highlight the fact that differences in 
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these will too change the incentives for individuals, and that parties themselves can 
artificially manage these incentives through the use of, for example, sex quotas. In turn, 
this will in itself affect the use of political experience. The chapter concludes by 
foregrounding the ways in which these three factors are linked.  
 
Conclusion 
The concluding chapter of the thesis fulfils two main functions – to summarise and 
generalise the findings of the thesis. Firstly, I restate the original scholarly contributions of 
the work, and relate these findings to the research questions outlined above. I make clear 
that the thesis builds on existing academic work in the field of political careers by 
introducing new conceptual understandings of pre-parliamentary political experience as 
well as a new empirical finding; that pre-parliamentary political experience does affect 
political career trajectory within the House of Commons. Secondly, in the conclusion I will 
outline the relevance of the thesis findings to work across a broad range of academic 
literatures, and additionally highlight the ways in which the findings could be of interest to 
non-academic political practitioners. Having done this, I then lay out markers for future 
adjunct research based on the limitations of this study, acknowledged within. The thesis 
concludes with a brief summary of the research questions and findings. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined the research focus of the thesis and justified it with 
reference to the empirical and conceptual shortcomings of the existing literature as well as 
normatively, locating the thesis in relation to broader work concerned with theories of 
political representation. Having done this, I then summarised the thesis in brief, outlining 
the direction that the arguments within will take, as well as highlighting the original 
scholarly contributions of the work. Outlining the core argument of the thesis, as well as its 
research questions, I have made clear where the original scholarly contributions of the 
thesis lie – in the creation of a standalone classification of political experience, and in the 
empirical findings that not only does pre-parliamentary political experience affect post-
election parliamentary career paths, but that different types of political experience have 
differential effects.  
 
In the next chapter I will review the relevant literatures in detail, utilising them to 
understand where this thesis can contribute to their understanding of political careers, as 
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well as assessing the extent to which this work can answer the research questions outlined 
above. I frame the review using the preoccupations of the existing literature on the topic, 
with three questions guiding it; first, who becomes an MP, second, how do they become an 
MP, and third, what do they do once elected? Finding that although it is useful, the existing 
work on the subject cannot answer the core research questions laid out in this chapter, I 
end the review by restating the direction of the thesis and offering some hypotheses which 
are then used to guide the conceptual and empirical analysis that follows.  
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Chapter One - Literature review 
 
In the previous chapter I introduced the main themes and structure of the thesis, its 
research questions, and offered a normative justification for interest in the subject matter. 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess to what extent existing work can help answer the 
research questions laid out in the introduction namely ‘what is the effect of pre-
parliamentary political experience on political careers in the UK parliament?’ and ‘do 
different types of experience have different effects on career trajectory?’ In other words, 
does the way in which MPs engage with politics prior to their election to the Commons 
have an effect on their career trajectory once they are elected, and is this effect the same 
for all types of experience? Across the British and comparative literature, studies of 
political careers are considered across three broad areas - who politicians are in terms of 
their personal and social characteristics; how they get into legislatures, considering 
processes of selection and election; and then what they do when in a legislature and what 
affects their behaviour (Searing 1985; Canon 1990; Searing 1994; Norris and Lovenduski 
1995; Norris 1997; Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2007; Evans 2008; Ashe et al. 2010; 
Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2012; Carnes 2012). 
 
I structure this review in such a way that reflects this literature, taking a tripartite structure 
which looks in turn at three questions which reflect the preoccupations of the existing 
literature. Firstly, the question ‘who becomes an MP?’ will be used to examine existing 
work which looks at the occupational, personal, and political backgrounds of MPs. It should 
be noted that for the purposes of this chapter, the focus will be less on the detailed 
findings of this literature but rather more on its broad approach and top-line findings, with 
more detail offered in chapter two. Secondly, I consider the structure of candidate 
selection processes. How do political parties provide formal and informal incentives for 
prospective candidates to seek out certain types of political experience? Thirdly, I address 
the question of what MPs do once elected and outline and assess the literature on 
parliamentary and executive careers in the House of Commons. Following this, I locate the 
thesis in reference to these literatures, and draw hypotheses from them.  
 
Who becomes an MP? 
In this section of the review I will discuss existing trends in political recruitment and the 
backgrounds of MPs.  I argue that the existing literature largely considers pre-
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parliamentary political experience as a subset of occupational experience. In this thesis I 
will develop this scholarship by suggesting that political experience should be considered as 
a stand-alone category, and two broad types of pre-parliamentary political experience will 
be outlined in support of this; experience gained on the national level of politics, and 
experience gained at the local level. 
 
In this thesis I address research questions which ask whether political experience gained 
before becoming an MP affects career trajectories once in the Commons and whether or 
not different types of experience have different effects. A natural starting point is to 
establish what is already known about who becomes an MP, how they do it, and whether 
any existing work can contribute a full, or partial, answer to this research question. 
Previous work focusing on the question of who becomes an MP has concentrated primarily 
on MPs’ prior occupations in addition to their social and personal characteristics, such as 
sex, race, and age at time of election (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997). These 
other factors will be considered in greater detail in chapter three. For now, in this section I 
trace the ways in which political experience has been understood in this existing literature, 
highlighting that it has been viewed primarily as a part of broader occupational experience.   
 
What is the occupational background of MPs? 
Occupation has been a core focus of existing elite studies of the House of Commons 
(Mellors 1978, pp.58-81). This is understandable; occupation can act as a proxy measure of 
social class, being tied up as it is with notions of social standing and income (Carnes 2012). 
Additionally, as noted by Mellors, it also ‘naturally reflects the main features and trends’ of 
MPs’ educational background. More recently, occupation has also become another way of 
measuring pre-election political involvement, a proxy measure for careerism in many ways, 
particularly with the proliferation of full-time paid roles on the staffs of political parties and 
in the offices of MPs (Webb and Fisher 2003; Cairney 2007; Rush and Giddings 2011). 
 
Early accounts of occupational background note the fact that many MPs were drawn from 
the same occupations (Jennings 1957, p.58; Mellors 1978, p.58), and this observation 
underpinned early attempts to classify these occupational backgrounds2. Over time, these 
                                               
2
 In these earlier works, including Jennings, for example, the emphasis is largely on the fact that MPs 
need an outside source of finance in order to subsidise the relatively small wage they would receive 
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developed into a primary initial classification of ‘brokerage occupations’, defined broadly as 
jobs that are ‘conducive to politics’ and offer ‘flexible over time, generous vacations, 
interrupted career paths, professional independence, financial security, public networks, 
social status, policy experience and technical skills useful in political life’ (Rush 1994, p.573; 
Norris and Lovenduski 1997, p.165). These are best exemplified in roles such as that of a 
teacher, law-based professions, trade union officials, journalists and political-related roles. 
Writing a decade later, Paul Cairney, however, argues that politically-related roles deserve 
to be recognised as a category of their own, which he terms ‘instrumental professions’ 
(Cairney 2007, p.215). These professions are those directly linked to politics in contrast to 
the brokerage professions which are amenable to a political career rather than part of the 
political world as such. Less of an effort has been made to classify these instrumental 
occupations than for the initially classified brokerage occupations and understanding of 
them seems to be limited, with most accounts being unsystematic in their consideration of 
the matter3. Within the instrumental category, Cairney includes journalism, ‘occupations 
that provide an apprenticeship for higher elected office’, or those that entail working 
closely with existing politicians, as well as mentioning individuals who pursue their duties 
as elected local councillors on a full-time basis (2007, pp.215-217).  
 
Cairney’s distinction between brokerage and instrumental is recognition of changing 
patterns in the composition of the House of Commons. Existing analyses of the 
Westminster parliament’s occupants have concluded that it is an increasingly socially 
homogenous group of people, dominated by those from professional backgrounds broadly 
defined: over the last three decades, the extremes of Labour’s manual workers and the 
Conservatives’ landed gentry have made way for individuals from this middle-class 
professional centre ground (Norris and Lovenduski 1997, p.158; Best et al. 2001, p.73; 
Keating and Cairney 2006, pp.43-44; Cairney 2007, pp.213-214). However, it would be 
inaccurate to ignore differences in social and occupational background depending on party; 
despite this convergence of sorts, Labour MPs with professional backgrounds are more 
                                                                                                                                     
for their parliamentary duties. Jennings writes, ‘the ‘bright young men’ who want to ‘go into politics’ 
but ‘have no money’ have to be ‘advised accordingly’ (1957, p58). 
3
 Political writers of a ‘popular’ dint, such as Peter Riddell (1993) or Peter Oborne (2007), have 
written variously about the professionalisation of politics and ‘the triumph of the political class’, 
with academic work remaining largely silent in terms of further developing this ‘instrumental’ 
category. 
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likely to be drawn from the public sector than their Conservative counterparts who are 
more likely to be drawn from the private sector (Rush 1994, p.573; Keating and Cairney 
2006, p.44). Utilising his own terminology, Cairney argues that the Westminster parliament 
has seen a shift from brokerage occupations, which dominated MPs backgrounds directly 
following the war until the mid-1970s, to a group of politicians that is increasingly drawn 
from his instrumental jobs category (Cairney 2007, p.218)4. Earlier studies of the Commons 
by authors such as Colin Mellors add weight to this thesis (1978). Norris and Lovenduski 
describe the rise of the ‘talking professions’ such as law, journalism, teaching and so on 
(1997, p.165; Best et al. 2001, p.77), and existing work looking at both the Labour and 
Conservative parties suggests that local party members may indeed be part of the cause of 
this, with studies suggesting that they are biased against candidates who are manual 
workers (Bochel and Denver 1983; Greenwood 1988). The number of representatives with 
a background in business is also striking, particularly on the Conservative benches, with 
roughly half of post-1997 Conservative MPs having such backgrounds, and even 8% of 
Labour MPs (Best et al. 2001, p.74) These processes of candidate selection will be 
addressed further later in this chapter and the range of empirical data relating to MPs 
backgrounds will be explored in greater detail in chapter two. 
 
As Cairney himself notes, the literature often plays fast and loose with its own terminology, 
with words like ‘professional’ or ‘middle-class’ taking on multiple meanings dependent on 
the source (2007, p.213). To this list could be added ‘career politician’, a term that will be 
considered again in chapter two, used in varying ways by different authors (King 1983; Jun 
2003) However, the broad thrust of the existing work, namely that many MPs have 
increasingly close links to Westminster and national-level political life prior to their election 
is clear, regardless of the terminology that is used to describe it. Given this development, 
and the more recent attention given to the notion of a political class (Cowley 2012), it is in 
many ways counter-productive to focus on occupation as an explanatory tool for these 
phenomena. Instead, the focus should be on political experience, as this is the 
characteristic which seems to be the cause for concern. That is, it is accepted that the 
characteristic binding many leading British politicians is their extensive political experience 
of the full-time paid kind, and their immersion in national-level political life prior to their 
election to the Commons. The opposite of this immersion is not a non-political occupation, 
but a different type of political experience. 
                                               
4
 These phenomena will be tracked statistically in chapter two. 
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Previous research has primarily focused on classifying the jobs that MPs had before they 
were elected to the Commons, and is in this sense largely descriptive. For the most part, 
the research has looked at which prior occupations were most common and has classified 
them in various ways, adjusting only slightly to allow for a distinction between directly 
political roles and those which are simply conducive to the political life. Attempts at 
utilising these categories to explain why they are so common are useful but under-
developed, focusing on non-political resources, such as those identified above – financial 
resources, flexible working hours, and so on. The focus on occupation has obscured the 
prominence of various types of pre-parliamentary political experience present in the 
Commons since 1945. The main types are locally-sourced political experience, primarily 
local council experience, and national-level political experience gained in or around 
Westminster, typified in the instrumental occupations described by Cairney (2007). This 
classification does not account for the broader range of non-occupational political 
experience that aspirant parliamentary candidates are likely to have. Previous approaches 
also obscure the reality of political life. Important as having the time and financial 
resources to pursue a parliamentary seat are, without the necessary political contacts and 
networks, one is unlikely to succeed. This is where political experience is paramount. In the 
next section of this chapter, I will examine these two main variants of political experience, 
with arguments relating to the blurring of occupation and such experience being returned 
to in chapter two. 
 
Patterns of pre-parliamentary political experience 
It is almost a given that political parties in the UK are unlikely to select a parliamentary 
candidate who has shown no previous interest in politics or in their party. As such, it is to 
be expected that large numbers of parliamentary candidates have earned some ‘political 
apprenticeship’ (Ashe et al. 2010, p.458) which they are keen to display to local party 
selectors, something that has led authors to note that ‘structural integration seems more 
and more to be an important prerequisite and an element of a normal political career’ 
(Frankland 1977, p.138; Best et al. 2001, p.80, p.87).Discussing the notion of political career 
paths, and how they can become established within a system, Best et al note: 
 
Both professionalisation and careerisation enable limited 
adaptation to change and a renewal of political personnel, since 
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they lay down a path to office for new contenders and provide 
them with the necessary means to follow it. On the other hand, 
they establish rules and procedures that integrate outsiders into 
the world of insiders and keep out of the game those challengers 
who are unwilling or unable to conform (2001, p.80). 
 
Similarly, Jens Borchert notes how: 
 
Politicians may move from party office to a legislature to a 
government to an interest group. They also move from the local to 
the national level or from the national to the regional. Moreover, 
they do so in patterns that vary systematically between different 
places, patterns that are reproduced through the knowledge of 
actors about the path taken by their predecessors and these and 
other actors' anticipation that established pathways might be a 
good guide for their own career plans (2001, p.1). 
 
Currently, we understand little about how these processes function in the UK. What we do 
know is that they exist, and we know that there have been shifts in the frequency that they 
occur, something inherent in the development of the instrumental category by Cairney as 
discussed above (2007). Research looking at political pipelines is developing in the UK 
(Meryl Kenny 2009; Allen 2013), though it is considerably more developed in the US (Fox 
and Lawless 2004; Lawless and Fox 2005; Lawless 2012). Much existing research into the 
backgrounds of MPs (more often than not a component part of work on political 
recruitment in a broader sense, something to be addressed later in this chapter) has 
focused on occupational or personal background as opposed to political background, 
despite this process of becoming an MP being inherently political and steeped in a tradition 
of gaining political experience. As seen in Cairney’s classification of occupational 
backgrounds, political experience is subsumed into the instrumental category, failing to 
highlight potential differences between different types of political experience. 
 
Building on other recent research (Durose et al. 2011; Allen 2012; Durose et al. 2012), this 
thesis will distinguish between two broad, and dominant, types of political experience, 
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which will be referred to as ‘local’ and ‘national’5. The former is rooted in local political 
experience, for example having a record as an elected councillor. The latter taps into the 
idea of being present on the national political scene prior to election as an MP, working, for 
example, in either party HQ, an MPs office, for a thinktank, or being a special adviser 
(SpAd) before becoming a member of the Commons. These will be briefly addressed in 
turn. The two categories that I focus on also have precedent in the existing literature 
(examined below and in chapter two), allowing any new findings to be contextualised in 
this work. In chapter two I will fully develop the classification of political experience to be 
used in the thesis in the context of political career trajectories, but here I will outline the 
ways in which the local and national traditions of political experience have shifted across 
the post-war period.  
 
Local experience  
Throughout the post-war period, a third of MPs at any time have been local councillors at 
some stage in their political lives (LGA 2008, p.26). In the 2010 parliamentary intake, 41.6% 
of new MPs had local elected experience, compared to 62% in the 1997 intake. This 
suggests firstly that there is a clear link between local and national politics in terms of 
political recruitment, and secondly, prima facie, a trend in decline. This will be discussed in 
greater detail below.  
 
Rush notes how the proportion of Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs with local government 
experience rose throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and how the trend has even taken off 
within the Conservative party, albeit at a lower rate (Rush 1994, p.573; 2001, p.18). It is 
possible to speculate that local elected experience could be a way for individuals to show 
their loyalty to the party (Rush 1994, p.573), and in cases where the local service is in the 
same area of the constituency, a way of showing their loyalty to the local area, or even a 
badge of ‘localism’ (Rush 1969, p79; Childs and Cowley 2011). In terms of candidate 
selection and political recruitment more broadly, the notion of localism is ill-defined, but 
some trends are apparent. The number of MPs and candidates claiming direct local 
connections to their constituency has increased significantly over the past decades (Rush 
                                               
5
 Durose et al. refer to ‘traditional’ and ‘professionalised’ pathways to politics, but the terminology 
used here regards political experience rather than occupational experience, hence I will use the new 
terms ‘local’ and ‘national’. This re-classification will be further discussed in chapter two. 
Additionally, these terms are relatively easy to grasp and are self-explanatory to a certain extent. 
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1994, p.575; Childs and Cowley 2011), as has the proportion of MPs being elected in the 
same region in which they were born (Best et al. 2001, p.86). Whether this is for electoral 
reasons or simply for practical reasons of comfort and ease for candidates is as yet unclear, 
and indeed is something that is worthy of attention in future research. 
 
In spite of the rising value of local connections, it is not the case that being a local 
councillor is considered the gold standard of pre-parliamentary experience. When 
recruiting for the Scottish Parliament, the Labour party actively discouraged a ‘councillor 
takeover’ of the new body (Keating and Cairney 2006, p.50). There appeared to be a 
perception at the top of the party that the candidates who would no doubt be keen to 
make the step up from local to national politics may not be of the standards that they 
desired (Shaw 2001, p.38). There is further evidence in the literature for the idea that the 
local councillor made a second rate politician. At the end of the 1960s Michael Rush found 
that Conservative candidates in seats where they were challengers (as opposed to 
incumbents) were more likely to have local councillors as candidates than the other, 
presumably safer, seats. He also found that local connections and local government 
experience are more likely to be found amongst unsuccessful parliamentary candidates 
than those who do go on to win. 79.4% of candidates selected in challenger seats had local 
connections, compared with 62.8% in incumbent seats, with local government experience 
being the primary basis of this connection (1969, pp.60, 75, 97-98). Again writing about the 
Conservatives, Rush also finds that local government experience was: 
 
Typical of certain types of candidate: more non-graduates than 
graduates, more non-public school than public school candidates, 
more Redbrick than Oxbridge graduates have had local 
government experience. It may be that local government 
experience is regarded as a partial substitute for the social 
background which these candidates lack (1969, p.79). 
 
Research like this suggests that In this case it is local council experience that has both 
positive and negative implications for how an individual fares in comparison to the ideal 
type candidate a party is seeking.6 Such candidates were found to be preferred in Northern 
                                               
6
 This idea is common in the political recruitment literature, with Elizabeth Evans, for example, 
noting that the Liberal Democrat ideal woman candidate is ‘white + no children + graduate+ no 
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constituencies more so than in the South, with Rush arguing that having local government 
experience may result in a candidate being perceived as having a ‘parochial outlook’ and a 
‘lack of wider experience’ (Rush 1969, pp.79-80). Conversely, one instance where it would 
appear that having local government background is a bonus is if seeking selection for a 
marginal seat, be it one already held by the party or not, with 43.4 and 41.6% respectively 
of candidates in these seats having such experience (Rush 1969, p.99). This relationship 
does not appear to be present in the data gathered for analysis in this thesis on the 1997 
general election, however – this will be explored further in chapter five. 
 
Within the Labour party, Rush draws a distinction between candidates sponsored by trade 
unions and those sponsored by Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs), arguing that CLP 
candidates are drawn from a middle-class pool not dissimilar to the Conservative 
candidates whereas union candidates tend to be more working class, and are also more 
likely to have local government experience (1969, p.206). Looking at seats where Labour 
was incumbent, 67.5% of trade union candidates had local government experience 
compared to 39.8% of CLP candidates. In non-incumbent seats, the trend is the same, with 
69.5% of union candidates compared to 46.7% of CLP candidates holding local council 
experience (Rush 1969, p.181). Belchem notes how local government has consistently been 
easier to access for both the working class and women across the last 150 years, citing the 
fact that franchise extension occurred as early as 1869 for both of these groups as part of 
the Municipal Franchise Act, but only in local elections (1990, p.14). Additionally, a higher 
proportion of local councillors across England are women than is the House of Commons 
(Evans and Aston 2011).Reviewing this, it is possible to argue that local councils have the 
potential to act as a springboard into national-level elected politics for a broad range of 
people in terms of class and sex, but that party selection processes mediate this 
springboard effect. In some cases, local experience is valued, in others it is not. The ways 
that processes of candidate selection affect this are discussed below. The possibility of 
broader party type being linked to a party preferring certain types of pre-parliamentary 
political experience is addressed in chapter six, linking the thesis to comparative literature 
in this area. 
                                                                                                                                     
previous experience’ (2009). Such preferences are constantly in flux: for example, the July 2013 
Labour party candidate selection scandal in Falkirk has led some Labour candidates to distance 
themselves from trade unions, announcing themselves as non-union backed candidates (see 
https://twitter.com/SophyRidgeSky/statuses/354552643282145280, last accessed 10-07-2013). 
 37 
 
 
In addition to this formal type of local political experience, it is also likely to be the case 
that almost all MPs who are elected under the banner of a political party will have broader 
experience of local politics akin to that of a typical party member. Amongst other things, 
this could include campaigning for the party, voter canvassing, holding administrative or 
leadership positions within a local party, and being a regular or constant attendee at 
meetings of a local constituency party (Seyd and Whiteley 2004). In terms of the sample of 
MPs studied in this thesis, a large majority of MPs had experience of this kind, and in nearly 
all cases, it overlapped with either elected local council experience, or with national-level 
political experience such as working in or around Westminster. Clearly, local politics, 
particularly of the elected kind, acts a pathway to parliament, and has a key role in the 
recruitment of parliamentary candidates. As outlined in the previous chapter, a core 
concern of this thesis is path dependency; the idea that events that occur at one point of a 
political career can affect outcomes at a later stage. In light of this, it is worth considering 
whether local councils are neutral political recruiters – in other words, are all councillors 
equally disposed to consider running for higher office? 
 
Local government in the United Kingdom – two types of councillor? 
It is worth considering if a two-tier system is set in motion even earlier than the 
parliamentary candidate selection stage (Pitre 2003). The local government reforms 
overseen by the Labour government at the turn of the millennium resulted in an already 
complex system becoming even more so. The adoption of the executive system by large 
numbers of councils in place of the existing committee system has radically changed the 
role of what are now known as ‘backbench’ members. Council work relating to policy and 
delivery is now concentrated in the hands of cabinet members, leaving the new 
backbenchers to focus more on ward-facing work, primarily casework brought to them 
from constituents. There are 22,000 local councillors within the United Kingdom who serve 
terms of four years between elections (Wilson and Game 2006, p.252). The reforms 
enacted by New Labour gave councils four options to choose from when selecting a new 
structure, all of which were designed with the key aim of breaking up the previously 
combined roles of a councillor, representation and policy-making (Wilson and Game 2006). 
David Wilson and Chris Game accordingly refer to the new models offered to councils by 
the government as ‘separate executive’ models (2006, p.102). Overall, 81% of councils 
adopted a model which involved having a Council leader and a supporting cabinet (Wilson 
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and Game 2006, p.111).The majority of councils have split the various policy areas which 
they control into separate and distinct policy portfolios, each of which is held by an 
individual councillor. Complementing this executive function is a mechanism through which 
overview and scrutiny (O&S) can occur. In the initial government documentation relating to 
the reforms, O&S was seen as an area with huge potential, and indeed something that may 
add value to the role of backbench councillor.  
 
Recent work in this area has suggested that these changes to the formal hierarchies of 
councils have not had an impact on the political ambitions of councillors – both backbench 
and frontbench councillors report roughly the same levels of ambition when asked if they 
has considered running for parliamentary office (Allen 2012). Whether this remains the 
case as the reforms embed themselves over time will have to remain to be seen. However, 
what did make a difference to whether or not councillors considered running for higher 
office was whether or not they received encouragement from other political figures or 
friends and family, with the encouragement of a sitting MP and party officials having 
particular influence on a decision (Allen 2013). Such findings relate to the central research 
questions of the thesis in two ways. Firstly, they suggest that local councils are not neutral 
political recruitment venues, raising the possibility that this is also the case for other sites 
of recruitment, something that has representative repercussions regarding access to 
political office at all levels. Secondly, it reinforces the rationale for the thesis by 
foregrounding the ways in which different factors, such as sex, or broader political activity, 
can affect outcomes at a later stage in a career.  
 
National, Westminster-based experience 
The increasing trend for MPs to have previously worked in ‘instrumental’ occupations is 
noted across the literature. More and more new MPs at some stage worked within their 
party, either within parliament itself, or elsewhere within the national-level professional 
political machinery (Rush 1994, p.574). These intra-party networks, however, are relatively 
under researched. Although not a new phenomenon there has been a steady increase in 
recent years. For example, in the 2010 Labour intake, 34% had professional experience in 
politics (precisely what this categorisation entails is unclear) (Durose et al. 2012). 
 
Rush notes that the Conservatives have a longer history of party insiders becoming MPs 
than does the Labour party (1994, p.574), but in the wake of the 2010 Labour leadership 
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contest, it is clear that the party no longer lags far behind the Conservatives. A majority of 
the leadership contenders for the 2010 leadership selection contest held past experience 
as ministerial aides and advisors. Indeed, the three current leaders of the main political 
parties in the UK have all gained national-level pre-parliamentary political experience at 
some stage – Nick Clegg in Brussels as an MEP, David Cameron in Conservative Central 
Office and as a SpAd, and Ed Miliband in the office of then Chancellor Gordon Brown 
(Cowley 2012).  
 
However, despite the increase in the visibility of this type of pre-parliamentary political 
experience, it is not dominant. Phillip Cowley writes, ‘for sure, this leaves a majority of MPs 
who enter the Commons without such experience, but it creates the potential for a two-
track career path, with accelerated promotion for those with significant pre-Westminster 
experience and perhaps a slower route for those without’ (Cowley 2012, p.36). This second 
point from Cowley considers that this type of political experience may have knock-on 
effects when it comes to intra-parliamentary promotions. This is a development on other 
work which considers this insider, or professionalised, route solely in terms of political 
recruitment (Durose et al. 2012). Cowley’s suggestion is that although this group is not 
numerically large within the Commons overall, they may have particularly good access to 
higher-level positions. That is, their pre-parliamentary political experience is their passport 
to the frontbench7. An interesting question this raises relates to whether this increase then 
becomes self-fulfilling – aspirant politicians take note of who makes it to the top and who 
does not and then act accordingly, creating a feedback loop within this model of supply and 
demand (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). One of the key differentials between young, part-
time local councillors and those individuals who work full-time in an instrumental political 
role is that for the latter, politics is their profession, they are professionally political if not 
actually professional politicians, and indeed this could lead to a more rapid appreciation of 
their opportunities for ascension, with their ‘professionalism breeding careerism’ (Borchert 
2001, p.3). Such research is beyond the scope of this thesis, but this ‘chicken or egg’ 
question is something to be considered in future. 
                                               
7
 Durose et al.’s discussion of this type of experience (2012) is weakened by their assertion that this 
professionalised pathway to parliament ‘relies on less political experience’ (2012, p14). Presumably, 
they mean less elected experience. To term a route to parliament which involves working 
professionally in national-level politics as lacking in political experience is to belie the overt political-
ness of it. 
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One of the drivers of change is the increase in the numbers of staff employed by political 
parties. This has resulted in a blurring of the distinction between pre-political experience in 
the traditional ‘extra-curricular’ sense as a local councillor or party helper, and seen a move 
towards people obtaining political experience as part of their main employment. Indeed, it 
is common to see aspirant candidates holding a combination of all of these things.  Justin 
Fisher and Paul Webb (2003; 2003) conducted both quantitative and qualitative studies of 
Labour party employees based both at Millbank (the party headquarters in London) and 
other employees based around the country. Their research focuses on the role, attitudes 
and degree of professionalisation seen amongst the party staff in the context of their 
increasing prominence and importance (Webb and Fisher 2003, p.10). In terms of general 
characteristics, the authors find that Labour employees are well balanced in terms of sex, 
are generally middle-class (56%), are very well-educated with only 9% of respondents 
lacking a degree or vocational qualification, are mostly white and overwhelmingly likely to 
have union membership (Webb and Fisher 2003, pp.14-15). Utilising existing work to 
provide comparator groups for the data, Webb and Fisher find that party employees are 
substantially different to both party members more broadly and the electorate, whilst at 
the same time being similar to Labour MPs in terms of education and class (2003, pp.14-
15).  
 
Addressing the question of political ambition amongst party employees, Webb and Fisher 
find that 20% of employees plan to seek adoption as prospective parliamentary candidates 
in future, and a further 11% plan to mount a candidacy for a seat in the European 
parliament (2003, p.16). It is possible to speculate that party employment offers experience 
related to both the formal and informal workings and contacts of political life from a 
partisan perspective, and anecdotal evidence suggests that party employees network 
amongst themselves on a regular basis both in and outside of work hours, networks 
formalised in the Labour Staff Network, the Conservative Staff Group and Liberal Democrat 
Staff Group8. The question of institutionalisation can be raised here – to what extent does 
working in such an environment affect the political beliefs or outlook of an aspirant MP? In 
his diaries, discussing such political insiders, Chris Mullin writes, ‘most have never, nor will 
they ever (in public at least), ask a question that betrays even a hint of scepticism about the 
official version of events’ (Mullin 2011, p.13). There is a perception, made clear here, that 
                                               
8
 http://www.w4mp.org/html/personnel/represent.asp 
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such individuals, once elected, are likely to be party loyalists, again facilitating their fast 
promotion onto the frontbenches (Cowley 2012). 
 
Scotland and Wales – similar trends? 
The devolved legislatures are not part of the main focus of this thesis, but they do provide 
an interesting case study in the sense that they are geographically close to Westminster, 
but have a lifespan that is minute in comparison. Keating and Cairney, looking at the 
composition of political elites in devolved Scotland, found that rather than pave the way for 
a new politics with wider representativeness, devolution actually seems to have sped up 
the trend towards professionalisation, with more Members of the Scottish Parliament 
(MSPs) being of a professional, middle-class background than the Scottish MPs who 
represent the same areas at Westminster, and indeed more than the non-Scottish MPs at 
Westminster (2006). The Scottish Parliament also has more women MSPs than 
Westminster does women MPs, but interestingly the women MSPs are proportionately 
more likely to be from a professional background than their male colleagues (Keating and 
Cairney 2006, pp.51-52). This again raises the question of how different pathways to 
parliament work for different groups of people. Overall, the experience of the new 
parliament in Scotland suggests that these trends towards political professionalisation, and 
the holding of national-level political experience prior to election, are not simply a product 
of the Westminster bubble.  
 
Summary – a convergence of political and occupational? 
As seen above, it can be argued that changes in the nature of British politics, with the hiring 
of more staff by MPs, political parties, and the growth of a political industry of think tanks 
and NGOs has led to a greater possibility of unelected full-time paid employment in 
political work.9 For a number of MPs, these are now the same thing. It was demonstrated 
above that existing classifications of MPs’ pre-parliamentary experience focused on their 
occupational backgrounds, with political experience being considered as a sub-section of 
                                               
9
 The 1990s saw a growth in the policy advocacy role of UK NGOS, as they ‘became increasingly 
involved in…policy work to influence the behavior [sic] and policies ofconsumers, corporations, 
governments and international organizations’ (Hudson, 2002, p.402). See Hudson, Alan (2002), 
‘Advocacy by UK-Based Development NGOs’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 31, pp. 402-
418. The growth of the political arms of such organisations saw a growth in engagement with 
national governments and departments. 
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this (Cairney 2007). Other work has also noted the rise in the number of MPs with political 
backgrounds termed ‘professional’ (Durose et al. 2011; Durose et al. 2012). However, in an 
argument that will be further developed in chapter two, I instead contend that this existing 
classification fails to highlight the more complex reality of pre-parliamentary political 
experience. Firstly, placing various types of political experience into the instrumental 
category makes a tacit assumption that they of equal utility in a political career, or at least 
are, de facto, the same in some way. Secondly, it also fails to combine like with like - as 
discussed above, MPs having political experience is not a new phenomenon, with local 
government experience in particular having a long history in the House of Commons. As 
such, the rise of national-level political experience of a professional nature is a change in 
political experience, not solely in occupational backgrounds. In this vein, in chapter two and 
the thesis as a whole, I make the argument that political experience needs to be considered 
as a stand-alone category in analytical terms. 
 
The existing work that has been outlined above is firmly interested in the question of 
where MPs come from, not whether this then has an effect on what they do following their 
election. As a result of this focus, it does not address the question of whether the pre-
parliamentary political experience it tracks might affect political careers. I take this 
question as the focus of the thesis, developing and contributing this existing literature. In 
the next section of this literature review, I look at how political experience has an impact 
on the candidate selection processes of the three main British political parties, and will 
highlight the opportunities and constraints that having certain types of experience places 
on aspirant candidates. Prior to asking what happens once MPs are elected, I instead look 
at the process by which they get there – what do the parties want and what do candidates 
with certain types of political experience offer? 
 
By what process do individuals become MPs? 
Political parties are the gatekeepers of political office, controlling selection for candidacy 
for the House of Commons. The UK Government is made up Ministers and Secretaries of 
State drawn almost entirely from the House of Commons, with only a small number coming 
from the House of Lords (Rush, 1994, p.567). Promotion to government positions is 
controlled by the leadership of the governing party, and reflects the dominant role of 
political parties within the political career of any MP, or indeed any individual seeking any 
political office (Rush, 1994, p.568-9). Thus, if you want to be a government minister, and 
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are prepared to work to get there, the first thing to do, to quote Rush, is to ‘pick your party’ 
(1994).  
 
This section will focus on the candidate selection processes employed by the three main 
parties in British politics; the Labour party, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats10. 
Of interest to this thesis is how these processes interact with political experience. Do some 
parties prefer local experience, whilst others prefer national? Does the electoral strategy of 
the party depend on the political experience of the candidate they select? This section will 
consider the three main parties in turn before providing a summary of the similarities and 
differences between them. 
 
Understanding candidate selection: the theory of supply and demand 
The challenge of explaining the high levels of homogeneity across parliamentarians has 
been taken up by a number of authors, mostly looking specifically at the low numbers of 
women in parliament. The dominant explanation is that of supply and demand, elaborated 
by Norris and Lovenduski in Political Recruitment (1995).  
 
Norris and Lovenduski propose using the supply and demand model, more commonly seen 
in economics when describing the workings of markets, to help explain the 
underrepresentation of women, and other underrepresented groups of society, in politics 
(1995, pp.14-15). In other words, it allows an analysis of why parties select the candidates 
they do. The model assumes that there are two sets of processes that can explain the 
eventual outcome of the candidate selection process, those of supply or demand. The 
demand explanation assumes that selectors will base their decision about an aspirant 
based on the limited information they receive about them personally (such as a CV and/or 
a brief meeting) but then additionally on their perceptions about them, perceptions often 
based on wider stereotypes regarding the group from which they are drawn, be it white 
men, black women, their views of what characteristics an MP should have, and so on  
(Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p.14). The authors distinguish between direct and imputed 
discrimination, different ways of being either for or against something. Direct 
discrimination is defined as the ‘positive or negative judgement of people on the basis of 
                                               
10
 Although not unheard of, Independent MPs are rare in the UK Parliament, with political parties  
functioning as the primary vehicle through which candidates are selected and then elected as MPs, a 
system that has been in place since at least as early as the eighteenth century (Best et al 2001, p.69). 
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characteristics seen as common to their group, rather than as individuals’ (Norris and 
Lovenduski 1995, p.14). Imputed discrimination is seen in cases when selectors themselves 
claim to support an aspirant but couldn’t select them because, for example, the electorate 
wouldn’t vote for them. The demand-side explanation of women’s underrepresentation 
posits that the make-up of parliament is as a result of these two types of discrimination 
being at work in the candidate selection process (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, pp.14-15). 
 
The supply argument adopts a different approach, positing that ‘outcome reflects the 
supply of applicants wishing to pursue a political career’ (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995, p.15). 
This places the onus more on the underrepresented group, as such, when trying to explain 
their underrepresentation. It is not, however, quite as simple as this. It is feasible that there 
exists a feedback loop of sorts resulting in women, for example, not coming forward to run 
for political office because there are not many women at the top of politics, creating an 
impression that women cannot succeed in politics (Norris & Lovenduski, 1995, p.15). It is 
clear that the two factors interact.  
 
A supply and demand explanation can be utilised to consider the ways in which parties may 
prefer candidates with certain types of pre-parliamentary political experience. These ideas 
can also be applied to characteristics that are not inherent like gender; for example, parties 
may desire local candidates ahead of those who are not from or linked to the area. Parties 
may prefer candidates of a certain age, candidates who hold certain views or sit within 
certain factions of the party, and so on.11 As noted above, the Labour party was slow to 
select large numbers of candidates with local council backgrounds around the time of the 
first elections to the Scottish parliament  - that is, the party had low demand for such 
candidates (Keating and Cairney 2006). 
 
The nature of the institutional structure surrounding aspirant politicians in terms of 
candidate selection processes can be viewed through an explicitly institutional lens, in both 
formal and informal senses of the word (Cheng and Tavits 2011). Taking its cue from 
historical institutionalism more broadly, this thesis is interested in looking at path 
dependencies in political careers, asking ‘who wins, who loses and why?’ (Steinmo 2001, 
                                               
11
 The supply and demand model is not without its critics. Krook outlines three key criticisms of the 
model prior to suggesting that there is a step forward to be made if feminist scholars look towards 
an institutionalist approach for pointers (2009, p.4). 
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p.3). Conversely, following the work of rational choice institutionalists, the thesis is also 
interested in whether the early stages of the process we will refer to as a political career 
‘sets the pace’ for the latter stages (Pitre 2003). In many ways, an institutionalist approach 
is useful for this thesis. Jeanette Ashe et al point out how the idea of a political 
apprenticeship is a clear example of a practical institution, noting its role as an ‘important, 
albeit not always necessary, pre-requisite for candidates, especially those seeking selection 
in a party’s best seats’ (2010, p.458). This places the notion of a political apprenticeship 
within an institutionalist analysis of candidate selection processes, utilising Steinmo’s 
assertion that institutions will ‘influence what these actors believe to be both possible and 
desirable’ (2001, p.1). 
 
Candidate selection in the Conservative Party 
The process of becoming a parliamentary candidate for the Conservatives has been 
reformed fairly extensively in recent years, particularly following the victory of David 
Cameron in the 2005 leadership contest and this has resulted in a renewed scholarly 
interest in the process (McIlveen 2009; Childs and Webb 2012; Hill 2013). The direction of 
recent reforms within the party have broadly seen an increased influence of the central 
party apparatus on candidate selection at a local level, although the final decision on 
candidate selection still remains very much that of the local association (Childs and Webb 
2012, pp.85-86).  
 
The recent attempts to reform candidate selection within the Conservative party highlight 
the tensions between the central and local party that are present within such processes, as 
well as underlining the role that political experience plays in this process. Indeed, it is clear 
that different types of political experience are preferred by different sections of the party. 
Cameron’s primary rationale for reforming candidate selection processes was that 
increased diversity would be electorally beneficial for the party. In his acceptance speech 
directly after he won leadership of the party, he declared that he wanted a more 
representative parliamentary party and to put an end to low numbers of elected 
Conservative women, a phenomenon he dubbed ‘scandalous’ (Childs and Webb 2012, 
p.63). The reforms can be seen as a compromise of sorts, with the central party stopping 
short of imposing certain candidates on local parties but still shaping the nature of the 
selection process to assist their preferred candidates in many ways. Sarah Childs and Paul 
Webb argue that the Cameron reforms can be seen as attempts to create a demand for 
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women candidates (amongst other traditionally-underrepresented groups) and at the same 
time, change the selectorate itself, mostly by opening it beyond the traditional participants, 
a double-whammy movement of sorts. There has also been a distinct lack of working-class 
Conservative MPs over the years. Michael Hill posits that ‘the main obstacle to selecting 
working-class candidates lay with the individual constituency associations, who were still 
reluctant to choose candidates who were not from a middle-class, professional 
background’ (2013, p.81). In other words, there was little demand for candidates that did 
not fit the bill, which itself was decided on by constituency associations. 
 
A ‘Priority List’ of candidates was assembled by central office, purporting to contain the top 
50 men and women candidates, and it was expected that constituency associations would 
select their candidates from this list, thought this was not compulsory (McIlveen 2009; 
Childs and Webb 2012, p.76; Hill 2013). In addition to this was a rule that required, at each 
stage of the selection process, 50% or more of those listed to be women, as well as the 
inclusion of central office in the process of ‘sifting’ through applications to be put forward 
for shortlisting (Childs and Webb 2012, p.76). Childs and Webb argue that this strategy, 
which saw the ‘best’ women candidates going before local selectorates, left the latter in a 
situation where they would find it extremely hard to not select them (Childs and Webb 
2012, pp.76-77).  
 
The mechanics of the process have also been changed, with candidates now having to 
focus less on a heavily-weighted speech to the local party, with this instead making way for 
an approach based more on a series of questions and answers. Alongside these subtle 
measures promoting equality of selection are more braggadocio ones such as the screening 
of a DVD prior to selection meetings which emphasises the importance of descriptive 
representation to the future of the party (Childs and Webb 2012, p.76). Finally, the 
selectorates themselves have also been changed, with open primaries and community 
panels being utilised in some seats to broaden the field of those actually selecting the 
candidates. The assumption is that the general public are less averse to the idea of women 
politicians than party activists (Childs and Webb 2012, pp.78-79). However, it is still 
possible for a local executive committee to avoid the above and revert to old models of 
selection, but only if they choose an all-women shortlist to select their candidate from. 
Arguably the influence of the central party is felt no matter which way the local parties 
move.  
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Childs and Webb note that one unintended consequence of the moves towards a process 
of candidate selection that promotes the selection of women is the rise of the oppositional 
‘local man’: 
 
Candidate selection is a prized benefit of party membership and 
Cameron’s efforts looked to be perceived on the ground as 
unwarranted central intervention underpinned by political 
correctness. Critics contended that it was evidence that Cameron 
spent too much time in West London, a euphemism for 
metropolitanism. The Priority List, in particular, generated intra-party 
antipathy at best, if not outright hostility. ‘Good men’ were said to 
have been left off the list in order to make place for ‘less good’ women 
(Childs and Webb 2012, pp.79-82). 
 
Speaking to wider debates, relevant to this thesis, of localism and the role of the local in 
candidate selection (as well as British politics more broadly), this interaction between 
issues of competing claims for representation, equality, and ‘localness’ are of great 
significance. Amongst other things, this preference for ‘local’ candidates will privilege 
political experience gained on the local level over that gained nationally, in theory making it 
harder for those individuals who have worked in or around Westminster to be selected. It is 
feasible that those seats which are more likely to remain Conservative at future elections, 
safe seats, will be even more closely guarded by their constituency association members.  
 
If women, or individuals drawn from other societal groups, are more likely to have certain 
types of political experience than men, and certain types of political experience are 
privileged by the process of candidate selection, this too will affect both supply and 
demand factors. It is possible to speculate, for example, that political experience of certain 
types will be correlated with candidates being either younger or older than their 
colleagues, namely candidates who have national-level political experience. Within the 
Conservative party, the reforms described above caused resistance in other forms, with 
some warning against ‘a cult of youth’ (Hill 2013, p.85). In this way, political experience 
may be related to other factors which will influence the decisions of selectors. It is clear 
that political experience has a role to play in candidate selection in the Conservative party.  
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Candidate Selection in the Labour Party 
Candidate selection in the Labour party is best characterised as even more locally-focused, 
and potentially more fractious, than within the Conservative party. The process begins and 
ends at the local level, in contrast to the arguably more centralised operation within the 
Conservative party, something established early on by the National Executive of the party 
(Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Shaw 2001). The procedure was not questioned until intra-
party conflict between the left and the more centrist figures led to a campaign forcing all 
sitting MPs to face mandatory reselection should they wish to stand again in the seat they 
currently occupied (Shaw 2001, p.36). Following this development, there was a fear that 
MPs would be in thrall to the small numbers of activists within their constituency who 
would have the power to reselect them. As such, moves were successfully made to 
implement ‘one member one vote’ (OMOV) which resulted in the entire membership 
within a constituency having the right to vote to select a candidate. Shaw notes that the 
above developments may have shifted power to the grassroots, but the NEC 
simultaneously gained almost total power over the selection of by-election candidates 
(2001, p.37). Following the 1997 election, a powerful and confident Tony Blair was keen to 
re-examine candidate selection more broadly as part of the process of devising guidelines 
for selecting candidates for the new Scottish and Welsh devolved bodies as well as for the 
London mayoral and assembly positions. Shaw posits that there were two key goals of the 
changes; the first, to increase the diversity of Labour’s parliamentary candidates in terms of 
sex and ethnicity, and the second to increase their ‘quality’, evidently a more subjective 
goal than the first (2001, p.46). Particularly in the devolved bodies, there was a fear that 
long-term established local favourites may get the nod ahead of candidates who the party 
leadership deemed more appropriate and more qualified (Shaw, 2001, p.38). This raises a 
more normative question not considered fully in this thesis, whether or not a trend of local 
candidates becoming MPs is inherently a good thing or not, either in terms of the ‘quality’ 
of MP, or in the pursuit of an increased diversity of representation (Childs and Cowley 
2011).  
 
The action of most relevance here was the establishment of a vetted parliamentary panel 
established by the NEC, a step previously not taken.  Previously, there existed four lists, 
known as the A, B, C and D lists, which were maintained by unions, constituencies, the 
Cooperative party and the women’s list (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). According to the 
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Labour party rulebook, constituencies and affiliated organisations can still recommend 
candidates who will be automatically included on the list, but these candidates must have 
met certain criteria which will have been established between the organisation in question 
and the NEC (Labour Party 2008, p.30). This centralisation represents a desire on the part 
of the New Labour establishment to exert more control over the candidate selection 
process, and ultimately the type of MPs they will have at Westminster. Union sponsorship 
is a trend that has decreased within the party, but is still present in some form. Rush 
identifies how there has been a shift within the nature of union sponsorship, with 
sponsored candidates changing over time from being manual workers and ‘shopfloor’ 
candidates to a position of unions sponsoring individuals without direct industrial 
experience, namely lawyers, journalists and so on (1994, p.574). 
 
As with the Conservative party, candidate selection is a contested element of the political 
life of the Labour party. In terms of political experience, it is clear that having local 
experience will be potentially useful in gaining selection as a prospective parliamentary 
candidate, but equally that the role of national-level political influences will also be felt in 
this process, giving those individuals with national-level experience an opportunity to 
deploy their resources in the process. Around the time of the OMOV debate, and in the 
decade or so that followed, the varying political preferences of different sections of the 
party resulted in similarly varying preferences for candidates. As with the Conservative 
party, it is likely that certain types of political experience were more welcome than others, 
with national-level experience, gained as part of the central party apparatus, potentially 
treated with greater suspicion by CLPs keen to assert their autonomy.  
 
Candidate selection in the Liberal Democrats 
The Liberal Democrats have become of increasing interest to political scientists since the 
1990s as their vote share has increased and entrenched them as key players in 
Westminster politics (Evans 2008, p.591). Indeed, the Liberal Democrats currently occupy 
the seat of government in coalition with the Conservatives, and as such, the party is now of 
more interest than it has been for almost a century before. The candidate selection process 
of the Liberal Democrats is very much a local one, with little interference from the central 
party at Cowley Street, and local also in the sense that only members living within a 
constituency can take part in the selection vote (Evans 2008, p.591). However, like Labour 
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and the Conservatives, the party operates a centralised list of approved candidates (Evans 
2008, pp.594-595).  
 
An example of the central party’s reluctance to interfere with candidate selection 
processes is the non-pursuit of action that may result in an increased number of women 
being selected to stand for election. Indeed research has shown how the Liberal Democrats 
consistently perform badly in terms of increasing the numbers of women in their 
parliamentary ranks (Evans 2008, p.590). Elizabeth Evans utilises Norris and Lovenduski’s 
supply and demand model to analyse the possible reasons for this. She concludes that 
there is a clear demand-side problem, although acknowledges that there is a potential 
supply-side problem in terms of the lack of diversity amongst those women coming 
forward as candidates, namely that women without children are disproportionately 
overrepresented (2008, p.600, p.604). One of the key issues identified in her analysis is that 
the party seemed unwilling to select women in winnable seats, and have even gone to the 
lengths of manipulating seat classification in order to create the impression that they had 
actually done the opposite (2008, p.598; Harrison 2009, p.38). The party also appear 
resistant to any sort of positive action, namely gender quotas as seen in the Labour party 
with all-women shortlists. Arguably, there is an inherent tension between the ideological 
tenets of liberalism and the notion of preferential treatment for one type of person present 
in a sex quota (Evans 2008, pp.601-602). Lisa Harrison, who similarly utilises the supply and 
demand model to analyse the selection process of the Liberal Democrats, suggests that the 
party are more comfortable with ‘facilitating’ steps towards an increase in women MPs 
than ‘parity’ steps (2009, p.37).  
 
Another key factor in the party noted by both Evans as well as Harrison is the Liberal 
Democrat desire to take advantage of localism by embedding a candidate, who will often 
be full-time, into the public life of an area for a significant amount of time prior to an 
election (Evans 2008, p.594). There is a potential for such a desire on the part of the party 
to damage the chances of women candidates who may have other commitments, or who 
may not be in a financial position to suspend working in order to campaign. Conversely, it 
could also be argued that the desire for localism, and a local figure, combined with high 
numbers of Liberal Democrat women councillors, makes these councillors obvious potential 
candidates. Why this is not happening is open to debate. Evans, combining statistical 
analysis with semi-structured interviews, noted a strong masculine ethos that is embedded 
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into the core of the party, a potential cause of this (2008, p.600). This can be related to the 
idea that if certain types of political experience are privileged by local party organisations, 
this will benefit those individuals who have best access to these types of experience. As 
already noted, recent research has highlighted the ways in which local council experience is 
not a neutral political recruitment vehicle, with certain groups of councillors more likely to 
use it as a political springboard than others (Allen 2012, 2013).  
 
Similarities across the three main parties 
Despite their differences, there are clear points of similarity in the candidate selection 
processes of the three main parties. There is a key role for sub-national party organisations 
within each party in the process of candidate selection, something that could perhaps be 
described as the ‘pay off’ that central parties have to submit to in order to maintain 
effective local parties (Best et al. 2001, p.70). The nature of a political party, particularly in 
terms of structure, is likely to affect the relative importance of different types of pre-
parliamentary political experience to the party. That is, certain parties will value certain 
types of experience over others. This relationship between political party type and political 
experience will be explored in greater depth in chapter six. 
 
Clearly, the presence of local-central tension will affect the nature of the candidate 
selection, what it means to the parties involved, and the candidates selected by it. As Childs 
and Webb note, the selection itself can grow beyond its usual purpose, becoming a site of 
the contestation of power between various factions of a political party (2012). Questions 
relevant to this thesis spring from these speculations. If constituency parties are indeed 
focusing on the selection of local candidates (possibly local men) as a rebuttal of sorts to 
the perceived interference of central party organisations in the selection process, they are 
likely to pick candidates with impeccable local credentials – local councillors, perhaps, and 
if not councillors, then certainly individuals rooted in the community in some obvious way 
(see Childs and Cowley, 2011 for discussions of localism). They are likely to pick candidates 
who could be seen as having loyalties to the constituency as opposed to the central party, 
something that is an opposite of sorts to the situation for candidates with extensive 
experience at the central party or Westminster level.  
 
Conversely, however, a job within the Westminster bubble of national-level politics, 
particularly for a political party, offers an individual access to useful networks of 
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information and contacts that can be used both before and after any possible election to 
parliament (Rush 1994, p.573; Jun 2003, p.172). Proprietary information relating to the 
future availability of a prized safe seat would be one possible example of the benefits of 
being a part of such a network, in addition to having a high-profile party figure lobbying the 
local party on behalf of a prospective candidate (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p.60). These 
issues will be considered in greater depth in chapter two, and throughout the thesis as a 
whole.  
 
What is made clear above is that pre-parliamentary  political experience of different kinds 
has a role in the candidate selection processes of the main three parties in Britain. 
Although this role is not formalised, it has the potential for great influence, particularly at 
times when candidate selection processes become the political footballs of intra-party 
conflict. Having established both who MPs are and how they get there, I now turn to the 
final of the three questions posed at the opening of the chapter, what do MPs do once 
elected? 
 
What do MPs do? 
Although getting elected is tough, what comes after is in many ways even more complex. 
The role of an MP is multi-faceted, initially on a simple Westminster versus constituency 
basis, but then in a far more complex way within parliament, and there exists no formal job 
description (Norton 1994, p.705). The distinction of constituency versus Westminster 
service, and the dual nature of the role of MP, is made across the relevant literature, and 
perhaps offers a useful starting point. One significant trend that has developed hugely since 
the war, and particularly notably in the electronic era, has been the amount of time that 
MPs devote to constituency matters (Buck and Cain 1990; Rush 1994, p.578). The increase 
in the amount of time, effort and resources that MPs are spending on dealing with 
constituency matters, specifically casework, both physically within the constituency and at 
Westminster, increasingly through online channels such as email and even Twitter, is 
acknowledged in the literature (Gay 2005; Ward and Lusoli 2005; Norton 2007; Gibson, 
Lusoli, and Ward 2008; Jackson and Lilleker 2011). In this section of the chapter, I briefly 
outline the roles of a backbench and frontbench MP respectively before considering the 
implications of this for the subject of the thesis, political experience.  
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Focus on the constituency is particularly stark for backbench MPs, those without 
frontbench responsibilities within their parties. Oonah Gay offers a concise analysis of both 
the symptoms and the causes of this phenomenon, the core element of her argument that 
such a trend suits the government as it results in less time being available for MPs to ‘make 
a nuisance’ of themselves (2005, p.57). Additionally, it provides the government with an 
direct contact line to the country at large in the shape of their own MPs (2005, p.58). 
Constituency surgeries are a long established part of the life of an MP and date from the 
1960s. The sheer volume of constituent-representative communication has increased 
hugely in the same time, though, requiring MPs to make the best use of new resources 
made available to them in order to deal with it. Such resources include parliamentary 
money and new technology including email and constituency databases (Gay 2005, pp.58-
59, pp.62-63). Asking what has driven such an increase, Gay posits that an increasingly 
aware and educated electorate who are aware of their ability to challenge official decisions 
are driving the process, as well as a belief on the part of MPs that focusing on local issues 
will benefit them when seeking re-election. This a belief particularly held in seats that 
reflect the wider decline of the two-party system, a belief previously held far more strongly 
in the United States and also known as the incumbency effect (Carson, Engstrom, and 
Roberts 2007), but something that has also been considered in the British case previously 
(Gaines 1998; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005). This links in to the notion of an MP as a 
local campaigner, with the Labour party even going as far as to introduce targets related to 
this, asking their MPs to contact over 100 voters per week as part of a continuing local 
strategy (Gay 2005, p.63). With parliamentary money being made available to MPs with 
which they are meant to inform their constituents of their work, there is a thin line 
between doing this and actually campaigning, perhaps increasing the potential for an 
incumbency effect to have influence (Gay 2005, p.64). Gay highlights a tension within the 
role of an MP between the need to address the issues and concerns of constituents and the 
constituency as a whole, and the duties of scrutiny that they are expected to fulfil at 
Westminster, a restatement of the classic Burkean tension inherent in the act of 
representation (2005, p.65). It would seem to be a basic distinction, perhaps too simplistic, 
but the possibility of there being a fluctuation in the time and effort devoted to each does 
seem to be grounded in fact.  
 
Donald Searing offers a fine-grained analysis of the role of the constituency MP. He 
identifies two sub-sets of the ‘constituency member’ role (Searing 1985, p.355); the 
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‘welfare officer’ and the ‘local promoter’. The former focuses on individual-level 
constituency issues, generally from individual constituents. These could include housing 
issues, problems relating to various aspects of the welfare state, or simply other personal 
issues (Searing 1985, pp.357-358). The local promoter is less likely to focus on being a 
micro-level problem solver and instead devote their time to focus on the more collective 
needs and interests of the constituency as they see them (Searing 1985, pp.359-360). 
Searing is clear that these categories are in no way mutually exclusive, and many MPs who 
are classified as one hold a number of attributes of the other. He is also able to draw a 
distinction here in the activities of these two ‘real types’ of constituency member (Searing 
1985, p.352). He highlights how welfare officer constituency members are more likely to 
discuss their constituency activity in terms of constituency surgeries where constituents 
can speak to them, or even mobile surgeries in different areas of the constituency, both on 
a more formal level and also an informal level, for example seeking out constituents with 
problems in local pubs and clubs (1985, pp.357-358). A key distinction between welfare 
officers and local promoters is the tendency for the former to address problems 
themselves that the latter would most likely refer to local government (1985, p.358). Some 
welfare officer constituency members may even stretch their brief to include dealing with 
some constituents personal issues that may be considered outside of the purview of an 
MP’s role, traditionally perceived, with Searing describing one MP who made regular visits 
to a woman in his constituency who had tried to commit suicide previously (1985, p.358). 
 
Conversely, local promoters discuss their role as constituency members more in terms of 
visiting local business and industry, hospitals, schools and so on than they are to talk about 
constituency surgeries (1985, p.359). One local promoter constituency member 
interviewed by Searing described his role as tantamount to being a ‘catalyst’ within his 
constituency, ensuring the harmonious functioning of the composite parts. Other 
frequently mentioned aspects of this role included having an influence on planning 
applications, town centre rejuvenation, for example, and also influencing other investment 
in services such as roads (Searing 1985, p.359-360).12 
                                               
12
 Searing goes on to discuss how these roles impact on ‘behaviour’ . He does this by analysing time 
spent by each MP in the constituency (more for ‘constituency members’ than MPs who do not fit 
this ‘real type’), cross-voting behaviour, namely voting against the party whip (there is not much of 
interest here, but Conservative ‘constituency members’ are found to be more likely to vote against 
the party whip than their Labour counterparts) . 
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This analysis fails to separate, or take into account, certain factors. There doesn’t appear to 
be a recognition that the progression into these roles in the first instance may be of huge 
interest. This could be accounted for simply by understanding that parliament at the time 
was essentially homogenous, composed of white men. As such, a party analysis could be 
used as a crude class division (Labour as working class and Conservative as more middle 
and upper), and indeed this perception is hinted at when discussing possible reasons for 
the phenomena identified in the piece (Searing 1985, pp.371-372). 
 
The salient point here is that in many ways, particularly for the political parties, all things 
local (i.e. good local contacts, a local profile, local knowledge) are good things. Thus, it 
stands to reason that local councillors becoming MPs, from this starting point, is also a 
good thing for political parties. Whether or not this is the case isn’t the research question 
of this thesis, interesting though it may be, and of more interest here is whether parties 
take advantage of the fact that many MPs have been local councillors by getting them to 
focus primarily on this type of localised activity once an MP at Westminster. That is, do 
they carry on the work of being a local councillor from an office in London? Or are MPs 
with local council backgrounds simply more likely to focus on constituency matters than 
their colleagues who ascended to their seat through central party roles, and who may 
already be used to the glitz and glamour of ministerial-level political life.  
 
Frontbench career paths in the Commons 
For those MPs who make it beyond the backbenches, there lies the prospect of a 
frontbench position. It is no surprise that there exists an established body of literature 
which looks at the role and formation of the executive within the House of Commons, with 
such a subject providing great fodder for academic and popular writers alike. Of key 
interest to my own research are those studies which address the recruitment and 
composition of the executive and/or the frontbench in addition to any which consider 
career progression in the broader sense13. 
                                               
13
 This thesis will not consider select committee careers in its analysis. In 1997, select committees 
were yet to take on the powers they currently hold, and as such, they were not seen as a vehicle for 
a parliamentary career, although this changed over the next thirteen years (Benton and Russell, 
2012). To track these changes as part of the thesis would result in such an analysis of backbench 
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The latter are particularly few and far between. Of note are E. Gene Frankland’s 1977 
comparative study of career progression in both the UK and West Germany (Frankland 
1977) and Mellors’ socio-economic study of the Commons (1978). Of those studies which 
focus on Cabinet and executive formation, two recent studies by Samuel Berlinski, Torun 
Dewan, and Keith Dowding (Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2007, 2012) provide, in both a 
comparative and UK-only format, a closer look at the nature and duration of cabinet 
careers whilst incorporating some aspects of more holistic career studies, such as 
Frankland’s (1977). To clarify, I would class a holistic career study as one which looks at the 
ways in which individuals move through different levels and locations of an institution(s) 
whilst assessing how these interlink. In contrast, a focused study is interested in a specific 
role, job, or position within an institution, such as the cabinet, and this is the primary unit 
of analysis rather than the individual.  
 
It is first worth noting that it is not possible to provide an answer to the question posed in 
the title of this thesis using existing work, although some work brings us closer than others. 
Frankland’s 1977 study takes the approach that is perhaps the closest to the one utilised in 
this thesis in methodological terms. Crucially, however, the study is comparative, focusing 
dually on the British Parliament and the German Bundestag, and thus has a broader 
interest than the specific effect of pre-parliamentary political experience directly. Rather, 
Frankland’s core argument is that intra-parliamentary factors (i.e. those factors which kick 
in following election to the institution in question) are better at explaining variation in 
parliamentary career attainment than those which are pre-parliamentary in nature (in this 
he includes all socio-economic indicators, sex, age, etc. in addition to any prior political 
experience) (Frankland 1977, pp140-2). Using a sample of 984 MPs from both parliaments 
who were first elected within the same period (1950-61), he uses regression and 
correlation to analyse how parliamentary service, measured by the number of years an MP 
has been in the Commons, is the main predictor of success. That is, the longer you are in, 
the better you generally do (Frankland 1977, pp149-50). In many ways, the findings of the 
study are not particularly revolutionary, with it being an almost self-evident truth that 
longer inhabitancy of the Commons will probably correlate with doing more (this was, 
Frankland notes himself, a time when many who didn’t get promoted were more likely to 
                                                                                                                                     
career paths being rather weak, and as such, I will instead note in the conclusion that this would be 
an interesting direction for future work. 
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leave than remain in the Commons and establish themselves as long-standing 
backbenchers making his finding even more of a self-fulfilling prophecy) (1977, p138). 
Instead of the findings, it is the methodology which stands out in addition to the 
suggestions for future work which close the piece. As noted above, Frankland utilises cross-
sectional data collected on a relatively large sample of MPs (479 of whom are British MPs, 
the other 505 German) who were elected at roughly the same time, an approach not far 
from the cohort study method utilised in this thesis. In addition, he too approximates a 
hierarchy of parliamentary positions which also includes shadow frontbench appointments 
(i.e. those of the opposition rather than governing party), an approach also incorporated 
into this thesis. His hierarchy allows for a differentiation between frontbench appointments 
at the junior ministerial level, for example, and those to the cabinet level (Frankland 1977, 
p141). A similar hierarchy used in this thesis will be discussed in greater detail in chapters 
two and three. Of vital importance here is to note how Frankland’s methodological 
approach, including the cross-sectional data he uses, allows him to unpick the individual 
effects of various factors on career progression, something which he is able to measure 
across different political parties (and even different parliaments in this case), even if he is 
not actually particularly interested in these contributions.  
 
He ends the article by calling for more detailed country-specific studies of career 
progression; 
 
If MPs tend to achieve leadership positions largely because of lengthy 
apprenticeship, which socializes them into the norms of the 
parliamentary party, what factors determine who gets the chance to 
become an apprentice? Do individuals of certain backgrounds get an 
earlier start up the career ladder? I found that about seventy percent of 
those who reached top leadership levels had attained some 
nonbackbench position during their first term. Which apprentice 
positions are more likely to be stepping stones or to be deadends? When 
does seniority (or age) begin to work against one's getting off the 
backbench? (Frankland 1977, pp.150-151). 
 
It would seem, however, that this call has remained unheeded, with a distinct lack of 
systematic career analyses remaining. Perhaps the most comprehensive work in this area is 
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that of Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2007, 2012) who have collected similar cross-
sectional data on all cabinet ministers in the post-war period, providing the most in-depth 
account of their work in Accounting for Ministers, a book published in 2012. As the name of 
their book suggests, however, they are interested solely in those who make it into the 
government rather than the larger cohort, including backbenchers, which both Frankland 
and this thesis include (1977). Additionally, their main focus is on ‘who serves in 
government and how long they serve for’ (Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2012, p1), not on 
how they get there, or on which factors affect who gets there, although the latter is 
addressed in the book. Finally, their work does not encompass shadow appointments, 
analysing solely those appointed to government positions.  
 
Berlinski et al. state that their unit of analysis is ‘the individual minister’ and that they will 
provide data which will shine a light on the ‘career trajectories of different ministers in 
British government’ (2012, p1). However, there are a number of characteristics of the study 
which limit the amount that it contributes to answering the research questions of this 
thesis, namely that a) the authors are interested in a different research question 
themselves (the tenure of ministers in cabinet positions) and b) the variables included in 
the analysis are not wide-ranging enough to comprehensively account for the patterns 
identified. In terms of the latter, the authors essentially omit any discussion of pre-
parliamentary political experience or occupation (the list of variables included in the 
analyses is available in Accounting for Ministers p60).  
 
Berlinski et al. also produce different findings to Frankland, perhaps most crucially in that 
they find ‘the existence of systematic features of ministerial tenure related to the 
ministerial characteristics which are independent of the aspects of the government’ (2012, 
p86). That is, it is not simply intra-parliamentary characteristics that make a difference, a 
finding contrary to that of Frankland (1977).  Again, although the variable of interest for 
Berlinski et al. is ministerial tenure, they find that education and gender in particular have 
an effect, with women ministers and those with an Oxbridge education tending to survive 
longer than their colleagues who are either men or did not attend Oxbridge (Berlinski, 
Dewan, and Dowding 2012, pp83-4), something that suggests these variables may also be 
of note when looking at initial access to these positions, not just how long they are 
occupied. However, the study provides no comparison with backbenchers, those who are 
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not promoted at all, and does not consider extra-parliamentary political experience in any 
great depth. 
 
In conclusion, these studies provide fodder for thought in terms of what they do tell us 
about parliamentary careers and the methods they used to uncover that information, but 
perhaps more interesting is what they do not tell us. There exists no systematic study of 
how pre-parliamentary political experience, arguably a key component of a political career, 
affects parliamentary career trajectories, thus shedding no light on whether this factor 
holds explanatory power when addressing the question of why some people make it to the 
very top of British politics whilst others do not.  
 
Path dependency and the effect of pre-parliamentary political experience 
Based on the above, I will now set out the argument of the thesis. Essentially, the rationale 
is that there does exist an extensive body of work which considers parliamentary 
personnel, their backgrounds, and their recruitment. This literature additionally 
acknowledges the influence of various characteristics, such as sex, age, and political 
experience, at various stages of these processes, most notably on the recruitment stage. 
Concurrently, there exists a more limited literature which uses cross-sectional individual-
level data to examine the ministerial and parliamentary careers of MPs in the House of 
Commons. This literature, amongst other limitations, however, does not look at the role of 
pre-parliamentary political experience in parliamentary career progression in a 
sophisticated way. The review has highlighted shifts in the nature of this pre-parliamentary 
experience that require both recalibration of the existing schema of classification in 
addition to new research using data from a more recent era. This thesis will do both of 
these things, making an original conceptual contribution to knowledge through the 
creation of a standalone classification of pre-parliamentary political experience, and 
making an additional empirical advance by analysing original data to highlight the fact that 
different types of pre-parliamentary political experience have differential impacts on career 
paths. This review also generates hypotheses, outlined here, which will guide the 
forthcoming analysis. 
 
1. That in addition to factors that are traditionally considered in analyses of 
parliamentary career progression, pre-parliamentary political experience has 
explanatory power, both statistically and qualitatively.  
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2. That MPs with national-level political experience are more likely to 
progress to frontbench positions. 
3. That MPs with locally-focused political experience are more likely to 
remain backbenchers for the duration of their time in parliament. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have located the thesis in relation to existing relevant literatures. I opened 
the chapter by identifying three broad research foci across the existing literature on 
political careers; first, identifying the social and occupational backgrounds of MPs; second, 
investigating the candidate selection processes of political parties; and third, accounting for 
the intra-parliamentary behaviour of parliamentarians. These three foci were then adopted 
to provide a structure for the literature review within the chapter. In this review, I 
considered each of these three areas of existing scholarship in turn. Building on the main 
research questions of the thesis that were identified in the introduction, I have shown that 
no existing work answers these research questions in a complete fashion.  
 
Overall, the existing literature provides a basis for the work of this thesis, but does not 
provide a clear answer to the research questions presented in the introduction. I contribute 
to this literature in an original fashion in two ways; firstly, by presenting a classification of 
political experience as a standalone category, not subsumed into occupation; and secondly, 
by demonstrating that this classification can be empirically borne out, linking the study of 
pre-parliamentary experience and post-election parliamentary careers for the first time. 
Existing work does, however, provide fodder for some tentative hypotheses relating to 
these research questions, and these are presented at the close of the chapter, with it 
posited that there will indeed be an effect on career trajectory related to pre-parliamentary 
political experience.  
 
In chapter two, I develop the theoretical basis of the thesis, specifically extending the 
discussion of how to classify different types of political experience seen in the first section 
of this chapter. I argue that it is possible to see political experience as gained on either the 
local or national level. I support this distinction with examples from the existing literature 
before operationalising it empirically in chapter three. 
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Chapter Two – Theorising the link between 
political experience and political careers 
 
In the previous chapter I introduced the body of literature on which this thesis will be 
based – on political careers and personnel in the UK, political recruitment to the House of 
Commons, and the parliamentary activity and careers of MPs once elected. In this chapter I 
build on my review of the literature to develop a more holistic theory of why political 
experience firstly needs to be considered as a stand-alone category, not a subset of 
occupation, secondly that not all political experience is the same, and thirdly, that there is a 
strong case in favour of arguing that political experience is likely to impact upon overall 
political career trajectory. It is in these distinctions and contentions that part of the original 
scholarly contribution of the thesis lies, and in this chapter I flesh out the rationale for the 
research by addressing the question of why would there be a link between political 
experience and political career trajectory? 
 
I begin with a more developed examination of the existing literature on the occupational 
and political backgrounds of MPs by applying the existing brokerage-instrumental 
framework to available data. This highlights the benefits and shortcomings of such an 
approach. Applying the existing framework, I argue it provides two main pieces of 
information about British politics; that the House of Commons is largely homogeneous in 
terms of occupational backgrounds, being comprised of individuals from ‘brokerage’ 
occupations, but also that there has been a shift towards professionalisation and a rise in 
the number of MPs entering parliament with experience of working in politics, although 
this group is still in the minority. However, two limitations of this framework are also 
noted; firstly that it homogenises descriptions of political experience, placing different 
types of political experience in one overarching category, and secondly that it doesn’t 
consider the relationship of pre-parliamentary characteristics to post-election career paths. 
I build on these limitations and argue that political experience should be considered as 
separate from occupation when considering the pre-parliamentary backgrounds of MPs.  
 
Moving on from this analysis, I ask why it is reasonable to presume a link between political 
experience gained prior to being elected to the Commons and the career path of an MP 
following said election? Addressing this question, I delineate between various benefits that 
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different types of political experience will provide an aspirant parliamentary candidate 
with. I also discuss the ways in which these benefits are likely to play out both pre- and 
post-election to the Commons, mapping on to a distinction between political experience 
gained on the local level, for example as a local councillor, and that gained on the national 
level, such as working for an MP or in the head office of a political party. Drawing on 
existing work and evidence, I make the case that political experience is indeed highly likely 
to influence career trajectory in the Commons. Concluding on this point, I lay the 
conceptual ground for the empirical analysis which follows in subsequent chapters.  
 
The existing classification - political experience as occupation 
Studies of routes into parliament are numerous in the existing literature, both academic 
and non-academic, ranging from popular general accounts focusing on notions of personal 
ambition and driven by individual exemplars (Riddell 1993; Oborne 2007) to feminist 
accounts which look at the candidate selection process in a more systematic and 
institutionalist way (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997). Attention rarely strays from 
how traditionally underrepresented groups fare in their attempts to become MPs, and this 
framing of the issue of parliamentary recruitment, candidacy and representation as one of 
(in)equality is common (Durose et al. 2011; Durose et al. 2012). In short, the question 
addressed is one of why individuals with certain characteristics fare better than others in 
political environments, namely when contending selection for parliamentary candidacy. 
 
As noted in chapter one, the basic contention of these accounts is that an increasing 
number of MPs work in or around politics prior to being elected to the House of Commons, 
something identified as a ‘professionalisation’ of sorts  (Cairney 2007).14 Existing accounts 
of this professionalisation have tended to use the paid employment of MPs before their 
                                               
14
 It is worth noting here that the terminology in this area is inconsistently used and can be rather 
confusing. For some, professionalization can be taken as the time at which ‘politicians seized the 
opportunity to make politics not only their pastime but their job’ (Borchert, 2003, p.7). For others, it 
means that MPs have worked in politics prior to their election, something not mutually exclusive 
from this other definition, but decidedly different in scope. More widely, professionalisation has 
myriad uses, for example describing the way in which an occupation is carried out (Fisher and Webb, 
2003). 
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election to measure its growth15. That is, political experience (in occupational form) is 
considered alongside all other occupations, not as a part of a stand-alone political 
experience categorisation. 
 
To reiterate the brief outline of the ways in which the literature deals with occupational 
experience, classifications of pre-parliamentary occupation initially distinguished between 
jobs that are considered useful for or conducive to someone running for parliament, and 
those that are not. These two broad categories allow for little in the way of subtlety or 
nuance. Paul Cairney argues that this all-encompassing ‘politics-facilitating’ classification of 
pre-parliamentary occupations that are broadly favourable to an individual considering a 
run for parliament is outdated and no longer of great use (2007). He posits a distinction 
between ‘brokerage’ and ‘instrumental’ with the former being a job that is conducive to 
running for political office whereas the latter is perceived to ‘be of value as an aid to 
election’, and building on the ‘politics-facilitating’ label by distinguishing between 
occupations conducive to office and those with a direct link to politics (2007, p.6). As noted 
previously, the basis of this conduciveness lies in the resources (financial, temporal, and 
social) offered by such occupations. The brokerage-instrumental distinction is laid out with 
examples in figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
15
 Within the literature, this is measured in different ways, with some research focusing on 
‘formative’ occupations and others focusing on occupation directly prior to the election. This is 
another way in which focusing on occupation alone is problematic, with the possibility that empirical 
analysis ignores less notable, but potentially politically significant, sections of an individual’s career. 
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BROKERAGE  
Conducive to politics 
INSTRUMENTAL 
Direct link to politics 
Law (Barrister, Solicitor) 
Teaching 
Academic 
‘Professional’ more broadly 
Business 
 
 
 
Journalism 
Public Relations 
Trade Union official 
Interest Group representative 
Full-time Councillor 
MEP/MSP/AM 
Party worker 
Parliamentary staff 
QUANGO staff 
Think-tank staff 
Figure 2.1 Brokerage and Instrumental occupations defined in Cairney, 2007. 
 
Within the instrumental category, Cairney includes journalism, ‘occupations that provide an 
apprenticeship for higher elected office’, or those that entail working closely with existing 
politicians, as well as mentioning individuals who pursue their duties as elected local 
councillors on a full-time basis (2007, pp.215-217). These individuals are broadly 
considered to be the archetypal professional politicians. This is typical of the way that a 
number of separate lines of enquiry are often conflated under the label of 
‘professionalisation’. For example: 
 
…reflected in, and strongly reinforced by, the increasing number of MPs who 
had previously been local councillors and/or worked for their party or a 
campaigning group – in short, career politicians (Rush and Giddings 2011, 
p.235). 
 
This account, characteristic of many in this area, conflates a number of significantly 
different factors into a homogenous and all-encompassing ‘career politician’ label. By doing 
this, researchers obscure the differences that may exist between these different types of 
pre-parliamentary political experience. This matters especially in an era when political 
experience can be both paid and unpaid, can be both a full-time job and experiential, or in 
some cases is very much something pursued in addition to a non-political full-time job. 
Some of the roles listed are available only to those who have successfully competed in an 
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election of some sort, others see individuals in the employ of an actual political party (and 
therefore presumably working in a partisan capacity), whereas others are instead more 
generalised, political in a broader non-partisan sense. The discussion of 
‘professionalisation’, as detailed above in both the schema of Cairney and others, can take 
us only so far in addressing questions of political experience. The professionalisation thesis 
is mainly interested in how politicians are increasingly already heavily-involved in political 
life by the time of their election in the form of full-time paid work. This account conflates a 
number of activities together when assembling evidence to support or refute whether this 
is occurring or not. This issue will be returned to later in the chapter, where I argue that a 
stand-alone focus on political experience rectifies this issue. This can also be linked to the 
normative justification for interest in this subject outlined in the introduction. There I 
argued that the domination of elite political roles by those with similar types of pre-
parliamentary political experience would have an exclusionary effect, giving politics the 
appearance of a closed shop, open only to a small section of the population. An increase in 
the number of MPs with solely political experience gives an appearance of them having no 
‘normal’ experience. In turn, this paints the political as abnormal, increasing the notional 
distance between the representative and the represented (Voet 1992).  
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the occupational background of MPs has been a long-
held fascination for scholars of MPs, Parliament, and elections (Mellors 1978; Rush 1994; 
Jun 2003), but classificatory schema are inconsistently applied. The following section of this 
chapter will apply the brokerage-instrumental distinction to the available data on post-war 
parliaments prior to highlighting both what we can learn from utilising this approach, and 
conversely, what we cannot. 
 
Applying the existing classification 
Between 1945 and 1979, parliament contained high numbers of MPs with professional 
occupational backgrounds. Some 40.8% of all MPs across the 29 years had occupational 
experience as barristers, solicitors, doctors, civil servants, and members of the teaching 
profession (Mellors 1978, p.61). This is a figure largely consistent across the then two main 
parties, with only a .3% difference between Conservative and Labour numbers in this 
category (40.4% and 40.7% respectively), and 45.1% of the 83 MPs elected from other 
parties had a similar background. In his account of this era, Colin Mellors is clear, however, 
that these statistics should not be seen as denoting a convergence of MPs from the two 
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parties, as to do so would muddy some clear intra- and inter-party differences (1978, p.80). 
The main sources of data here are Colin Mellors’ The  British MP (1978) and The British 
General Election series (Criddle 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005; Cracknell 2010; Criddle 
2010), and the classification of brokerage and instrumental occupations seen in figure 2.1.  
 
The Conservative Parliamentary Party  
The Conservative party, lacking a tradition of electing ex-manual labourers to the 
Commons, is dominated by MPs from brokerage backgrounds, a pattern unchanged for the 
most part since 1945. This is shown in figure 2.2. Manual labourers fall under the code 
‘N/A’, which is neither a brokerage nor instrumental occupation. Of those MPs with 
brokerage backgrounds, MPs drawn from the world of business are broadly dominant 
within the parliamentary Conservative party (PCP). Between 1945 and 1974 this was the 
largest group within the PCP, 41.6% of MPs in this period having a business background. 
This is over three times more than Labour over the same time period (Mellors 1978, p.61).  
 
Within the professions, the Conservatives are dominated by lawyers, specifically barristers, 
who make up between 15 and 20% of all Conservative MPs at any of the ten elections in 
this period (Mellors 1978, p.60). Mellors notes that this means not only are the number of 
Conservative MPs who were lawyers higher than their Labour counterparts, but they also 
tended to achieve a higher position within the profession. Linked to this is some evidence 
that barristers tended to get better Conservative seats (1978, p.60). Even within the 
brokerage category, there is variation across the two main political parties, with the 
Conservatives more likely to have MPs with private sector experience and Labour those 
who have worked in the public sector, a distinction masked, at least in part, by the 
brokerage-instrumental classification. 
 
MPs with a military background are also more prominent in the PCP than the parliamentary 
Labour party (PLP) in this period, although they are very much a dwindling group by the 
1970s (Mellors 1978, p.61). Another group whose representation on the Conservative 
benches declined throughout this era were farmers, who made up only 8.1% of MPs 
following the October 1974 election.  
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Figure 2.2 Conservative MPs by Occupational Background (1945-2010), Adapted from 
(Mellors 1978), and the British General Election Series (Criddle 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 
2005, 2010; McGuinness 2010). 
 
The largest single occupation represented on the Conservative benches between 1945 and 
1974 is business, with many MPs coming directly to the Commons from company 
directorships (Mellors 1978, p.71). Business was clearly the rock on which the Conservative 
parliamentary party, and indeed the leadership, was built (Mellors 1978, p.73). The shift 
towards business away from the professions and indeed other roles such as farming was 
not as marked as the changes occurring in the Labour party at the same time, but there is 
what Mellors describes as a ‘subtle re-drawing’ that should not be ignored (1978, p.74). For 
example, following the 1945 general election, almost half (46.5%) of Conservative MPs 
were from the professions, a figure which had fallen over ten per cent to 35% by 1974. At 
the same time, the percentage of Conservative MPs with business experience saw growth 
at almost the exact same rate, rising from 36% in 1945 to 46% in 1974.  
 
The parliamentary trends of the Conservative parliamentary party post-1979 are in many 
ways quite similar to those in the Labour party, but there are still a number of key 
differences that should be drawn out. Cairney notes the large difference in the numbers of 
MPs with legal backgrounds on the Conservative and Labour benches respectively, despite 
the overall convergence of the two parties on those MPs with professional backgrounds 
broadly defined (2007, p.13). The presence of those involved in business continues to grow, 
with them making up 52.4% of the 1992 cohort and just over 40% of the 2010 intake (Rush 
1994, p.572; Cairney 2007, p.15; McGuinness 2010). More than anything else, such results 
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suggest a continued stability of the trends seen within the party in the period following the 
Second World War. 
 
The steady growth of instrumental backgrounds amongst Conservative MPs since 1945 is 
notable. Beginning as a trickle, this group have expanded to become a significant minority 
within the PCP in recent years. Lacking the trade union officer background of the PLP, the 
Conservative instrumental cohort has been drawn partly from the long-standing 
Conservative Research Department (CRD), a breeding-ground for numerous key figures 
within the party. Until 1979 the CRD was separate from the Conservative Central Office 
(CCO), in terms of both location and, at times, leadership. This changed under Margaret 
Thatcher, and the CRD has since been housed within CCO.16 As Tim Bale highlights in his 
account of the party between the early 1990s and the current day, the CRD has been a 
training ground for leading Tories including David Cameron, George Osborne, Steve Hilton, 
and Andrew Lansley amongst others. Many join the CRD ‘just after university, going on to 
work as special advisers’, then leaving politics before returning later, often as MPs (Bale 
2010, p.13). Looking at figure 2.2., the increased growth in the percentage of MPs with 
instrumental backgrounds in the late 1980s and early 1990s could perhaps be linked back 
to the centralisation of the CRD. This centralisation made the CRD even more a part of the 
policy-making and political machinery of the party at that time, holding a key role in the 
production of the 1992, and other, general election manifestos (Clark and Kelly 2004; Bale 
2010, p.100).17 Think-tanks played a similar role for the Party in the Thatcher era, primarily 
the Centre for Policy Studies and the Adam Smith Institute. Barnes and Cockett write that 
these think-tanks ‘filled a void not being filled by the existing party machinery’, particularly 
with regard to promoting the free-market approach so favoured by Thatcher (Barnes and 
Cockett 1994, pp.380-381). The proliferation of these bodies, and other venues (such as 
Thatcher’s Policy Unit and the Conservative Political Centre) provided a number of possible 
roles for those aspirant parliamentary candidates from which to gain instrumental political 
experience. Thus in many ways, the growth in number of MPs with such experience is 
partly a reflection of changes external to the Commons but still within the Party itself as 
well as the wider Westminster bubble. Although there are currently a higher percentage of 
                                               
16
 http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/wmss/online/modern/cpa/cco/crd.html 
17
 A fuller history of the CRD is available in Clark and Kelly (2004), or in Barnes, J. & Cockett, R. 1994. 
The Making of Party Policy.pp.348-382. In: Seldon, A. & Ball, S. (eds.) Conservative Century: The 
Conservative Party since 1900. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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Labour MPs with instrumental experience than Conservative, the consistent rise in the 
proportion of Tory MPs with such experience is notable. 
 
The Parliamentary Labour Party 
The backgrounds of those in the parliamentary Labour party (PLP) between 1945 and 2010 
are more varied than those of the Conservatives. The shift in the nature of the backgrounds 
of the PLP between 1945 to 1974 is significantly more marked than seen in the 
Conservatives. Mellors characterises the shift as one from ‘men of toil to men of ideas’ 
(1978, p,74), with a clear pattern of professionals (mainly teachers), displacing manual 
workers. Alongside this shift, there is relative stability in numbers of MPs with business and 
other occupational backgrounds, from journalists and political workers to policemen or 
pilots (Mellors 1978, p.74).  
 
Figure 2.3 suggests an increase in the percentage of the PLP with backgrounds classified 
neither as brokerage nor instrumental, most likely manual labour backgrounds, in 1979. 
Potentially, this increase reflects the political shift to the left of the ideological spectrum 
that the party took in this era, however, caution is advised when interpreting this data. 
When coding the available data, I used two main sources; Mellors’ account which covered 
1945-74, and then the various ‘candidates’ chapters written for The British General Election 
series by Byron Criddle. The first election for which I utilised the latter was 1979 – thus, 
there is potential for this sudden increase to be the result of the shift in source material, 
perhaps by the coding differences of the two authors, rather than an actual change on the 
ground. Speculatively, I think this could have root in the ways the respective authors coded 
those MPs who had been manual workers but also representatives of trade unions – the 
latter role is arguably ‘instrumental’, the former neither instrumental nor brokerage. 
Regardless, the subsequent decrease in the percentage of MPs with this background still 
tells a story of decline; the decline of MPs with backgrounds in manual work in the modern 
Labour party. Additionally, the figures for all parties were drawn from the same source at 
each time point, thus making comparisons across party consistent regardless of changes in 
coding over time. 
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Figure 2.3 Labour MPs by Occupational Background (1945-2010), Adapted from (Mellors 
1978), and the British General Election Series (Criddle 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010; 
McGuinness 2010). 
 
In Figure 2.3, the group ‘NA’ consists largely of manual workers, this type of occupational 
experience not falling into either the instrumental or brokerage categories, and it is clear 
that within the PLP, this group has fluctuated in size since 1945. As noted above, there may 
be some discrepancies in measurement, but in any case, the story since the 1980s has been 
one of decline, with the size of this group reducing markedly, particularly in the past 
decade, to a record low in 2010. By the 2005 general election, only 9% of Labour MPs had 
backgrounds in manual labour occupations, with only one new MP at that election having 
such a background. The prominence of teachers on the Labour benches is notable, 
becoming the biggest single occupational group amongst the party’s MPs post-1992 
(Cairney 2007, p.5). Mellors attributes such predominance to generational class shifts 
amongst the population, whilst Norris and Lovenduski point out that the benefits of such 
brokerage positions are practical – flexible, long-term careers, significant vacation breaks, 
and so on (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Yvonne Galligan, writing about the Irish Republic, 
points out the benefits of being, for example, a teacher or nurse in terms of the potential 
recognition it would offer a candidate within the local community (Galligan 2007).  
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One clear point of distinction between the Labour party and the Conservatives is the sheer 
variety of occupational backgrounds found in the PLP. The Conservatives were dominated 
by business and the professions throughout this time, whereas Labour have a clear split 
along the four lines of professionals, business, workers, and then miscellaneous  
backgrounds (Mellors 1978, p.74). As well as the variation in overall groupings, there is 
more variety within each group than is seen in the Conservative figures. For example, 
within the professional category, in contrast to the dominance of the law in the 
Conservative party, the older professions are balanced by more modern occupations such 
as teaching, something that Mellors sees as a product of social mobility amongst the 
working class (Mellors 1978, p.76).He goes on to distinguish between two types of 
professional within the party, those of ‘the established middle class and those who have 
transferred from one class to the next higher social class’ (Mellors 1978, p.76), with the 
increase in the numbers of the latter group resulting in the high numbers of Labour MPs 
with professional backgrounds. Comparing the numbers of teachers and manual workers 
on the Labour benches, there is almost a parallel shift in favour of the former (Mellors 
1978, p.77). 
 
Labour has a longer tradition of returning MPs with instrumental experience than the 
Conservative party, primarily thanks to a group uniquely represented on the Labour 
benches: trade union officials. Such individuals tend to be elected later in life and will rarely 
achieve frontbench status, although they will often occupy very safe seats. Labour returned 
98 trade union officials to the Commons throughout the period 1945-74, making up 5.6% of 
all MPs returned in this time (Mellors 1978, p.62). Since, then this percentage has broadly 
increased, and as of the 2010 general election, MPs with instrumental backgrounds 
comprise 31% of the PLP. How has this occurred? Fisher and Webb, discussing the growth 
of party staffs (a key component of the instrumental category), note that ‘party employees 
may well be becoming more important in the overall composition of (political) parties’ 
(Fisher and Webb 2003, p.167). This is both the case for Labour and the Conservatives. The 
key trend to highlight within the PLP in this period is the marked rise of ex-political workers 
being elected, with them composing 16.9% of the PLP following the 2005 general election, 
a rise from 4.8% in 1979. Other occupations have overwhelmingly stable representation 
within the PLP, with most shifts being limited to less than 5% either way. Broadly, there 
were increases in the number of solicitors but a very slight fall in the high numbers of 
teachers as well as a fall in the number of barristers (Cairney 2007, p.11).  
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The Liberal Democrats 
Since 1983, a liberal party of some description has been the third-largest party at 
Westminster, reaching a peak of 62 MPs following the 2005 general election. However, in 
contrast to the Labour and Conservative parties, the party lacks a distinct social base and 
thus does not have obvious roots in occupations such as manual labour and business 
respectively.  
 
Accordingly, the Lib Dems lie somewhere in between the two larger parties in terms of the 
occupational background of their MPs. Since 1983, they have had almost no MPs who have 
occupational experience as manual labourers, this category comprising a maximum of 2% 
of their MPs over the last 30 years. Over the same time period, the parliamentary party was 
largely dominated by those MPs with occupational backgrounds in the professions, 
although this percentage has declined from around 60% of (the considerably smaller) 
intakes of 1987 and 1992, to around 40% at the two most recent election (2005 & 2010). 
There has been a similar fluctuation in the proportion of Lib Dem MPs with business 
backgrounds, this figure rising from 12% in 1987 to a peak of 29% in 2005, before dropping 
again to 19% in 2010. The miscellaneous category makes up between 24% and 40% over 
this time period, with 20% of the 2010 intake specifically having backgrounds as politicians 
or political organisers.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Liberal Democrat MPs by Occupational Background (1992-2010), Adapted from 
the British General Election Series (Criddle 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010; McGuinness 
2010). 
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Again, the Liberal Democrats are a halfway house of sorts between Labour and the 
Conservatives, having more MPs with business backgrounds than the former but fewer 
than the latter, and vice versa with regard to MPs with occupational experience of manual 
labour. As the size of the intake has grown, the representation of business experience 
amongst Lib Dem MPs has grown, reaching its peak in 2005 with 29% of their 62 MPs. 
Applying the logic of a normal curve, one would expect that this is, in many ways, the ‘true’ 
party shining through thanks to the larger sample of MPs. And in many ways, as noted 
above, their location in terms of occupational experience is to be expected, with the Liberal 
Democrats occupying a similar middle-ground ideologically. As with the other two parties, 
instrumental occupations are well-represented on the Lib Dem benches, comprising almost 
25% of their 2010 parliamentary intake. This figure is higher and lower than the equivalent 
for the Conservatives and Labour respectively.  
 
When making a cross-party comparison of occupational trends amongst MPs since 1979, it 
is perhaps the continuing stability of the trends seen prior to the late 1970s that is most 
striking. By and large, brokerage experience is the norm amongst MPs in the Commons, 
although there are party differences within this category. The Conservative party remains 
dominated by MPs with backgrounds in business, whereas Labour has a more professional, 
teaching-oriented, parliamentary party.  
 
Perhaps the only major shift has been the increase in instrumental occupational experience 
across all parties, this group comprising 31% of Labour MPs, 20% of Conservatives, and 25% 
of Lib Dems following the 2010 general election. Although nowhere near a majority, this 
group is now a notable minority of parliament. However, applying this classification of 
brokerage and instrumental to the available data can only take us so far. As noted above, 
this data is drawn from the work of Mellors (1978) and Criddle (1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 
2005, 2010), and I have adapted their coding of political occupations into a brokerage-
instrumental split. The primary category which comprises the ‘instrumental’ category is 
‘politician/political worker’, and there are two points to first make about the way in which 
this category might have been understood by the authors, and subsequently coded. Firstly, 
it includes ‘politicians’, and thus may well incorporate MPs who have previously sat in 
devolved bodies, or who were full-time local councillors. Secondly, it is unclear what the 
‘political organiser’ classification involves precisely, although it is probably safe to assume 
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that this includes many of the positions discussed in chapter one, such as parliamentary 
assistants, constituency organisers, central party office staff, and so on (Webb and Fisher 
2003). In any case, and regardless of the exact assessment criteria, these categories remain 
sparsely populated, leaving the majority of MPs with no experience in such roles (Cowley 
2012). 
 
How have these findings been utilised and what can they tell us? 
The classification above, as part of a wider body of work (outlined in chapter one) which 
looks at questions of who, in socioeconomic terms, our MPs are and where they come from 
has two broad key findings; 
 
1. That most MPs have backgrounds in brokerage occupations 
The literature detailed above finds that politics is dominated by MPs who have 
backgrounds in brokerage occupations – for the Labour party, this means a majority of MPs 
who have broadly ‘professional’ backgrounds, often in the public sector, and for the 
Conservatives, MPs who have worked in private sector business (Jun 2003). Again using 
occupation as a proxy measure of social class, it is concluded that parliament has seen a 
shift to dominance by a majority of highly-educated middle-class politicians, with outliers 
to this trend (working class Labour MPs and aristocratic Conservative MPs) relegated to the 
periphery since the 1970s (Jun 2003; Cairney 2007). 
 
This shift has also been linked to the changing age of the Commons; King posits that many 
career politicians will be first elected between the age of thirty and forty-five, contrasting 
this with the small numbers of MPs first elected after the age of fifty (1983, p.263). More 
generally, it is found that Westminster has become a younger legislature since the 1970s, 
perhaps due to changing expectations relating to pre-parliamentary experience as part of 
the spread of careerism (Best et al. 2001, p.86). 
 
2. That there is a growing minority of MPs who have held instrumental occupations 
Although dominated by MPs from brokerage occupational backgrounds, the Commons has 
seen a growth in the number of MPs with instrumental occupational experience. There has 
been a proliferation of adjunct roles around the key political institutions. Many of the 
analyses of the trends examined here centred on the notion of a political class or career 
politicians (King 1983; Riddell 1993; Jun 2003). The political class thesis can be broadly 
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defined as the idea that many new MPs are ‘career politicians who [have] spent their whole 
occupational lives in politics’ (Jun 2003, p.169). Jun writes; 
 
While MPs are at the center of the political class, the group also includes the 
growing numbers of political consultants, political advisors to ministers, research 
assistants to MPs, as well as the staff at party headquarters, in the House of 
Commons, and in policy research institutes working for the parties. To this list 
should also be added lobbyists working for interest organizations. On the regional 
and local level the class includes the members of newly established legislatures and 
assemblies, their staff and political advisors, and the growing number of 
professional councillors and members of local government. The last of these 
groups increasingly constitutes the pool of recruitment for the lower House of 
Parliament (Jun 2003, p.170). 
 
There is a general theme in this literature, and more popular (or populist) versions of it, 
that politicians are increasingly close to the political system before they are elected. Rush 
identifies three overarching trends. First, early engagement, both occupational and 
financial, with politics as a precondition to pursuing a political career; second, a decline in 
individuals who become MPs following a successful non-political career, and thirdly, the 
‘professionalisation’ of politics, marked by an increase in MPs salaries and the providing of 
the resources necessary to do their jobs effectively (Rush 1994, p.576). In addition, it is 
possible to highlight other trends, such as serving in parliament for longer, with most MPs 
serving for at least fifteen years (Rush 1994, p.571) and being initially elected at a younger 
age.  
 
Anthony King’s analysis provides a wide-ranging discussion of the idea of a career politician, 
beginning with an observation that ‘a lot is known about the social background of 
politicians. Perhaps it is time to learn more about their social foreground’ (King 1983, p. 
249). King’s argument is clear – that career politicians have come to dominate the top roles 
in British politics and government. For King, the career politician is someone who is 
‘committed to politics’, ‘regards politics as his vocation’ and who seeks fulfilment in 
politics, sees his future in it, and would be ‘deeply upset if circumstances forced him to 
retire’ from it (1983, p. 250). Utilising individual case studies with data drawn from limited 
quantitative sources as well as political biography, King paints a picture of the rise of the 
 76 
 
career politician in British politics in the post-war era. Turning to the consequences of this 
development, he posits that it will be ever harder for an individual without significant 
political experience to reach the upper echelons of political life, that this will lead to an 
intensification of the ‘village atmosphere at Westminster, and that parliament as a whole 
will see an increase in the ambition of its Members (1983, pp. 276-280). 
 
Accounts such as that offered by Peter Riddell (1993) offer qualitative evidence of 
increasing numbers of MPs who harboured parliamentary ambitions since their student 
days and have known ‘nothing else than politics’. An example is the account provided by 
Labour MP Sadiq Khan, quoted in the introductory chapter of this thesis (Riddell 1993, 
p.186; Mullinger 2011). Jun describes these conclusions as ‘overdrawn’, but acknowledges 
the declining proportion of MPs coming into parliament from non-political backgrounds. It 
should be noted that although this figure is in decline, it is not the case that prospective 
MPs are leaving school or university and simply strolling into a parliamentary seat as would 
have been the case in the eighteenth century (Rush 1994, p.573; Jun 2003). Indeed, the 
large proportion of MPs being elected for the first time in their thirties would suggest that 
some sort of occupation prior to seeking election is the norm (Rush 1994, p.576). 
 
What can they not tell us? 
Despite the core findings outlined above, this literature is lacking in two main ways. 
Primarily, the classification of brokerage and instrumental ignores the significant 
differences between, for example, working at Westminster in an MPs’ office and being a 
local councillor in the North of England. By utilising data focusing on occupation to 
diagnose a proximity that is essentially political, this work provides no counterpoint to the 
rise of MPs with instrumental experience. Realistically, the natural opposite, and a more 
useful comparator, to someone working full-time in national level politics is not a lawyer, or 
teacher, or businessman. I argue below that it is more fruitful to consider political 
experience as a stand-alone category, and to delineate between local- and national-level 
political experience, the latter embodied in these instrumental roles. 
 
Secondly, this literature provides only a muddled answer to the question of ‘so what?’ It 
does not use the data it has to ask whether such patterns have consequences for the 
individuals in question following their election to the House of Commons. In chapter one, I 
argued that there is a strong theoretical case, largely borne of the representation 
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literature, that these questions matter. In the rest of the thesis, I will show that there are 
practical implications, that these patterns do affect the career trajectories of MPs in the 
Commons, and argue that this is something that should both interest and potentially 
concern political scientists. Rather than looking solely at how these characteristics affect 
pre-election patterns of recruitment and success at the ballot box, I will track their 
relationship with post-election career paths within parliament.  
 
A distinct classification of political experience 
There are two strands to the original contribution made by this thesis to the study of 
political careers, and I discuss both in this section. Firstly, political experience should be 
considered as a stand-alone concept when studying the pre-parliamentary lives of MPs. 
Secondly, I utilise this new conceptual framework to go further than previous studies in the 
field and link the pre-parliamentary political experience of MPs with their intra-
parliamentary careers, thus providing original, new, findings regarding a previously 
unmeasured phenomenon.  
 
The brokerage-instrumental distinction, as outlined and operationalised above, acts as a 
useful delineator of different types of occupations, and allows for broader trends to be 
identified than is possible when looking at specific occupational types. However, although 
the classification allows us to chart the increase in MPs with instrumental occupational 
experience, this is placed in isolation. That is, it is not charted against anything else. The 
brokerage-instrumental distinction, as noted in chapter one, grew out of an interest in 
parliamentary candidacy, out of questions regarding who ran for parliament, and why; 
what made them more able to do so than others? Over time, however, the classification 
has been used to address other issues, namely the composition of parliament and what this 
composition means in terms of the relationship between the representatives and those 
they are sent to the Commons to represent. The primary theme of the responses to these 
issues has been that politicians are becoming professionalised, using politics as a career, 
and doing so earlier than before (with the assumption, sometimes implicit, sometimes not, 
that this is a bad thing). However, this classification of brokerage and instrumental doesn’t 
provide the detail necessary to understand fully this phenomenon, these changes in the 
pre-parliamentary political lives of politicians. 
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At heart, what is being measured by the instrumental category is politics and the political; 
that is, experience of the political world prior to election. Subsuming such experience as an 
offshoot of occupation underplays the complexity of this situation. In particular, it masks 
the huge number of MPs with local council experience or other local-level experience that 
is not occupational in nature. Within the classification, although council experience is 
partially included, it is only included on a full-time basis, despite the majority of councillors 
still pursuing their council duties alongside other occupations. Additionally, for many other 
individuals, the primary involvement with politics prior to election will be on a local scale, 
at the constituency level. As such, when coded, this kind of experience is likely to be 
missed, as it is unrelated to occupation. I argue that the natural comparator of national-
level instrumental occupational experience isn’t non-political occupational experience, but 
rather local-level experience. I will argue here that political experience deserves 
consideration as a stand-alone factor in these types of coding schema, and the subsequent 
analysis of them. I will argue a theoretical case grounded in existing literature in this 
chapter prior to outlining in chapter three how I will construct my own study and 
measurements of this phenomenon. 
 
 
 
The utility of political experience – the local and the national 
Studies of political careers identify trends in pre-parliamentary occupational experience, 
but beyond a basic interpretation (that some jobs provide resources making them more 
conducive to political candidacy than others), fail to interrogate exactly what is offered by 
these routes into the Commons. This gives rise to two main considerations. Firstly; what is 
it about these political apprenticeships that make them exactly that, providing those who 
undertake them the skills necessary to become (relatively) successful politicians? Secondly; 
when are these things useful within a political career – pre- or post-election? 
 
In previous research which explores why some local councillors are more likely to consider 
a run for parliamentary office than others, it has been proposed that political 
apprenticeships consist, essentially, of three components; (1) an understanding of the 
formal processes of politics in terms of institutional structures and official behavioural 
norms; (2) the development of informal social contacts and networks, an understanding of 
what goes on behind the formal institutional structures (Allen 2012); and (3) a more 
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abstract demonstration of loyalty to both party and constituency (or locality). In reality, the 
first two facets will be closely intertwined (for example, in the subversion of arcane 
legislative procedure to achieve a given aim) and hard to untangle. However, for the 
purposes of understanding the utility of political experience to prospective parliamentary 
candidates in a more systematic manner, it is helpful. As such, this three-way distinction 
will be referred to throughout the following section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Benefits of pre-parliamentary political experience at different stages of a 
political career 
 
There is a long-standing tradition in Britain of MPs cutting their political teeth at the local 
council level prior to moving on to national-level political positions. The question of why 
local councils play such a prominent role in the careers of many parliamentarians in Britain 
is largely unaddressed in the existing local government or political recruitment literature, 
perhaps because it is deemed too obvious or too simple a question to warrant serious 
discussion. Post-election, having been a local councillor is of obvious benefit. Thinking in 
terms of the practical utility of a formal training in how to ‘do politics’ following an 
individuals’ election to the Commons, retired Labour MP Christine McCafferty remembers 
the early days of the new parliament following the 1997 election: 
 
…all the new intake, mostly Labour, were 22 to a room on the upper 
committee corridor because there were no rooms to put us in. With one 
telephone between 22. In that room, you quickly saw who had been on a 
local authority. You knew all the councillors of all the parties, knew all the 
chief execs of all the local organisation, knew absolutely everybody. I found 
that other people, and I won't name names because they are people who I 
admire and who are very good MPs, but I can tell you, in that first eight 
weeks, they didn't know what they were doing (Elliott 2010). 
PRE-ELECTION 
Getting selected as a parliamentary 
candidate 
POST-ELECTION 
Getting promoted/achieving personal 
aims in parliament 
FORMAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
INFORMAL 
CONTACTS 
 
PARTY LOYALTY 
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Local council experience is also likely to have utility in the pre-election, even pre-selection, 
phase. In the literature review, the demonstration of party loyalty (Rush 1994, p.573) and 
localism (Childs and Cowley 2011) were noted as potential explanations for the prominence 
of local council experience. There is no formal role for local government in the candidate 
selection process – parties are not obliged to choose local councillors to be their MPs, local 
councillors are not required to run in any selection, and there is nothing compelling local 
councillors to show any interest whatsoever in the selection of a parliamentary candidate 
for their constituency if they do not wish to. This lack of a formal role obscures the fact that 
the presence of local politicians is strongly felt in the candidate selection processes. Similar 
caveats apply for those involved in local politics in a non-elected fashion, as what can be 
termed ‘party foot soldiers’. These individuals generally undertake unglamorous tasks for 
no pay, such as knocking on doors to canvass votes, delivering leaflets, and attending 
constituency party meetings (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 2002).  
 
Throughout their study of the candidate selection processes of British political parties, 
Norris and Lovenduski find evidence of the importance of a number of aspects of the 
‘local’. Firstly, there is an emphasis on a local candidate, particularly within the Labour 
party, although this is markedly less of a norm within the Conservative party with 
candidates applying to multiple seats across the country (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, 
p.23). It is also argued that the UK electoral system, first past the post, contributes to the 
localism of the system by strengthening the link between an MP and their constituency. 
Across all three main parties, local party organisations hold the key roles in selecting 
candidates, and generally also the final word (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p.7). As 
previously mentioned, it is well-contended in the literature that the political character of 
each party is reflected in the nature of their candidate selection process. As such, the 
Labour party process values local loyalty among candidates, for example, above those 
candidates who have applied to multiple constituencies (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p.54; 
Ware 1996). They also note that the Labour process is still one dominated by patronage: 
 
But in many safe seats the Labour party system, despite the detailed 
rule book, is essentially one where informal local patronage remains 
important. What matters, still, is who you know in these constituencies 
(Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p.54). 
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This notion of ‘being known’ in the constituency being a bonus in the selection process is 
something that can be linked to local political service. Local councillors, and other local 
political operatives, will be ideally placed to build networks of contacts and to raise a 
significant public profile amongst the wider population. The authors are keen to emphasise, 
however, the key party difference here, with the Conservatives placing more emphasis on 
the concept of ‘meritocracy’, with assessments of candidates focusing on formal 
qualification and what the authors describe as “‘the best chap for the job’ irrespective of 
local origin” (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, pp.54-55). 
 
Candidates will also often have to participate in selection meetings within the constituency 
with local members, and it is not unusual for local issues to be a key focus of the 
questioning at such events (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p.44). Naturally, this proximity 
between local party organisations and power over the candidate selection process leaves 
those individuals with some sort of local profile within a constituency in an advantageous 
position. Referring back to figure 2.5, having this sort of locally-focused political experience 
would be a clear pre-election benefit. 
 
There are other less obvious opportunities for a good local knowledge to act as an 
advantage to a candidate, for example the ability to glean proprietary information 
regarding forthcoming parliamentary vacancies prior to those not privy to such information 
(Norris and Lovenduski 1995, p.60). Similar to this process is the natural gravitation 
towards running also described by some Labour MPs who were local to the seat, who 
found that over time more and more people suggested to them that they would make a 
good candidate. These findings are similar to those of Lawless and Fox in the USA as well as 
preliminary data (collected by the author) which suggests that this applies to British local 
councillors too (Lawless and Fox 2005; Allen 2012). Such local recognition may also result in 
a candidate having more cheerleaders for their candidacy within the constituency, also a 
good thing (Norris and Lovenduski 1995, pp.61-63). The authors note that this was less the 
case for Conservatives.  
 
The benefit of this local experience, other than a residual knowledge of political process 
and actors on the local level, is in some ways unclear. For one, it would not appear to act 
for MPs as an extra power source within their constituency. Vernon Bogdanor writes that in 
 82 
 
1889, 87 MPs held parliamentary and local elected seats concurrently. In 2006 this figure 
was just 18, with 16 of these MPs being newly-elected the previous year and expected to 
stand down from their council duties shortly (2009, p.240). There is little incentive for MPs 
to hold this dual mandate of both parliamentarian and councillor, something that is 
common in France, for example (Murray 2010). Bogdanor argues that this trend can in part 
be explained by the fact that MPs rarely get elected in areas where they were local 
councillors. Highlighting how the first-past-the-post electoral system limits the 
opportunities available to, for example, 'a Labour councillor in Henley or a Conservative 
councillor in Tower Hamlets', he argues that the system 'makes constituency 
representation very much a carpet-bagger's charter' (Bogdanor 2009, pp.240-241). 
Bogdanor posits that MPs are mostly 'rootless', that there is a disconnect between local 
and national political life, and that these reasons combine to reinforce a widely-held 
perception of local government as of little use (Bogdanor 2009, pp.241-242). 
 
At the same time, however, it would seem that candidates are increasingly in possession of 
links to the area in which they are running for election. Childs and Cowley, looking at 
research conducted by Michael Rush, note a rise in MPs claiming local connections to their 
constituency, from 24% in 1979 to 45% in 1997, peaking at 48% in 2001 before a slight drop 
to 46% in 2005 (Childs and Cowley 2011, p.6). Breaking the findings down by party, they 
find that it is a phenomenon concentrated in the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, with 
very few Conservative MPs claiming local connections (only 9% in 1997). Childs and Cowley 
are well aware of the problems with this notion of a return to localism. Asking what it 
means to be local, they write: 
 
Is it dependent on place of birth? Or schooling? Or 
residence? (And if so, for how long?) Or place of 
employment? Or service on the local council? Or even, as 
with some MPs, a dynastic link to a seat that their parents or 
grandparents previously held? And is it coterminous with the 
precise borders of the constituency, or with some broader 
area, such as a city or a region? The ‘local’ may also mean 
different things – and with a different intensity – in different 
parts of a country (Childs and Cowley 2011, pp.6-7). 
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They also acknowledge that it could be a self-fulfilling prophecy that more candidates have 
local connections; if such connections are desirable, people will strive ever harder to find 
them, perhaps at the risk of the link being so tenuous as to become meaningless. This also 
raises questions of the unique utility of local council experience to an aspirant MP. If it is 
possible to claim local connections to a seat through increasingly vague familial or 
occupational means, and it is unlikely that you will be elected in the area in which you 
serve on a local council, quite simply, why bother? In many ways, it may be simply to offer 
service to one’s political party of choice in a less specific, perhaps even constraining, way. 
For example, this could be achieved by working for the party on the national level, or 
perhaps working as an organiser across multiple constituencies. 
 
Hypothetically, it is possible that different types of experience will be more useful at 
different stages of a political career. Whereas having local council experience is of more 
obvious utility prior to actually (successfully) competing in an election, instrumental 
experience will leave an individual (now an MP) in better shape following their entry into 
the Commons. This will be discussed further in chapter six. The idea that there are different 
‘types’ of MPs is not new (Searing 1985), but the idea that this could be either a conscious 
or unconscious result of their pre-parliamentary political lives is. Thinking about those MPs 
with instrumental experience compared to their colleagues who cut their political teeth at 
the local level, they will know different people, different skills, and have different ideas 
about both what politics is, and it is done. For example, in a 2011 interview, newly-elected 
MP Luciana Berger said: 
 
The job that I did most recently in the three years running up to 
standing for parliament, I was working in and around Westminster in 
both the House of Commons and the House of Lords and ... I think it 
definitely helps to understand Parliament’s processes, to understand 
the physical layout of the building ‘cos it took me a good couple of years 
to work out how to get everywhere, there’s lots of nooks and crannies 
about the place, and just generally understanding how you can use 
parliament to promote the interests of your constituents. I think, 
because I had that experience, it’s been incredibly helpful (Fairbrother 
2011). 
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Working for the central party, or an affiliated organisation, in the bubble of the 
Westminster village is likely to give aspirant MPs detailed knowledge of the way that 
politics in the British parliament is carried out – the geography, the personalities, the 
language, and the formal and informal methods of getting things done. Herein lies a key 
distinction between experience gained at the local and national level – the difference 
between having a knowledge of how politics plays out locally versus how one conducts 
business on the Westminster stage, within the national legislature. Drawing from this, it is 
possible that pre-parliamentary activity is likely to affect post-election activity, for various 
reasons, no doubt including comfort and familiarity, prowess, and interest. Politicians may 
well stick to what they know best. 
 
The promotions game within the House of Commons is a difficult one to pin down. Not 
obviously based on meritocratic principles of any kind, it has been characterised as 
something of a game of who knows who, requiring good contacts in addition to political 
acumen. Arguably, instrumental experience puts aspirant MPs in close contact with those 
already rising to, or already at, the top of political life, providing them with an opportunity 
to forge relationships that may benefit their careers at a future stage. Former Labour MP 
Oona King (1997-2005) writes: 
 
Any aspiring MP who wants to be a Government Minister needs to find a 
power broker. If you haven’t got a senior politician, ideally a Cabinet 
Minister, going to bat for you, you’re nowhere. ..if someone isn’t banging 
on the table you have to give my boy/girl a break (usually in return for 
something), well, it just won’t happen (King 2007, p.210). 
 
Such benefits are largely intangible, and thus hard to operationalise in research terms. In 
fact, some of the best insights into what it takes to get into cabinet, and whether or not 
there are consistent patterns of who does, comes from studies which consider who does 
not make it into cabinet roles that often – women (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 
2005, 2009; Krook and O'Brien 2012). Much of this work finds that women, seemingly by 
virtue of their sex, simply do not gain promotion as often as their male colleagues. This 
introduces the idea, more explicitly than so far in this thesis, that there is a bias towards 
certain groups gaining promotion to frontbench roles ahead of others based on such a 
group membership. Could this membership be based on political experience? Chris Mullin, 
 85 
 
a junior minister and previous long-term backbencher throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s, writes; 
 
I notice the former special advisers tend to stick together in the Tea 
Room; some have already developed the short attention spans one 
associates with the upwardly mobile. Before the year is out they’ll all 
be in government (Mullin 2009, p.187). 
 
The question driving this analysis is that of whether the pre-parliamentary political 
experience of an MP affects their career trajectory once elected to the Commons? Is there 
a roadmap of sorts for individuals who wish to reach the top of British politics, namely a 
frontbench position in either government or opposition, identified by Cowley as a ‘two-
track career path’ (2012, p.36). Is there evidence for this? Existing literature from the 1970s 
suggests that MPs who have a political background as local councillors are more likely to 
end up being long-term backbenchers than those MPs who do not share this experience, 
and that transfer from local to national leadership is rare (Judge 1973; Mellors 1978, p.98). 
Mellors writes; 
 
But in both parties local government has now become an important 
factor in parliamentary recruitment. There is, however, one 
important qualification to this conclusion...such MPs rarely achieve 
leading positions in their parliamentary party (1978, p.98). 
 
Is it still the case that having been a local councillor is not a boost to frontbench careers? 
Are local councillors destined to continue their locally-focused work, only now from an 
office in Westminster? Cowley argues that 'for those who want an accelerated route to the 
top of the political parties, being a career politician now appears to be the only game in 
town' (Cowley 2012, p.37). As noted above, the classification of 'career politician' requires 
disaggregation, but Cowley's point is clear - that political experience has changed, and that 
there is a group of MPs who have Westminster-based experience prior to their election 
who benefit from these changes at the expense of those MPs without it: 
 
For sure, this leaves the majority of MPs who enter the Commons 
without such experience, but it creates the potential for a two-track 
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career path, with accelerated promotion for those with significant 
pre-Westminster experience and perhaps a slower route for those 
without (2012, p.36). 
 
Utilising the distinction between pre- and post-election benefits laid out in figure 2.5, this 
section of the chapter sets out the argument that pre-parliamentary political experience is 
not only likely to have an effect at the beginning of a political career, but is likely to leave a 
legacy that stretches on for the duration of an MP’s stay in the Commons. It has been 
suggested that local council experience is likely to expend most of its benefits to a career in 
the pre-election phase, possibly easing the path to selection as a prospective parliamentary 
candidate, but is unlikely to aid an individual in their climb up the slippery slope of 
frontbench promotions once in the House of Commons. Conversely, instrumental political 
experience, gained at the national level, may prove beneficial when seeking a seat, but 
really kicks in once an MP is in the Commons, giving them the requisite contacts and 
political know-how to make it onto the career ladder, and keep climbing. 
 
 
 
Summary and conclusion 
It is clear that not all political experience is the same, no longer obtained primarily from 
locally-based door-knocking or local councillorship. The expansion of parliamentary and 
party staffs, along with other politically-oriented roles in think-tanks amongst others, has 
made it possible to obtain political experience as part of a full-time occupation. Also noted 
above is how the instrumental occupational category, and the professional politician 
category which it both subsumes and also closely resembles, conflate these divergent 
sources of political experience into a single, falsely homogenous term. As this category 
denotes direct political experience, for example in the form of local council experience or 
paid working experience in a political role, it is important to address ways in which this 
categorisation can be made more subtle. 
 
Firstly, a distinction is required between elected and unelected political experience. The 
main example of elected political experience is having been a local councillor, but there is 
also the possibility of having been a member of the European Parliament (MEP) or having 
served in a devolved assembly or parliament elsewhere within the UK. Unelected political 
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experience is made up of ‘instrumental’ occupations that are not achieved only by standing 
for election. This involves a broad range of roles, from being a parliamentary researcher to 
heading up a think-tank. The uniqueness of being elected is two-fold. In terms of the act 
itself, it requires a commitment that is simply not present for jobs which do not require the 
process of election to be undergone. Election is a public act and perhaps requires a loyalty 
not present in roles achieved privately. It should be acknowledged here that this is not true 
of all candidates for election; paper candidates are a significant issue in British local 
elections, but it is probably safe to assume that running for two elections (i.e. local 
followed by national) is less likely to be a mistake. The second, less ambiguous element, of 
holding an elected position is the representative function of that role - every elected official 
has an electorate who she will be expected to represent in some way, be it actively or 
otherwise. For many councillors, this will involve extended and intense interaction with 
their communities, in theory helping them develop an understanding of life as a 
representative, something that again would in theory be useful if one day elected as an 
MP.  
 
Secondly, the location of the experience should be acknowledged, namely the difference 
between working at Westminster, or close to it, and being based elsewhere. Working at 
Westminster will allow individuals a knowledge and familiarity with the geography and 
workings of the institutions based there, both on a formal and informal level. Linking to the 
distinctions discussed above and below, it allows access to certain groups of people, social 
networks based there, and contacts and resources that cannot be cultivated elsewhere. It is 
clear that there is a big difference between working in the Westminster office of an MP for 
a Northern constituency and being a local constituency caseworker based in the seat.  
 
A third, perhaps less crucial, distinction is between party and non-party roles. In some ways 
the distinction is similar to the elected-unelected one - arguably, working for a party is a 
similar measure of loyalty as being an elected politician for said party. However, the 
distinction also matters within the context of working at Westminster (in a geographical 
sense) in terms of the proximity and access to elected politicians and other potential 
brokers in political careers that working for different organisations will offer an aspirant 
MP.  
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The next chapter, chapter three, is the methods chapter of the thesis, and focuses primarily 
on how best to empirically operationalise the conceptual and theoretical developments of 
this chapter, which has developed existing scholarship by expanding both its explanatory 
power through the provision on a new classificatory schema, as well as its scope, by 
suggesting that post-election patterns can be studied using this framework.  I will 
additionally highlight other factors which work alongside pre-parliamentary experience to 
affect career trajectory in the House of Commons. 
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Chapter Three – Methods: studying political 
experience 
In the previous chapter I outlined the theoretical rationale for the subject matter of this 
thesis; primarily that pre-parliamentary political experience is likely to have an effect of 
some sort on post-election career progression within the national legislature of the UK. I 
distinguished between political experience gained on the local level and that gained on the 
national level, a distinction not systematically made in the existing literature. Finally, I 
argued that these different types of pre-election political experience are likely to have 
differential effects on post-election parliamentary career paths.  
 
In this chapter, the methods chapter of the thesis, I describe how my original classification 
will be empirically operationalised in the empirical analysis which follows in chapters four 
and five. Looking to the international comparative literature, the chapter first considers 
how others have studied political careers, if not for precisely the same reasons that 
concern this thesis, then those adjunct areas which may hold experiential lessons for this 
work, a subject which is returned to in chapter six. The comparative literature offers 
further justification for focusing on political experience in isolation from occupational 
classifications, as such concerns are more common in the European and North American 
literatures, but missing from the British literature until now. I identify the variables used to 
measure political experience in the empirical analysis. A further question considered in this 
chapter is which other variables to consider alongside political experience in order to 
construct robust, accurate, and useful regression models? Existing studies of Britain and 
comparative work in adjunct fields, namely from scholars of gender and politics, are utilised 
to develop a core group of variables which are included in the regression models presented 
in chapter four.  
 
I begin the chapter by describing the context of the 1997 general election, making the case 
for using this election as the basis of the cohort study examined in this thesis, a research 
design that appears not to have been used for this purpose previously in British political 
science. I then justify the cohort study methodology of the thesis, underlining the various 
unique benefits offered by longitudinal data, prior to detailing the precise details of the 
approach used throughout. Following this, I consider the methodological issues discussed 
above, prior to framing the data itself with some basic descriptive statistics. These statistics 
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provide a brief introduction to the dataset and the key variables which will be used in the 
empirical analysis chapters which follow this one. Finally, I outline the measures of 
‘success’ that will be used in the empirical analysis, measures of frontbench progression 
across various political parties.  
 
The General Election of 1997 - one of a kind? 
A lack of generalisability is the price of utilising case-study approaches. However, in order 
better to understand the case in hand, and potentially draw broader lessons and themes 
from a specific situation, it is important to provide context. In this section I will examine the 
unique facets of the 1997 election, particularly those which have relevance to the core 
elements of the thesis, and highlight areas in which 1997 truly was a one of a kind election. 
 
The 1997 general election saw the highest number of newly-elected MPs since the Second 
World War, with new MPs making up 36.9% of the total and a turnover rate of 41.9% (Rush 
and Giddings, 2011, p.33). The election saw a landslide victory for the Labour party, led by 
Tony Blair, as well as a doubling of the number of women MPs, most of them from the 
Labour benches. The Labour party won the subsequent two elections, in 2001 and 2005, 
giving them an unprecedented three consecutive terms in government. This provides a self-
enclosed period of time which can be studied as a cohort and used as a ‘political 
generation’ in the sense that anyone first elected in 1997 would most likely have reached 
the highest office they will reach in that thirteen year period. Clearly, there will be 
exceptions to this, but the high turnover of MPs at the 2010 election, as well as the 
electoral shift away from Labour, compounds this notion of a generation that has arrived 
and left again; the beginning and end of a political era.  
 
Amongst the iconic images that have come to define the 1997 general election, a 
prominent one is the photograph of new Prime Minister Tony Blair surrounded by the 
female members of his parliamentary party, a group of women who came to be defined as 
'Blair's babes' in the popular consciousness. Behind the tabloid hysteria of this moment, the 
photograph tells a story about the Labour party under Blair. It was younger, the prime 
minister himself being only 43 years old, and it included women in unprecedented 
numbers. In turn, the story of the all-women shortlists (AWS) that helped Labour double 
the number of women in parliament overnight itself tells a broader story about the party of 
that time. Labour experienced significant change in the preceding two decades, change 
 91 
 
that affected the workings of the party and the candidates it put up for election. The 
popularity of the party, a popularity that arguably stemmed in part from those changes, 
also resulted in an unprecedented electoral return for Blair and the party he dubbed as 
'New' Labour. Here I outline the context for the 1997 election, namely the internal changes 
made to the Labour party which affected candidate selection and address the question of 
how representative is the 1997 when attempting to draw general inferences about the core 
questions of the thesis. A key debate to consider before analysing the data is the local-
national divergence within the Labour party in the lead up to the 1997 general election 
which took the form of the debate over the ‘one member, one vote’ policy. 
 
Labour: One Member One Vote & Localism 
The One Member One Vote (OMOV) debate was one that waxed and waned within the 
Labour party across the second half of the twentieth century, with the debate reaching 
fever pitch in the 1980s and early 1990s (Russell 2005, p.62). The debate centred on the 
question of how to select both candidates and leaders, and whether or not the 
responsibility for this (in the form of a vote) should lie with individual members or in other 
bodies seen to represent them (Russell 2005, pp.34-35). Until 1987, the powers of 
candidate selection lay solely with the General Committee (GC) of each constituency party, 
a body of representatives and delegates elected by local branches and sent by affiliated 
organisations respectively (Russell 2005, p.12, p.34). Following the 1987 party conference, 
a local electoral college system was adopted which gave more power to local members 
more broadly, but maintained the ability of activists and union members to dominate 
proceedings. Eventually, OMOV in constituency selections was accepted at the 1993 party 
conference, with a separate electoral college system being adopted for party leadership 
elections (Russell 2005, p.53). This is an extremely brief account of what was in reality a 
complex and drawn-out process (see Russell, 2005 for more detail), but the key point of 
interest for this thesis is the changes that OMOV made to the concentration of power 
within the candidate selection process, arguably de-entrenching the power that local elites 
situated on the GC had to select their preferred candidates and instead dispersing this 
power more widely across party members.   
 
Throughout the process of adopting OMOV, there was much concern from both the ‘right’ 
and ‘left’ of the party that their respective spheres of influence would suffer in the various 
reforms proposed (Russell 2005, p.10). The debates occurred within the context of 
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continued post-defeat agonising within the party, as well as at a time of antagonism 
between the two wings of the party mentioned above, specifically over issues such as 
mandatory reselection, seen by the right as an opportunity for left-wing activists to remove 
MPs unsympathetic to their causes. As such, OMOV was seen by some as a counter-balance 
to the power of mandatory reselection. Under OMOV, the ability to reselect would be 
spread more widely across the constituency as opposed to being in the hands of the very-
active few who sat on the GC. These individuals were thought to be more likely to be from 
the left of the party, although some evidence suggests that this is a false assumption (Seyd 
and Whiteley 1992, p.21, p.24). A number of concerns were aired on both sides regarding 
this concentration of power in the GC (Seyd and Whiteley 1992, pp.4-5; Russell 2005, p.42). 
Evidence provided by Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley has shown, however, that the 
distinction between left and right and between members and activists is not as stark as the 
received wisdom on the topic suggests, and indeed the terms are frequently misused 
(1992, pp.8-9). 
 
A key principle here is a perceived tension between the core and periphery of the party in 
terms of political direction, and how the location of specific powers will affect the ability of 
different actors to influence this direction (Russell 2005, p.58). This discussion has the 
potential to be wide-ranging, too wide for this thesis, but can be brought into focus by 
speculating on the interplay of localism (and its' counterpart of concentrated central 
influence) and powers of candidate selection. As noted above, the GC previously held the 
majority of powers relating to candidate selection. As such, a candidate would be well-
advised to have cultivated a beneficial relationship with members of the GC in the 
constituency they were planning to run for. Looking at the same situation from the 
perspective of the GC, the members of this body may be more inclined to select someone 
already known to them, indeed someone they may have a long history with. It is clear that 
established local councillors would be in a strong position under this system, assuming 
there don’t exist huge political differences of opinion within the CLP in question.  
 
The switch to OMOV will have changed this situation, shifting these powers away from the 
highly active and interested GC to the wider Labour membership of the area, a group with a 
less intense interest in the machinations of the local party, and indeed the party on a 
national level (Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley and Seyd 2002; Seyd and Whiteley 2004). 
It is possible to speculate further that they are unlikely to be as aware of locally active 
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individuals as those who are on the GC would be, although this is not to say that they 
would not value local service or localism any less. It is possible, however, that OMOV 
opened the door to candidates who are not so entrenched in the CLP, perhaps candidates 
who instead have sought out political experience by working in Westminster or in other 
non-partisan political roles. As noted above, local connections would appear to be 
important in British politics, but the increasing range of ways in which such connections are 
claimed, combined with the decreased power of the GC and associates, means that, post-
OMOV, it is perhaps easier for outsiders to come in and be selected for a seat than it once 
was. 
 
The Labour majority and unexpected MPs 
Another factor to consider, which might also be unique to this specific election in many 
ways, is the size of Labour’s majority at the 1997 election. This majority led to the election 
of many candidates who were not expected to do so by commentators, and indeed, who 
didn't expect to win themselves, despite all evidence, from public opinion polling to by- and 
local election defeats (Norris 1997, p.512). Charles Pattie and Ron Johnston note that many 
new MPs were 'unknown quantities to the party whips in parliament' and quote one MP 
elected at the time who dubbed the group of surprise MPs 'the unlikely lads' (2004, p.806). 
How does this affect a study of the parliamentary career trajectories of this cohort? 
 
In terms of studying those MPs who remain backbenchers for the entirety of their stay in 
parliament, it cannot be assumed that every MP being studied is seeking promotion. It is a 
tacit assumption in classic studies of political careers, such as that of Schlesinger (1966) 
that individuals who are not already upwardly mobile are simply waiting for a favourable 
opportunity structure to present itself. In other words, there is an assumption that most 
MPs are looking to be promoted. Richard Fox and Jennifer Lawless, in their study of 
gendered patterns of political ambition, argue that this rational choice approach is too 
simplistic. They argue that it doesn't fully account for, amongst other things, gendered life 
experience and how this might affect perceptions of what a favourable opportunity 
structure actually looks like. In short, people who aren't looking for political opportunities 
are not going to see them (Lawless and Fox 2005, p.29). In terms of their progressive 
ambition once elected to parliament (itself a strong suggestion of some political ambition), 
are some MPs simply looking not for the way up, but the way to stay where they are?  
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Arguably, there will be equivalent issues to these present in any cohort chosen for study. 
Ideally, a broader cohort (for example, the entire post-war period) would be analysed, but 
such a study is beyond the scope of this thesis. And even so, changes to parliamentary 
procedure, namely the growth of the select committee system, would create problems 
when assessing the career options available to MPs. By highlighting and accounting for the 
limitations of the methodology, I keep them in mind through the subsequent analysis and 
discussion.  
 
Why a cohort study? 
Studying political career paths is by necessity a longitudinal process, with attention focused 
on a process that takes place across a period of time, measured generally at certain fixed 
points.  
 
None of the studies discussed above adopt a cohort approach – they look simultaneously at 
MPs elected at various time points. Hibbing notes that ‘the benefits of career analysis have 
not been fully realized’, and highlights the predominance of cross-sectional, rather than 
longitudinal, research designs’ (1991, p.406). Hibbing actually goes on to refer to a cohort 
approach, as used in this thesis, as a ‘shortcut’ arguing that it doesn’t allow for inspection 
of lifecycle or generational effects (1991, p.406). About this, he is correct, but the remedy 
to this is a data collection exercise which would have had to have been on a scale beyond 
the resources of this thesis. However, the nature of the data that I have collected for this 
thesis is such that it could be incorporated into a dataset of larger size in future, thus 
facilitating the type of longitudinal approach advocated by Hibbing. Thus, the drawbacks of 
the approach taken in this thesis (namely, being unable to identify whether the trends seen 
are the result of period or lifecycle effects) are in many ways matched by the benefits, 
which include the opportunity to conduct a detailed study of an atypical group of MPs in 
addition to the ability to provide a rich contextual analysis. So long as no claims are made 
beyond this sample without qualification, this approach is no less rigorous.  
 
On occasion, the data are broken down into cohorts to test for a possible cohort-versus-
generational effect, with Berlinski et al. looking at ministerial promotions under given 
prime ministers, and Hibbing looking for a cohort effect amongst certain groups of 
congressmen and women, but none look at the long-term legislative progression of a single 
group (Hibbing 1991; Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2012).  
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A cohort study, for the purposes of this thesis, is the study of a group of people bound by a 
specific characteristic over a given period of time. Often used in medicine to track the life 
cycles of individuals with certain illnesses or from various social or ethnic groups, the key 
aim of the cohort study is draw out patterns across these groups over time. In this case, the 
characteristic that binds the ‘participants’ of this cohort study is the year they entered the 
House of Commons and became MPs and the period of time being studied is from the 1997 
General Election until the 2010 General Election or the point at which they left the 
Commons, whichever came first.  
 
The study also focuses solely on those MPs elected to the Commons for the very first time 
at the 1997 General Election and a total of 242 are included in the analysis. The rationale 
for focusing specifically on those MPs elected for the first time is quite simple and revolves 
around understandings of political experience. Even if an MP had, for example, been 
elected previously for one term, left the Commons, then re-entered at a later election, they 
will have an understanding of the Commons that a colleague entering for the very first time 
would not have, even if they are both new to the House in the sense that neither were 
Members of the previous parliament.  
 
The data 
The data is cross-sectional, with each ‘case’ holding information relating to an individual 
MP. There are 242 cases.18 The dataset constructed for use in this thesis builds on an 
existing dataset built by Michael Rush, who generously shared his data.19 However, the 
Rush dataset was lacking in ways that left it unsuited to the research question posed in this 
thesis. Firstly, it did not apply the brokerage-instrumental distinction to occupational data, 
instead listing each occupation without classification. Secondly, it did not consider political 
experience in a stand-alone fashion, and included incomplete data relating to local council 
                                               
18
 This doesn’t include the 243
rd
 MP elected initially at this point who was a Member for Sinn Fein. 
Sinn Fein MPs do not attend parliament once elected owing to their refusal to take an oath of 
allegiance. Given the focus of the article on parliamentary career trajectories, and the lack of any 
opportunity for such trajectories available to Sinn Fein MPs, it was decided to exclude this single 
case from the data analysis. 
19
 The Rush data was collected as part of Economic and Social Research Council Award No. 
R000238382. 
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service. Thirdly, it included only incorrect and sporadic data in terms of post-election 
frontbench appointments. It was imperative that these factors were addressed, and to do 
so involved a significant data collection exercise lasting almost 12 months. Primarily, official 
sources, such as the Dod’s Parliamentary Companion from 1998 (Bedford 1998) were 
utilised, as was the website of the UK Parliament20 to complete biographical information 
and unearth prior political experience. Additionally, the internet often held information on 
MPs from around the time of their election on news websites such as the BBC, or on 
candidate’s own websites.  
 
Having gathered a more complete set of data for all 242 cases, the data then had to be 
reclassified along the lines of the classification of political experience outlined above. 
Following this, I obtained electoral data for all candidates which allowed the dataset to 
denote the marginality of their electoral seat, this in addition to updating variables such as 
age, death, and so on. At the time of writing, the dataset contains 139 different variables, 
all mostly complete for all 242 MPs. 
 
This final section will introduce the data, providing some descriptive statistics for the entire 
sample in the areas which will be analysed in greater detail in the following two empirical 
chapters. The areas of age, sex, electoral majority and political experience will be 
considered, amongst others. Such an exercise provides the reader with a firmer grasp of 
the nature of the data sample prior to more in-depth analysis. All of the variables below 
will be included in the regression analyses in chapter four. 
 
Measuring political experience 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the existing body of work in this area differs from the work 
of this thesis in two main ways. Much work looks solely at selection for, and election to, the 
House of Commons, asking who succeeds in this endeavour and who does not (Norris and 
Lovenduski 1995). Secondly, some recent work focuses on the selection of ministers, again 
asking who makes it to these ministerial positions (Dowding and Dumont 2009; Berlinski, 
Dewan, and Dowding 2012). What these do not do, and what the thesis does, is both 
contrast those who do make it to ministerial roles with those who do not, and also consider 
the question of political experience drawn from extra-legislatorial sources, i.e. the sort of 
occupational political experience as discussed in the previous chapter. 
                                               
20
 www.parliament.uk 
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So how is political experience measured in existing studies? Berlinski et al utilise a measure 
of political experience in their work which is focused solely on intra-parliamentary 
experience, namely the length of any previous ministerial tenure (2012, p.60). They class 
any ministerial experience as ‘some experience’, supplementing this with a more detailed 
variable measuring the length of said experience in years. Alfred P. Montero, studying the 
determinants of ‘parliamentary leadership’ in the Spanish Congreso in the post-Franco era, 
utilises measures of political experience closer to those utilised in this thesis (2007). He 
differentiates between local, regional, and national party positions, in addition to those 
classified as ‘state bureaucracy’, simultaneously distinguishing elected roles from 
executive, or unelected, ones (Montero 2007, p.588). The study of the UK House of 
Commons and German Bundestag by E. Gene Frankland, discussed in chapter one, includes 
two measures of pre-parliamentary political experience: party office experience and public 
office holding. These two categories map reasonably well onto the national and local 
distinction discussed in the previous, although Frankland considers these factors only in 
passing in his analysis, preferring to concentrate on intra-parliamentary factors (Frankland 
1977, pp.144-147). Additionally, there is no great consideration of the explicit effect of this 
experience, or the reasons why such an effect may exist, as Frankland is primarily 
concerned with the relative impact of pre-parliamentary factors compared to intra-
parliamentary factors. Nonetheless, the fact that different types of political experience are 
acknowledged is noteworthy; particularly that political experience can exist in an extra-
legislative way. 
 
Legislative tenure 
Ministerial/governmental tenure 
Local elected positions (public/party office) 
Local unelected positions (public/party office) 
Regional elected positions (public/party office) 
Regional unelected positions (public/party office) 
National elected positions (public/party office) 
National unelected positions (public/party office) 
Electoral support (personal vote) 
Figure 3.1 Measures of political experience utilised in existing studies 
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The United States (US) literature discusses political experience in a primarily electoral way, 
experience generally equalling having ‘held elective office prior to running for another 
office’(Lazarus 2008, p.185). Jeffrey Lazarus notes that this ‘has become the standard ex 
ante indicator of challenger quality in the study of American elections’ (2008, p.185). John 
R. Hibbing utilises another electoral measure, that of electoral support, in his study of 
Congressional careers, in addition to more traditional measures of political experience such 
as tenure (in this case, the number of terms previously served in the House of 
Representatives) (Hibbing 1991, p.423). Paul S. Herrnson’s account of the electoral fortunes 
of ex-congressional staff perhaps uses the most detailed measures of political experience in 
the US literature (1994). Like Frankland’s comparative study of the UK and Germany, and 
also in a similar vein to this thesis, Herrnson distinguishes between Congressional staff, 
elected officials, unelected officials, or those individuals who combine both elected 
officialdom and Congressional staff experience (1994, p.145).  
 
Studying the Canadian House of Commons, David C. Docherty makes a distinction between 
political amateurs and professionals, in terms of their political experience, measured by 
both office-holding at the sub-national level and, secondly, by tenure within the House of 
Commons (1997, pp.40-59). Similarly, David T. Canon, again studying the US Congress, 
categorises ‘amateurism’ as judged ‘on the presence or absence of previous political 
experience’ (1990, p2). This prior experience appears to include both elected and unelected 
positions (for example, Mayor and House or Senate staff, respectively), again something 
roughly similar to the distinction made in this thesis (Canon 1990, pp.165-166).  
 
Turning to France, Kam and Indridason include measures of parliamentary experience in 
addition to measures of local political experience (regional council or mayoral experience) 
when considering ministerial selection in French government (Kam and Indridason 2009, 
p.45). Similarly, another study considering Spanish ministerial appointments includes prior 
governmental, parliamentary, regional, and local elected political experience, as well as 
including a measure of national administrative political experience (similar to Montero’s 
‘state bureaucracy’ measure) (Montero 2007; Real-Dato and Jerez-Mir 2009). Eoin 
O’Malley, studying government formation in the Republic of Ireland, considers electoral 
success, including a measure of personal vote relative to party vote share in the district of 
the Teachta Dalá in question (TD – an Irish MP) (O'Malley 2009).  
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It is possible to see a picture emerging here – studies generally consider political 
experience to be, inter alia, based within the legislature in question (i.e. terms served), 
drawn from electoral experience or success, or comprised of experience from either other 
legislatures or from positions held within the hierarchy of the party. It is this final element 
which most closely correlates to the notion of local or national-level political experience 
being put forward in this thesis, but these other types of measure will be incorporated into 
the analysis that follows in chapter four. Such variables act as useful controls for the 
variables of most interest as well as making the findings of this thesis more comparable to 
existing work from around the globe. I will further consider how the framework of political 
experience discussed in this thesis could be applied to comparative work more broadly in 
chapter six, resuming this discussion. 
 
The previous chapter laid out a theoretical rationale for distinguishing between the two 
main types of pre-parliamentary political experience in Britain, and for supposing that such 
experience may well affect political trajectories before and following election to the 
Commons. This chapter has, so far, examined how others have operationalised the study of 
political experience, and figure 3.1 lists a number of variables which are used in these 
studies.  
 
Building on this theoretical and empirical work, when coding the political experience of 
MPs included in the dataset (of which there are more details below), this thesis will include 
variables denoting political experience on the local level (including borough, town, regional, 
and parish councils, local constituency party organisers, or other localised campaign staff), 
political experience in an national-level political role, and then other variables for those 
MPs who either combined both of these types of experience or who possessed experience 
of neither. Further details on this coding are included in figure 3.2. 
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Local National 
Local councillor (borough, town, 
regional, parish councils) 
Constituency party chairs, treasurers, 
electoral agents, etc. 
Local party campaign organisers 
Constituency-based caseworkers 
Journalism 
Public Relations 
Trade Union official 
Interest Group representative 
Party worker (national-level) 
Parliamentary staff 
QUANGO staff 
Think-tank staff 
Figure 3.2 Coding of political experience variables used in this thesis. 
 
This coding has been applied to the data, and some descriptive statistics can be found in 
table 3.1. Above, I highlighted that different studies measure experience in different ways, 
for example sometimes classifying only an occupation that an individual held for a longer 
period of time than other occupations. I will instead simply code whether or not an 
individual has ever held either local- or national-level pre-parliamentary political positions. 
Doing so avoids inadvertently missing certain aspects of an MPs’ pre-parliamentary 
experience. As noted in the literature review, the Labour party has a stronger and more 
entrenched tradition of local councillors becoming MPs, though it should be made clear 
that this is now a tradition that the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats partake in as well. 
The figures in table 3.1, below, confirm this spread. 
 
Pol. Exp. Party Total 
Cons Ind. Labour Lib. Dem. SNP UUP  
Neither 
Local 
National 
Both 
30.3 
15.2 
48.5 
6.1 
0 
0 
100 
0 
11.8 
50.0 
16.3 
21.9 
7.7 
42.3 
15.4 
34.6 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
14.5 
43.4 
20.7 
21.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 3.1 Crosstabulation of pre-parliamentary political experience by party, n=242, chi-
squared and other significance tests violated assumptions. 
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As table 3.1 makes clear, different types of political experience are not evenly spread 
across all the political parties with representative in the cohort. For example, fully 50% of 
Labour MPs have just local council experience compared to only 15.2% of Conservatives. In 
contrast, 48.5% of Conservative MPs have just national-level pre-parliamentary political 
experience compared to 16.3% of Labour MPs and 15.4% of Lib. Dem. MPs. In both of these 
cases, each respective party has a higher percentage in each category than the mean of the 
sample (seen in the ‘Total’ column of table 5.1). Again, these figures reflect the recruitment 
traditions of the different parties, with the local traditions of Labour and the Liberal 
Democrats standing in contrast to the less locally-focused ethic of the Conservatives who, 
as noted in previous chapters, have largely recruited MPs from the business and other 
professional communities. These figures should be borne in mind throughout the data 
analysis, as they will aid interpretation of both regression and other statistical findings. 
 
In sum, looking at descriptive statistics alerts us to two main points: firstly, that this is not 
an evenly distributed sample, and that some characteristics are more prominent than 
others. Secondly, that this may result in sampling issues throughout the analysis to follow. 
This should not be considered a weakness however, as the aim of this thesis is not to 
extrapolate from this sample to a wider population in a quantitative way, but rather 
combine such analysis with theoretical and conceptual considerations of the data to 
produce a mixed-methods account of how political experience affects political careers. 
 
Other factors to consider 
Another consistent theme in existing work is that there are numerous factors in play in 
political careers, and as such, to best make the case that political experience is of similar 
importance, these factors must be considered alongside it. Regression analysis allows for 
the effect of our variable of interest (political experience) to be investigated whilst 
controlling for the effect of these other variables. I will consider here the operationalisation 
of the other variables which these studies consider. Doing this allows the contextual 
variables generally considered important in studies of legislatorial careers and activity to be 
identified and potentially included in the regression analyses in the following empirical 
chapters.  
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Age 
The age variable, usually measured either at the time of data collection or at the point of 
first election to the legislature in question, is widespread in legislative studies (O'Malley 
2009; Real-Dato and Jerez-Mir 2009; Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2012). Age is 
important for various reasons. Being elected young has obvious benefits, not least a 
novelty value, given the scarcity of MPs under the age of 30. When combined with a safe 
seat, however, being elected at a young age also gives an MP a long time in parliament, 
something ideal to the pursuit of a ministerial career. Thus age is something that will affect 
political careers and therefore needs to be considered in any model constructed in this 
thesis. 
 
Age by Decade Percent Cumulative Percent 
Under-30  
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
2.1 
30.6 
45.9 
20.7 
.8 
2.1 
32.6 
78.5 
99.2 
100 
Total 100 100 
Table 3.2 Age (by decade) of MPs elected for first time at the 1997 General Election, 
n=242. 
 
The House of Commons is an institution dominated by those of middling age, something 
which has been the case across the entire post-war period. The 1997 cohort is no exception 
here, with those MPs aged between 40 and 59 constituting a majority of all newly-elected 
Members. Figure 3.2 outlines some statistics relating to age within the cohort. Out of the 
new MPs, the youngest was elected at age 25, with the oldest 39 years older and aged 64. 
The mean age of new electees was 43.4 years of age.  
 
Sex 
Numerous studies of political careers consider sex to be an important variable (Frankland 
1977; Herrnson 1994; Murray 2010; Berlinski, Dewan, and Dowding 2012), but in what 
ways could we expect sex to affect the trajectory of a political career? Most overtly, 
perhaps, it has been shown in the past that women suffer from ‘vertical segregation’ when 
it comes to gaining promotion within large organisations, not only in political bodies but in 
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the wider corporate world (Yule 2000; Jalalzai 2008; Krook and O'Brien 2012). At heart, this 
means that men will climb higher than women within the hierarchy of an organisation, and 
the reason for this may be either outright discrimination, gendered perceptions of what 
women are capable of, or gendered ideas of what women want to achieve. For example, 
studies have also shown that women, when promoted into executive-level political 
positions, tend to be disproportionately concentrated in ‘soft’ portfolio areas which are 
feminine in terms of their gender-type (Karam and Lovenduski 2005; Krook and O'Brien 
2012). These include, for example, health, education, policy areas relating to children and 
families, and so on. The pros and cons of this situation won’t be debated here, but the fact 
that sex can have such an impact renders it worthy of inclusion when modelling political 
career paths. 
 
Historically the House of Commons, like many national-level legislatures globally, has been 
dominated by men. As noted above, the 1997 election was notable for the influx of women 
thanks to Labour’s all-women shortlist policy. Despite this, as shown in table 3.3, there are 
far more men than women in the 1997 newly-elected intake, and therefore far more men 
than women in the data sample analysed in this thesis.  
 
Sex Percent Cumulative Percent 
Male (n=170) 
Female (n=72) 
70.2 
29.8 
70.2 
29.8 
Total 100 100 
Table 3.3 Sex of MPs elected for first time at the 1997 General Election, n=242. 
 
The data collected as part of this thesis provides a unique opportunity to examine the 
relative career trajectories of men and women in the House of Commons. Although not 
something pursued in this thesis, I have written about this elsewhere (Allen and Campbell, 
2012; Allen, 2013).  
 
Electoral Majority 
Electoral majority, variously referred to as ‘electoral support’ or ‘personal vote’ amongst 
other names, is considered important to a political career across the existing literature 
(Frankland 1977; Hibbing 1991; O'Malley 2009). A strong electoral base can provide a 
politician with longevity in the legislature, a gift which is likely to make them more 
 104 
 
attractive to a party leader selecting a frontbench team, for example, as the leader can 
select them in the knowledge that they are in parliament for the long haul and not prey to 
the fickle changing of electoral weather. 
 
For elections to the House of Commons, Britain uses a simple majoritarian system with 
single-member constituencies referred to colloquially as ‘first past the post’. The single-
member per seat aspect of the system results in stiff competition for those seats which are 
traditionally considered ‘safe’ for one political party, a phenomenon discussed in chapter 
one. For example, seats in urban areas, particularly in the North of England and Scotland, 
are generally won by the Labour party, whereas the Conservative party have the preserve 
of seats in the South-East, particularly in an area surrounding London known as the ‘Home 
Counties’. Such seats tend to have greater concentrations of wealthy voters in comparison 
to urban seats, although these trends do shift over time. 
 
Majority 1997 (%) Percent Cumulative Percent 
1-5 (n=45) 
6-10 (n=50) 
Over 10 (n=147) 
18.6 
20.7 
60.7 
18.6 
39.3 
100 
Total 100 100 
Table 3.4 Electoral Majority (1997) of MPs elected for first time at the 1997 General 
Election, n=242. 
 
Looking at the spread of electoral majorities across those MPs first-elected in 1997, the 
predominance of MPs with safe seats, majorities of over 10%, is clear. In fact, the smallest 
group of MPs is those with slim majorities, sitting in what are known as marginal seats – 
these MPs make up 18.6% of the total. In between are those MPs with comfortable 
electoral majorities, but not ‘safe’ ones, who make up 20.7% of the sample. 
 
Party 
For reasons discussed in chapter one, political careers in Britain are affected by belonging 
to one party over another, with processes of candidate selection and informal recruitment 
traditions, in addition to ideological factors, affecting which types of pre-parliamentary 
political experience are most desirable in a candidate or MP (Rush 1994). The relative 
success of a political party will also affect career paths, including the availability of actual 
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governmental roles (as opposed to broader ‘frontbench’ roles), as if one’s party is in 
opposition, there is zero chance of making it into government at least until after a general 
election (except by ‘crossing the floor’ and switching parties). As I will outline below, this 
consideration is not particularly relevant to this thesis as I will be measuring both 
governmental frontbench roles and shadow frontbench roles for all three major parties 
within the Commons.  
 
Party Percent Cumulative Percent 
Conservative (n=33) 
Independent (n=1) 
Labour (n=178) 
Lib. Dem. (n=26) 
SNP (n=2) 
UUP (n=2) 
13.6 
.4 
73.6 
10.7 
.8 
.8 
13.6 
14.0 
87.6 
98.3 
99.2 
100 
Total 100 100 
Table 3.5 Party of MPs elected for first time at the 1997 General Election, n=242. 
 
Within the 1997 cohort being studied in this thesis, it is more useful to consider party as a 
question of numbers; that is, the Labour party simply has more MPs than any other party. 
In terms of political careers, the relevance here lies in the fact that it is probably easier to 
make it to the frontbench if you have less competition. Thus, being a Liberal Democrat MP 
as opposed to a Labour MP likely leaves more scope for promotion to those positions. In 
terms of the analysis in the following  chapters, this numeric imbalance is not troubling – 
for example, to avoid overt bias, I will break down the analysis by party when necessary, 
and regardless of this, what is of interest are the overall patterns relating to political 
experience, something that can be tracked across party lines.  
 
In Table 3.6, I outline descriptive statistics for other areas of interest for which variables are 
included in the regression models in chapter four. Experience of student politics and the 
number of seats previously contested in general elections are clear barometers of prior 
political involvement, whilst highest educational qualification and attendance at an 
Oxbridge university are considered proxy measures of candidate quality (Criddle, 2010). 
Finally, holding a constituency seat located in London is both a measure of geographical 
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proximity to Westminster in addition to acting as a control on the effect of being a Labour 
MP in the models that follow. 
 
Experience of student 
politics 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
No  
Yes 
90.9 
9.1 
90.9 
100 
Total 100 100 
Constituency located in 
London? 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
No 
Yes 
90.1 
9.9 
90.1 
100 
Total 100 100 
No. of parliamentary 
seats previous contested 
at general elections 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
None 
1 
2 
3 
4 
52.9 
33.9 
10.3 
2.1 
0.8 
52.9 
86.8 
97.1 
99.2 
100 
Total 100 100 
Highest educational 
qualification 
Percent Cumulative Percent 
Secondary school 
Graduate  
Post-graduate 
20.2 
64.9 
14.9 
20.2 
85.1 
100 
Total 100 100 
Attended Oxbridge? Percent Cumulative Percent 
No 
Yes 
78.9 
21.1 
78.9 
100 
Total 100 100 
Table 3.6 Descriptive statistics for other variables of interest included in regression 
models, n=242 
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Overall, existing studies tell us three main things. Firstly, political experience is deemed 
worthy of consideration by authors studying legislatorial issues, but it is not explored 
particularly closely, something that is certainly the case for existing studies of Britain. 
Secondly, socioeconomic variables are essential to individual-level studies, particularly 
those of sex and education. Thirdly, some sort of acknowledgement of an individual’s 
electoral situation, and the stability of their parliamentary seat, is also required. These final 
two points will form the basis of the regression models analysed in the following chapter, 
and all of the variables included in these are listed in figure 4.1. 
 
Measuring ‘success’ – the hierarchy of frontbench politics 
This thesis will look solely at the attainment of frontbench offices and as such the analysis 
does not incorporate ‘backbench’ offices, such as select committee memberships or 
chairmanships. There are both practical and theoretical reasons for this. Practically, 
incorporating the analysis of select committee offices into the data would have 
complicated an already time-consuming process, and would perhaps have detracted from 
other aspects of the thesis. In terms of a theoretical justification not to include them, it is 
arguable that select committee chairmanships and memberships do not yet constitute a 
serious alternative to the traditionally prestigious frontbench offices of government and 
shadow government, although this could change in future. 
 
The structure of British government 
British governmental roles are structured in a hierarchical way, with Secretaries of State at 
the top and junior ministers at the bottom. Beneath the level of junior minister comes the 
role of Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS). Within the category of junior ministers, there 
are two tiers – the junior minister and the more junior under-secretary of state (James 
1999, p.19). In terms of accountability, ministers are accountable to parliament in areas 
entailed by their brief. Each Cabinet minister will have their own PPS, with junior ministers 
sharing theirs (James 1999, p.21). The number of PPSs has risen over time at a rate 
unmatched by the overall rise in number of paid government posts. In 1999 the numbers of 
PPSs and MPs in paid government roles stood at 47 and 106 respectively (Butler and Butler, 
2000, p71). Clearly this growth of lower-level unpaid roles offers governments the option of 
using such positions to assuage the ambition of potentially restless backbenchers.  
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The opposition has a member of their frontbench shadowing each of these Secretaries of 
State and junior ministers. For example, Andy Burnham, currently the shadow health 
secretary, is the shadow of Andrew Lansley, the incumbent secretary of state for health. 
Membership of the shadow cabinet is considered to be a ‘certain guarantee of high office if 
your party wins the next election’ (Kaufman 1997, p.7). This senior group of MPs are part of 
the wider shadow frontbench in the same way that cabinet ministers are senior to more 
junior members of the government collectively make up the shadow cabinet. Liberal 
Democrat positions have been incorporated here too, helped by the adoption of similar 
‘shadow cabinet’ terminology by the party in the mid-2000s. 
 
In order to allow for analysis of the data that included the largest possible number of 
individuals, a scale has been constructed which harmonises the various positions into five 
equivalent categories. This allows for cross-party analysis to occur. Such a scale is, by 
necessity, imprecise and will inevitably gloss over the jagged edges of reality and is also 
open for perennial discussion. The scale is detailed below.  
 
Figure 3.3 Harmonised scale detailing hierarchy of highest potential frontbench offices in 
UK Parliament 
 
Throughout the analysis in this and subsequent chapters, this scale will be referred to 
whenever discussing office attainment. The text will, for example, refer to ‘level five’ or to 
‘Cabinet level or equivalent’, and so on.  
 
5 – Cabinet Minister / Shadow Cabinet / Lib Dem Shadow Cabinet / Chief Whips / Party 
Leaders 
 
4 – Ministers of State / Shadow Ministers / Lib Dem Shadow Ministers / Whips 
 
3 – Under-Secretaries of State / Opposition Spokespeople / Lib Dem Spokespeople / Junior 
Whips / Advocate General 
 
2 – PPS  
 
1 – Backbenchers 
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Aside from literature which focuses on ministerial appointments, the strand of literature 
that has devoted the most attention to the nature of executive appointments is that of 
gender and politics, with multiple authors providing a feminist assessment of ministerial 
portfolio appointments (Karam and Lovenduski 2005; Krook and O'Brien 2012). This work 
focuses on the relative prestige of posts that men and women are appointed to, in addition 
to their gender-type – whether or not they are policy areas historically associated with 
either sex, or are sex neutral. Although these factors will not be considered in this thesis, 
this framework has been applied to British cabinet posts elsewhere (Allen, 2013), and acts 
as a reminder that different research questions necessitate the use of different conceptual 
and methodological frames. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have introduced the methodology of the thesis, and described in detail the 
ways in which the conceptual contributions of earlier chapters will be brought to life 
empirically. In the next chapter I build on this, operationalising the variables outlined here, 
and beginning the data analysis of the thesis in full. Various types of regression analysis will 
be used to assess whether or not political experience has an effect on career trajectory in 
the House of Commons and ask whether this effect is positive, negative, or neutral for 
different types of pre-parliamentary political experience.  
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Chapter Four – Political experience and political 
careers – establishing an effect 
 
In the previous chapter I introduced the cohort data collected for this thesis, providing 
descriptive statistics and an overview of the scope of the forthcoming analysis. 
Additionally, I discussed how factors other than pre-parliamentary political experience 
could influence political career trajectories, drawing on existing studies to provide a 
rationale for the construction of the regression models included in this chapter. I described 
the methodological approach and methods of data collection utilised in the thesis, 
providing a specific context for the data by looking in detail at the circumstances 
surrounding the 1997 general election – the election at which the cohort being examined 
here were first elected.  
 
Moving on from this, in this chapter I establish the relative importance of pre-
parliamentary political experience as something that affects parliamentary success using 
regression analyses of the cohort data outlined in the previous chapter. I begin by outlining 
the different factors that could be expected to have an effect on the career trajectory of a 
politician. Building on the existing literature which identifies sex, age, and education as 
relevant, I add variables relating of pre-parliamentary political experience, and argue that 
this is a previously unacknowledged indicator as to why some individuals are promoted to 
the very top of British politics ahead of others. Pre-parliamentary political experience is 
broken down into the national- and local-level experience outlined in chapters two and 
three, and appropriate variables are operationalised throughout. This diverges from an 
existing literature which would often include political experience in an occupational 
classification, thereby missing the difference between different types of political 
experience. Here I make such a distinction and provide empirical evidence to support it, an 
original scholarly contribution.  
 
I begin by looking broadly at the effect of different factors on career trajectory across all 
parties within the House of Commons across backbench and frontbench positions. An 
ordinal logistic regression model is used to establish the effect of a number of variables, 
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including those related to political experience, on career trajectory. It is established that 
political experience does have an effect, but that this is small relative to other factors, such 
as age and electoral majority. However, I note that it could be a fallacy to suggest that 
these are not interrelated. I continue by focusing on promotion to specific office, as 
opposed to looking broadly at all frontbench progression – binomial logistic regression is 
used to look at the effect of variables on progression into frontbench roles, and then 
specifically into cabinet-level positions. These models find again that varying political 
experience, although not having the largest effect on promotion into either frontbench or 
cabinet office, does have an effect, and that different types of political experience, either 
local or national, neither of these or a combination of the two, have different effects on 
this – some negative, others positive. As such, these findings corroborate the conceptual 
distinctions made throughout the earlier parts of the thesis, and provide a noteworthy 
finding. Given that this is unaddressed in the existing literature, it should influence future 
work in this area. I close the chapter by restating that it is unlikely that all of the factors 
discussed here are independent, and that in chapter five I will address this 
interdependency in greater detail. 
 
The regression models 
The variables included in the models are listed and defined in figure 4.1. The initial model is 
an ordinal logistic regression model, and the two that follow are binomial logistic 
regression models. The key difference between these two types is the nature of the 
dependent variable, which is binary for the two binomial logistic regression models and 
ordinal for the ordinal logistic regression model.  
 
 
Elected student politician (Yes=1) (StudentPol) 
Constituency (1997) located in London? (Yes=1) (London1) 
Number of seats previously contested? 
Electoral majority at 1997 General Election (Marginal [0-4.9%] =3, Neutral [5-9.9%] =2, Safe 
[10+%] =1) (Majority97) 
Sex (Woman=1) (Sex Binary) 
Age at first election by decade (in ascending order) (Election Age by Decade) 
Highest level of education (Secondary=1, Graduate=2, Postgraduate=3) (Education Numerically 
Coded) 
National pre-parliamentary political experience (Yes=1) (expnationalrecoded) 
Local pre-parliamentary political experience (Yes=1) (explocalrecoded) 
National and local pre-parliamentary political experience (Yes=1) (expbothrecoded) 
Labour MP? (Yes=1) (Lab Binary) 
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Figure 4.1 Definition and coding of variables included in regression models (Tables 4.1, 
4.2, and 4.3).21 
 
A note on statistical significance 
This thesis uses full population data – that is, the data collected and analysed is not a 
sample of the target population (those MPs elected for the first time at the 1997 general 
election), but rather comprises of the entirety of this group. In statistical terms, it is the full 
population. As such, although tests of statistical significance will be reported in the analysis, 
the size and presence of effects will be discussed at greater length than any outcomes of 
these tests below. Though unusual, such an approach is hardly controversial, with 
discussion mounting in recent years as to the efficacy of focusing on significance at the 
expense of effect size (Ziliak and McCloskey 2008). 
 
The first regression analysis is an ordinal logistic regression with the ordinal dependent 
variable of ‘Highest Office on Scale’, measuring the highest office each individual MP held 
on the hierarchical scale outlined previously in figure 3.3 (in the previous chapter). As 
noted, the scale was constructed in order to facilitate cross-party analysis of frontbench 
positions, with much existing work focusing solely on governmental positions and ignoring 
their ‘shadow’ opposite numbers. The regressions are split into Labour and Non-Labour 
models to counteract the negative effect of being a Labour MP on the progression of an 
individual – in this cohort, being a Labour MP makes any ascendancy less likely to happen 
with the obvious explanation rooted in ideas of supply and demand. Following the 1997 
election, new PM Tony Blair had literally hundreds of MPs to select his government from, 
compared to a dilapidated Conservative party which had suffered great losses at the ballot 
box and thus in the size of its parliamentary cohort. As such, being a newly-elected Labour 
MP was to both ride the wave of national support for the party into the office of MP, but 
also to have a smaller chance of progressing into government once the tide had changed 
and it was no longer simply an electoral race. Conversely, being a Conservative MP at this 
time left one with more opportunities for frontbench office – the offices needed to be filled 
                                               
21
 For the purposes of the ordinal logistic regression analysis detailed in table 4.1, a number of these 
variables were recoded in the opposite order to that presented here. This is because ordinal logistic 
regression automatically takes the ‘latest’ category as the reference category. The findings below 
have been written up in a way that replicates the coding here, however, in order to avoid confusion 
for the reader. 
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whilst drawing from a significantly smaller parliamentary party. To put it another way, all 
else being equal, the odds of being picked to be a frontbencher if a Conservative MP are far 
higher than if a Labour MP. Splitting these regressions into two models allows a more 
nuanced analysis of the effect of both the variables of interest as well as the influence of 
party. The regressions are shown below in table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 Ordinal logistic regressions, dependent variable ‘highest office on scale’ 
(detailed in figure 3.3) [link function: logit], Model A - Nagelkerke R-square .329; 
n=variable, maximum of 17823; Model B – Nagelkerke R-square .416, n=variable, 
                                               
22
 For Model B, this variable was recoded to make the reference category election under the age of  
forty. This was done to avoid the hugely inflated Exp(B) odds which occurred when the reference 
category was the same as Model A. This problem occurred due to the lack of cases in the under-
thirty category for non-Labour cases. 
23
 Tests for multicollinearity were carried out and none was found. 
Variable Exp(B) (S.E.) 
A - Labour 
Exp(B (S.E.) 
B - Not Labour 
Elected student politician 
Constituency (1997) located in London?  
No. seats previously contested 
Electoral majority at 1997 G.E. (10%+) 
Electoral majority at 1997 G.E. (5-10%) 
Sex (Woman) 
Age at first election by decade (under-30) 
Age at first election by decade (30-39) 
Age at first election by decade (40-49) 
Age at first election by decade (50-59) 
Age at first election by decade (60-69) 
Highest level of education (secondary) 
Highest level of education (degree level) 
Oxbridge 
Experience – local 
Experience – national 
Experience - both 
8.25** 
0.65 
1.06 
4.42** 
1.90 
0.91 
76.32*** 
9.78*** 
5.54*** 
- 
- 
0.68 
1.28 
1.75 
0.82 
0.84 
0.85 
(.714) 
(.511) 
(.223) 
(.531) 
(.584) 
(.328) 
(1.014) 
(.561) 
(.480) 
- 
- 
(.559) 
(.454) 
(.438) 
(.530) 
(.636) 
(.577) 
0.47 
12.63* 
1.55 
3.62* 
3.19 
0.33 
-22 
- 
1.83 
0.21* 
0.00 
1.82 
2.46 
0.69 
0.28 
2.44 
1.73 
(.653) 
(.1.261) 
(.335) 
(.623) 
(.809) 
(.852) 
- 
- 
(.669) 
(.764) 
(.000) 
(1.097) 
(.803) 
(.621) 
(.810) 
(.728) 
(.887) 
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maximum of 64. * significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level; *** significant at .001 
level. 
 
These regression models measure the effect of these variables on position of an MP on the 
scale detailed in figure 3.3 (in the previous chapter). As such, it is measuring general 
upward trajectory on that scale as opposed to membership of a specific point on that scale. 
Two models are included: Model A, which includes Labour MPs only, and Model B which 
includes only non-Labour MPs.   
 
Turning to Model A, perhaps the most obvious point to note at first glance is that the size 
of all the effects in the model (converted to comparable expected values, denoted above as 
Exp(B)) are relatively small, the only exception the variable for being elected under the age 
of thirty. Alongside the respectable, but relatively small R-square value, it is likely that the 
model doesn’t necessarily account for all of the factors in play here. That is, there is 
something missing. When looking at an area like political careers, it is inevitable that there 
will be a lot of ‘noise’, or factors that are hard to account for. In this case, for example, 
informal political fraternities or loyalties may well play a role in the progression of a career. 
However, the virtue of the approach taken here is that it cuts through this noise to look for 
broader patterns across a large dataset. That is not to say that the ‘noise’ should be 
disregarded – it shouldn’t, and will be discussed throughout the analysis particularly in the 
case studies examined in chapter five – but rather that the wider effects and patterns are 
perhaps of more interest here than the individual story of each MP.  
 
Looking again at Model A in table 4.1, there are five variables with notable effect sizes, and 
these variables achieve varying levels of statistical significance. These were, in increasing 
order, whether an individual had been an elected student politician, a safe electoral 
majority at the 1997 general election (of 10% or more), and finally 3 variables relating to 
age at the time of the 1997 general election. The effects are all positive, meaning that they 
will have a beneficial effect on the odds of an MPs’ movement up the frontbench ladder, as 
detailed in figure 3.3.  
 
The largest of these effects are those related to the age variable. There are three categories 
of this variable shown above, which indicate, in ascending order, whether an MP was 
elected under the age of thirty, between the ages of 30 and 39, or between the ages of 40 
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and 49. The reference category, the category which these three are compared to, is being 
elected above the age of 50 – in other words, the odds ratios (shown as Exp(B) above 
highlight how election at a younger age will have a beneficial effect on progression to the 
frontbench compared to election at an older age. Election under the age of thirty results in 
log odds of progression for MPs over seventy times greater than those of MPs elected age 
fifty or above. Similarly, the log odds of progression for MPs elected age 39 or under are 
just under ten times greater than those elected over fifty, whilst those of MPs elected in 
their forties are just over five times greater. In short, for Labour MPs, being elected young 
has a positive effect on frontbench progression. 
 
The two non-age related effects which are of a notable size are connected to electoral 
majority and having experience as an elected student politician. Perhaps predictably, 
having a safe electoral majority of over ten per cent of the vote at the 1997 general 
election has a large positive effect on the odds of Labour MPs’ progressing into 
governmental roles. MPs with this majority have odds of progression over three times 
greater than MPs who sat in marginal seats following the 1997 general election, considered 
to be seats with a majority of less than 5% of the vote. The other category included in the 
model is those MPs with electoral majorities which are neither marginal nor safe, but 
rather fall between 5-10%. Such a majority still has a positive effect, but it is under half the 
size of the effect of having a safe seat, reflecting the fact that the prime minister is perhaps 
less likely to promote MPs who may not be in parliament following the next election.  
 
As noted above, having experience as an elected student politician also has a notable 
positive effect on the odds of frontbench progression. MPs with such experience had odds 
of progression eight times greater than those who lacked it. The effect size maybe 
particularly inflated for Model A, including solely Labour MPs, owing to the relatively high 
number of Labour MPs with this type of elected experience as a student politician who not 
only made it into government, but into the cabinet itself. Individuals such as Charles Clarke, 
Jacqui Smith, and Jim Murphy all attained cabinet posts by 2010. Additionally, these 
student posts are also quite likely to lead those who hold them into more traditional 
instrumental occupational roles, the case for both Clarke and Murphy. As such, it could be 
argued that the difficulty of untangling the interlinked nature of these various factors 
means one should avoid placing too much emphasis on any specific effect. 
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Turning to Model B, perhaps the most striking thing is its similarity to Model A. To recap, 
Model B was run on non-Labour MPs only. For descriptive statistics relating to how the 
sample of MPs being analysed breaks down by party, see table 3.5. Needless to say, given 
the political nature of the 1997 election, this group is much smaller than the Labour group, 
and makes up around a quarter of the sample. This small sample size does impact on the 
regression model, for example inflating certain coefficients. However, this does not pose 
too serious a problem so long as the researcher is aware of the issue and reports it in full.  
 
Model B contains eight variables which are of notable effect size, four of which achieve 
statistical significance at various levels, all shown in table 4.1. Firstly, two variables which 
had negligible effect sizes in the Labour-only model have greater prominence here. The sex 
variable indicates that women’s odds of progression are over sixty per cent smaller than 
their male colleagues. Holding local-level pre-parliamentary political experience similarly 
has a negative effect, with the odds of progression for MPs with such experience around 
seventy per cent smaller than those without. To put this another way, for non-Labour MPs, 
the odds of frontbench progression occurring increase if you are a man and have no pre-
parliamentary political experience on the local level. I will return to discuss the role of the 
other pre-parliamentary political experience variables across both models shortly. The 
other variable which has a large effect size here compared to being relatively invisible in 
Model A is being an MP for a London constituency. In Model A, this effect is negative, but in 
Model B, being MP for a London constituency results in a twelvefold increase in the odds of 
progression compared to being an MP for any constituency outside of London. This effect 
could have an inflated effect due to the presence of Liberal Democrat MPs in this non-
Labour section of the sample – owing to the small size of their parliamentary party, a 
higher proportion of Lib Dems will be promoted to frontbench roles than will their Labour 
or Conservative counterparts. Liberal Democrats also have the highest percentage of 
London-based MPs in the sample (15.4%). As such, even if only half of these MPs make it to 
frontbench positions, the variable will likely have a large effect in the model. 
 
The variables in Model B which make up the rest of the group with large effect sizes similar 
to those seen in Model A. Electoral majority, specifically having a safe seat (again, with a 
majority of over 10%) has a large positive effect on frontbench progression, increasing the 
odds of progression over three times compared to sitting in a marginal seat. It is worth 
noting that having a smaller majority of between 5-10% also has an effect of roughly the 
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same magnitude. Similar to Model A, age at the time of the 1997 general election has the 
largest effect size in the model. As noted above, this variable was recoded for use in Model 
B due to the lack of cases in the under-thirty category. This lack of cases led the Exp(B) 
outcomes for the variable to become hugely inflated. The findings in table 4.1 can be 
interpreted in comparison to an MP elected between the ages of thirty and thirty-nine. 
Thus, the story is very much the same as Model A – election over the age of fifty has a 
negative effect on the odds of frontbench progression relative to election under the age of 
forty, and this effect is particularly stark for those elected over the age of sixty. The odds of 
these MPs progressing beyond the backbenches are a fraction of a per cent of the same 
odds for an MP elected under the age of forty. 
 
Across both groups of MPs, Labour and non-Labour, there are common themes: a good 
electoral majority, ideally in excess of 10% of the vote, being under the age of 50 when 
elected, the younger the better, are all seemingly crucial to frontbench progression. 
Outside of this, there are variables in the non-Labour MPs only Model B which are not as 
prominent in Model A, but as explained above, this can be explained in part by sampling 
issues.  
 
Considering the pre-parliamentary political experience variables, the results are notable 
mainly for their differences across the two models, highlighting the influence of party on 
how political experience affects career progression. For the Labour intake (shown in model 
A), the effects are negative in their entirety, but are small. MPs with local council 
experience have eighteen per cent smaller odds of progression than colleagues with no 
political experience at all. Similarly, MPs with national pre-parliamentary political 
experience and those with both local and national experience have odds of progression 
sixteen and fifteen per cent smaller than colleagues with no pre-parliamentary political 
experience. 
 
In Model B, not only are the effect sizes larger, they are also not all negative, with the 
national experience and ‘both’ variables having a small positive effect. MPs with national 
experience have odds of progression twice the size of MPs with no pre-parliamentary 
political experience, and MPs with both have odds over seventy per cent greater. 
Conversely, MPs with local experience have odds of progression over seventy per cent 
smaller. Overall, in terms of how pre-parliamentary political experience contributes to 
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broad career progression, the answer would seem to be ‘not much’ based on these models. 
However, there are two caveats to make here. Firstly, given the type of analysis these can 
be taken as rules of thumb of sorts for considering the ascendancy of an MP within the 
frontbench hierarchy. That is, we are not looking here at whether or not MPs reached a 
specific office, for example, but their broad ascendancy on the hierarchical scale outlined 
previously. As such, these initial findings are not surprising, but do leave a gap open for a 
more targeted analysis to occur – for this, binomial logistic regression will be used. 
Secondly, as noted throughout the above discussion, to what extent can we untangle the 
causality, or even the truly independent effect, of these variables? I return to this question 
in chapter five.  
 
Concluding this initial analysis, and considering again the variables of note across both 
models, none are particularly surprising. Electoral majority and relative youth are the 
standout factors which have the largest effect sizes in both models, indicating that being 
elected young and being elected to a safe seat offer the biggest contribution to frontbench 
progression across all parties. How do these guiding principles hold up when considering 
promotion into specific offices, not just the frontbench overall? 
 
Backbench or frontbench? 
As seen above, it would appear that pre-parliamentary political experience has some 
impact, if not a large or statistically significant one, on the general career trajectory of an 
MP within parliament. Building on this, in this section I will utilise logistic regression to 
isolate different levels of office achievement for analysis, highlighting the more subtle 
impact of these variables when considering the very highest offices available to MPs who 
may seek them. 
 
The first binomial logistic regression model uses the binary dependent variable of whether 
an MP’s highest office was as a backbencher or a frontbencher. As such, we are looking at 
membership of fixed categories as opposed to the movement along a scale which the 
previous OLS model assessed and how the different variables included affect the likelihood 
of membership of either group. The first model, which distinguishes between those 
individuals whose highest office was as a backbencher and those who were elevated to a 
frontbench office of any description (including PPS for the purposes of this regression), is 
shown below in table 4.2, whilst the second model, which uses the dependent variable 
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‘Cabinet or not’ is table 4.3. As above, each regression is split into two sub-models, one for 
Labour MPs and one for non-Labour MPs. 
 
An obvious first point of comparison for this regression model is with the ordinal logistic 
regression model discussed above (table 4.1). Again, it should be noted that the binomial 
logistic regression considers the change in the odds of an MP’s highest office being a 
frontbench one (as opposed to backbench) given a change in the independent variable. 
Looking at Model A in table 4.2, the model including only Labour MPs, some similarities 
with the ordinal logistic regression are apparent. Firstly, broadly the same variables have a 
large effect size. These are the variables for having been a student politician, having a 
larger electoral majority, and age at election. It should also be noted that the variables all 
move in the same direction across both Labour models (Model A in both table 4.2 and 4.3), 
the latter two being negative on both occasions and the former positive.  
 
In terms of effect sizes for Model A, the student politician, 1997 majority, age at election 
and national experience variables are the largest. Of particular interest are the effect sizes 
for the political experience variables, which are mixed. The local council experience 
variable has one of the smallest effects in the model (a B of only -.113, reflected in a 
negligible log odds shift). As mentioned, the national experience variable has a much larger 
effect, with a coefficient of -.655, well over ten times the size of its’ local councillor 
counterpart, and this too is a negative effect. Finally, the ‘both’ variable, indicating the 
presence of both local council experience and national experience has a ‘B’ of .330, lying 
between the two individual political experience variables. Comparing these results with 
those of Model B, which includes non-Labour MPs only, highlights some key differences.  
 
As noted above, Model B incorporates fewer variables into the analysis than Model A due 
to the sample size. Owing to the smaller number of non-Labour MPs in the sample, running 
the exact same regression model on non-Labour MPs resulted in chronic multicollinearity 
and heteroscedasticity. Therefore variables shown in tests to be the root of this issue were 
removed one by one until the problem was resolved. Fortunately, it transpired that these 
were variables with small effect sizes in other models, thus reducing the risk that the model 
would be irreparably damaged by their absence. However, it is still likely that the remaining 
variables will have larger effect sizes as fewer other factors are being controlled for. As 
such, some caution is required when interpreting these results. 
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Table 4.2 Binomial logistic regression dependent variable ‘Backbench or Frontbench (1), Model A – n=178, Nagelkerke R-Square .256; 
Model B – n=64, Nagelkerke R-Square .307.24 * significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level; *** significant at .001 level. 
 
 
                                               
24
 Regression Model B contains fewer variables than Model A due to issues relating to the sample size. In order for the regression to run without serious 
multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity, the variables causing these processes were removed one at a time until the model was able to function. The 
impact of this is addressed in the main text. Interaction terms were not included in these models due to the small sample size. Including such terms 
resulted in multicollinearity between interaction terms. 
Model A (Labour) Model B (Not Labour) 
Variable BB or FB B (S.E.) Exp(B) B (S.E.) Exp(B) 
Elected student politician 
Constituency (1997) located in London? 
No. seats prev. contested 
Electoral majority at 1997 G.E. 
Sex (Woman) 
Age at first election by decade  
Highest level of education  
Oxbridge (1) 
Experience – local 
Experience – national 
Experience - both 
1.370 
-.355 
 .103 
-.673 
-.252 
-1.206 
 .412 
 .248 
-.113 
-.655 
 .330 
(1.133) 
(.581) 
(.251) 
(.267) 
(.383) 
(.290) 
(.304) 
(.524) 
(.611) 
(.741) 
(.672) 
3.937 
.715 
1.109 
.510** 
.778 
.299*** 
1.510 
1.282 
.893 
.519 
1.391 
- 
- 
- 
-.950 
- 
-1.549 
 .538 
-2.262 
 .268 
 .731 
 .273 
- 
- 
- 
(.707) 
- 
(.856) 
(1.128) 
(1.857) 
(1.648) 
(1.776) 
(1.573) 
- 
- 
- 
.387 
- 
.212 
1.712 
.104 
1.307 
2.078 
1.314 
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Table 4.3 Binomial logistic regression dependent variable ‘Cabinet (1) or not’, Model A25 – n= 178, Nagelkerke R-Square .394 ; Model B – 
n=64, Nagelkerke R-Square .304. * significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level; *** significant at .001 level.
                                               
25
 Model A has had the ‘constituency located in London’ variable removed due to multicollinearity, which is eliminated without it. 
Model A (Labour) Model B (Not Labour) 
Variable B (S.E.) Exp(B) B (S.E.) Exp(B) 
Elected student politician 
Constituency (1997) located in London? 
No. seats prev. contested 
Electoral majority at 1997 G.E. 
Sex (Woman) 
Age at first election by decade  
Highest level of education  
Oxbridge (1) 
Experience – local 
Experience – national 
Experience - both 
2.929 
 - 
 .362 
-2.560 
-.375 
-.811 
 .503 
1.031 
-1.614 
 .417 
-1.628 
(1.105) 
- 
(.634) 
(1.407) 
(.813) 
(.676) 
(.855) 
(.864) 
(1.465) 
(1.365) 
(1.706) 
18.715** 
- 
1.436 
.077 
.687 
.444 
1.654 
2.889 
.199 
1.517 
.196 
-.087 
1.662 
 .440 
-.129 
-.235 
-.455 
 .856 
 .636 
-2.296 
 .255 
 .379 
(.757) 
(1.729) 
(.394) 
(.381) 
(.956) 
(.471) 
(.741) 
(.685) 
(1.335) 
(.812) 
(.961) 
.917 
5.270 
1.553 
.879 
.791 
.635 
2.353 
1.889 
.101 
1.290 
1.461 
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In Model B (table 4.2), the non-Labour model, no variables achieved statistical 
significance, a notable departure from the patterns of Model A. However, the effect 
sizes of those variables which did achieve significance in Model A, and their direction of 
travel, remain the same – these are the variables for electoral majority and age at 
election. The greatest difference is in the Oxbridge variable, which denotes attendance 
at either Oxford or Cambridge universities. This shifts from a small but positive effect in 
Model A to a large and negative one in Model B. Of course, the increase in effect size 
could be a result of the reduced overall model size, but the change in direction is 
perhaps more compelling regardless of the alterations to the model. Turning to the 
political experience variables, the major difference is again in the direction of these 
variables, which are now all positive. That is, all of them have a positive effect in terms 
of moving from the back- to frontbenches for MPs of parties other than Labour. In 
increasing order of effect size, the local councillor variable results in an Exp(B) of 1.307, 
the ‘both’ variable in 1.314, and the national experience variable in an Exp(B) of 2.078. 
This final effect is both larger than its counterpart in Model A and is positive rather 
than negative.   
 
Overall, the two models foreground the importance of factors such as age, involvement 
in student politics, and having a decent majority to increasing the likelihood of making 
it from the back to frontbenches. This is hardly surprising – it stands to reason that 
being elected young will both provide an MP with more time to make it to the top in 
the longer term, but perhaps it is better to read something else into being elected 
young, namely that in and of itself, it is a mark of confidence in the individual. That is, 
to have circumvented the often long and torturous process of being selected to 
challenge a parliamentary seat (something addressed in more detail in the next 
chapter) suggests that the individual is either very talented and therefore highly rated, 
that they have had some assistance via useful contacts and so on to help them gain 
election at such a young age possibly through holding an national position, or both. The 
size of the effect of having been an (elected) student politician may require a similar 
interpretation – such experience likely gives the holder a profile, and contacts book, 
unmatched by colleagues who have not held political office of this type previously. 
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Also notable are the party differences across the two models, particularly in terms of 
the effect of pre-parliamentary political experience. For Labour MPs, the effects are 
mostly negative, with the exception of having both local and national experience. For 
non-Labour MPs, any and all political experience has a positive effect. The conditions 
under which these effects alter will be discussed below.  
 
Cabinet or not? 
Turning to the second set of binomial logistic regressions (table 4.3), some distinct 
differences are apparent. To clarify, these regression models have as their dependent 
variable whether someone made it into a Cabinet-level post or not (with yes coded as 
1). Model A only includes the cases of Labour MPs whereas Model B includes solely 
non-Labour MPs. 
 
Comparing the regression models in tables 4.2 and 4.3 allows us to see whether the 
factors that play a role in either aiding or inhibiting a move from the backbenches to 
the frontbenches play a similar or different role in assessing whether someone made it 
not just to the frontbenches, but to the very top, i.e. the cabinet or equivalent.  
 
The first thing to note about Model A (in table 4.3) is that its r-squared value is the 
highest of all 4 models across both tables, a figure of .394, suggesting that this model 
has more explanatory power than the others. It should also be noted that this model 
does not include a variable controlling for a constituency being located in London as 
including this variable led to high multicollinearity. This is likely due to the electoral 
dominance of the London region by the Labour party that would have reduced the 
amount of variance in the model. As a result of the omission of this variable, it is 
expected that effect sizes in Model A may be marginally more inflated than they would 
otherwise have been, something to bear in mind throughout the following analysis.  
 
In many respects, the two Labour-only models are quite similar, with the same 
variables having large effect sizes in both – for example, variables for student politician, 
electoral majority, and age at election. Where the models differ, however, is in the size 
of variables in the second model for Oxbridge, and then the local council and ‘both’ 
political experience variables. These last two variables have Exp(B) figures around .190, 
a large negative effect on the odds of making it to a cabinet-level position if in 
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possession of either local pre-parliamentary political experience or both local and 
national experience.  
 
Of additional interest here is the reduced impact of age, which not only fails to achieve 
statistical significance, something it has done in each model presented in this chapter 
so far, but also has a greatly reduced effect size. Indeed, this is consistent across both 
Labour and non-Labour models (see Model B, table 4.3), suggesting that although age 
is still a factor in promotion, and being younger will help, age alone will not get you all 
the way to the top. It would seem that other factors, such as political experience and 
Oxbridge attendance, play a part, with the Oxbridge variable in particular having a 
notable positive effect and an Exp(B) of 2.889. Having attended Oxbridge greatly 
increases the odds of making it into the Cabinet.  
 
The pre-parliamentary political experience variables also differ greatly from the 
previous regressions, increasing their effect size greatly in Model A of table 4.3 
compared to the same model in table 4.2. Of particular interest is the increase in size of 
the local council experience variable, which is ten times larger in the second model but 
remains negative. As such, local experience is one of the biggest negative effects in the 
model, along with a smaller electoral majority and having both types of political 
experience (which includes having local experience). National experience has a much 
smaller effect, with log odds of 1.517, but has switched from a negative effect in the 
backbench/frontbench model to a positive one when looking specifically at the cabinet. 
 
Turning to Model B, the model which includes cases for non-Labour MPs only, a 
number of variables change in terms of both size and direction. A few decrease in 
effect size compared to Model A, namely those variables for student politicians, 
electoral majority, age at election, Oxbridge, and then the national and ‘both’ political 
experience variables. Conversely, only number of seats contested, education, and the 
local council experience variable increase their effect size. Before looking at these 
changes more carefully, it is worth noting that these changes in and of themselves tell 
us something interesting – that the factors which affect promotion to cabinet-level 
positions differ by party. In addition, the changes between Model B in this regression 
and Model B in the backbench/frontbench regression show that these factors also vary 
in their impact dependent on the level of office attainment being studied.  
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In many ways, the differences between the Labour and non-Labour models make 
sense. For example, it stands to reason that, given their smaller number, these other 
parties are going to be less fussy, so to speak, over who gets promoted. Or at least, 
they have less opportunity to be fussy. Thus, factors such as age, electoral majority, 
and experience as a student politician will perhaps count for less in this situation, 
explaining their reduced impact and smaller effect sizes in the regression model. This 
does not, however, explain the massively increased negative impact of local council 
experience, something which makes those who possess it almost 90% less likely to 
achieve a cabinet-level role. Of course, it could simply be a side-effect of the fact that 
the majority of those MPs who did have local council experience are from the Labour 
party. Therefore, it is not that these parties ‘punish’ these individuals more than Labour 
do, but rather there were simply less of them to promote in the first place.  
 
Looking again at the pre-parliamentary political experience variables, other than the 
hugely negative impact of just local experience (with an Exp(B) of .101), the national 
and ‘both’ variables have a small positive effect (Exp)Bs of 1.290 and 1.461 
respectively). This differs from the Labour only model, where having both types of 
experience had a large negative effect, and also differs from the backbench/frontbench 
models (table 4.3) where the effect of this variable was roughly the same across both 
Labour and non-Labour regressions. Hence having both types of experience may help 
MPs reach the very top in those political parties that are not Labour. It is worth 
remembering that this group includes not only Conservative MPs, but also a number of 
Liberal Democrat MPs as well as MPs from the smaller parties. It is perhaps to be 
expected that these parties, particularly the Liberal Democrats, will value a mix of both 
local and national-level experience, relying as they do on a groundswell of local 
campaigning and support to counteract the higher spending and national reach that 
the larger parties have.  
 
The empirical data presented in this chapter has established both that political 
experience has an effect on parliamentary career progression but also that there are 
other factors in play. In addition, it has shown that no single factor is consistently the 
most important predictor of success and there is no single variable playing the role of a 
Rosetta stone, allowing for political career paths to be divined from limited knowledge. 
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It has highlighted that the factors which combine to result in promotion differ 
depending on which destination is being looked at (i.e. generic frontbench or 
specifically cabinet positions), and which political party the MP belongs to.  
 
Those variables which had the most consistently notable effect were a mix of personal 
characteristics fixed from a point in the personal history of each MP, often from birth, 
and then more immediate political characteristics. For example, age at election and 
electoral majority respectively. Thus, it would be easy to state at this point that these 
factors, particularly age, electoral majority, and having attended Oxbridge are the 
factors which matter most when considering who makes it to the top of British political 
life, more so than political experience in any case. But to do so would obscure the 
complexity of what we are looking at. To suggest that age at election or electoral 
majority is unrelated to political experience would be wrong. It is not random that 
some MPs sit in safe seats whilst others do not. It is not random that some MPs are 
elected young, and without having contested numerous unwinnable seats prior to this, 
whilst some are elected when older and battle-scarred from electoral dogfights. This 
raises the question of how different types of political experience interact with these 
other influential characteristics to either help or hinder individuals when it comes to 
being promoted. Addressing this question is the work of the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
The title of this chapter asks the question of whether pre-parliamentary political 
experience has an effect on career trajectory in the House of Commons. The empirical 
analysis in the chapter builds on the conceptual groundwork of the previous two 
chapters. In those, I argued that political experience should be considered separately 
from occupational experience and that different types of political experience should be 
distinguished from one another in both conceptual and empirical work. In this chapter I 
provide evidence that different types of political experience have differential effects on 
political career trajectories in the British House of Commons. 
 
The data analysis in the chapter focused on the presence and size of effects rather than 
their statistical significance – as the entire population (i.e. not a sample) is present in 
the data, such tests are not strictly necessary in order to assess effect strength. They 
were, however, reported, though were not given the prominence that has become 
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traditional in similar research. It was found that across a number of measure of career 
progress, including a generalised ‘highest office’ regression, alongside more specific 
binomial logistic regressions looking at both frontbench and cabinet-level roles in 
particular, pre-parliamentary political experience does have an effect. A key point to 
note is that this effect is not always positive, is not consistent in size, and is never the 
biggest in the model. That is, other factors are equally, if not more, ‘important’ and 
have larger effect sizes. This is hardly surprising – it stands to reason that factors such 
as electoral majority and age will have larger effects, though it has also been contested 
throughout this chapter that these factors are likely interlinked.  
 
The nature of interrelation is the focus of the next chapter, chapter five, which will 
highlight the ways in which political experience, and the different ways that individuals 
initially engage with the political system, affect their subsequent political careers, 
including their electoral majorities, their first promotions, and indeed their overall 
career achievements. It will show that where you come from really does affect where 
you go. 
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Chapter Five - Mapping the preferential 
political career 
In the previous chapter I used regression analysis to establish firstly that pre-
parliamentary experience has an effect on career trajectory in the House of Commons, 
secondly that this effect differs depending on the type of political experience, as well as 
by party, and thirdly, that other effects are consistently greater in size. In particular, 
factors such as the age of an MP at the time of their first election, as well as their 
electoral majority were shown to have a large effect on political career trajectory, with 
youth and a large majority having a notable positive impact. Confirmation that pre-
parliamentary political experience affected career trajectory post-election is an original 
contribution to the existing literature. I argued, however, that many of the factors 
being analysed overlap in some way and that it is hard to untangle fully the 
contribution of these various things, even when using regression analysis. 
 
In this chapter I build on those broad findings by looking specifically at how these 
factors do interrelate, and argue that pre-parliamentary political experience will shape 
an individual’s interaction with these other factors, in essence providing them with a 
preferential political career path throughout their political lives. I map the ways in 
which pre-parliamentary political experience interacts with other characteristics and 
events, such as age, safeness of seat, and so on, to aid or hinder an individual’s 
progress depending on the type of experience they have. Beginning at the stage of 
unsuccessful contestations of parliamentary seats at elections, and moving through to 
look at age at first election, electoral majority, first promotions and highest offices, I 
show how national-level political experience is more prevalent in politicians who are 
elected younger, promoted faster, and end up in higher office than their colleagues 
who cut their political teeth at the local level.  
 
Moving chronologically, I begin at the candidate selection phase, asking whether pre-
parliamentary political experience affects the ability of candidates to find a seat first 
time round, before looking at whether electoral majority, first non-backbench 
promotion, and highest office achievements, amongst others, differ by pre-
parliamentary political experience. Throughout the chapter, case studies of real MPs 
will be used to elucidate the findings, and these are interspersed with the main text. 
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Completing the empirical analysis of the thesis prior to broader contextualising of the 
findings in chapter six, this chapter foregrounds that pre-parliamentary political 
experience does indeed affect career trajectories within the UK parliament, that 
different types of experience have different effects, and that these effects only take 
hold at certain stages of a career. 
 
Finding a seat 
For any aspirant MP, indeed any aspirant politician, the first step in a political career is 
to gain access to their political venue of choice (Lawless 2012). Aspirant 
parliamentarians in the UK must stand for selection as a party’s parliamentary 
candidate for a single constituency. In other words, they need to find a seat where 
their party has not already selected a parliamentary candidate for the next election and 
stand for selection there. The processes by which this selection takes place in the three 
main political parties were detailed in chapter one, and the ways in which different 
elements of the process may be biased in favour of certain types of political experience 
were noted. In smaller parties, it is feasible that candidates may be approached and 
asked to run, and there are fewer formal structures and processes in place when 
selecting a parliamentary candidate. For the majority of MPs in the House of Commons, 
however, finding a seat and navigating the process of candidate selection is essential to 
their career progression, and this often fraught process is well documented in the 
academic literature (Rush 1969; Bochel and Denver 1983; Katz 2001). 
 
As noted in chapter one, a common occurrence in the process of becoming an MP is for 
many MPs to have unsuccessfully fought a seat before being elected (Rush 1994, 
p.575). The importance that constituency parties place on this ‘blooding’ when 
selecting a candidate is unclear, but evidence from King (1983) suggests that it became 
more common between the 1940s and 1980s for candidates to have been unsuccessful 
in another contest before winning selection and election to the Commons. Looking 
specifically at cabinet ministers, this trend is even more pronounced, with a third of 
Thatcher’s cabinet, including the Prime Minister herself, having fought unsuccessful 
seats at one time (King 1983, pp.266-267). Arguably seen as part of a political 
apprenticeship (Ashe et al. 2010), it variably provides both the experience of running 
for office, but equally acts as proof of party loyalty, of being willing to get one’s hands 
dirty for the cause. Of interest to this thesis is whether or not this phenomenon is more 
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or less prevalent amongst different groups of individuals elected for the first time at 
the 1997 general election dependent on the nature of the pre-parliamentary political 
experience they possess. As was also noted in chapter one, within this process safe 
seats, those seats which are traditionally held by a single party for long stretches of 
time, are prized. If an aspirant MP gains selection as the candidate for a seat which is 
safely in the grip of their party, they are the de facto MP from that moment on.  
 
There are various ways to interpret any differences across groups in this process of 
‘blooding’. It can be assessed as a measure of determination in the sense that 
candidates who gain more than one candidacy but have no electoral success are 
evidently keen on making it to the Commons. Conversely, continued loss could also be 
seen as a mark of misguided confidence and of lack of quality in a candidate – if 
election requires selection in either a marginal or safe seat, and this hasn’t happened 
after numerous attempts, it might be seen as the time to accept that it may not happen 
anytime soon. The regressions in the previous chapter showed that although the effect 
of having run unsuccessfully in multiple seats is small, it is always beneficial. That is, 
there is not necessarily any harm in it. Having said that, multiple runs without success 
are likely to result in a candidate being older when they do finally make it into the 
Commons, something which in turn will affect their progression to their frontbenches. 
 
No. of seats 
prev. 
contested 
Pre-parliamentary political experience Total 
Neither 
(%) 
Local 
(%) 
National 
(%) 
Both (%) (%) 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
42.9 
40.0 
14.3 
2.9 
0 
55.2 
29.5 
12.4 
2.9 
0 
54.0 
36.0 
8.0 
2.0 
0 
53.8 
36.5 
5.8 
0 
3.8 
52.9 
33.9 
10.3 
2.1 
.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.1 Crosstabulation of pre-parliamentary political experience and number of 
seats previously contested, n=242; no differences were found to be significant (Chi-
squared test), p=.415. 
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Table 5.1, above, suggests however that there is no significant relationship between 
pre-parliamentary political experience and the number of electoral contests a 
candidate has participated in prior to election to the Commons. It should be noted that 
this table collects data only for those occasions when the individual was selected as a 
parliamentary candidate and ran for election. Of additional interest here would be the 
number of seats for which selection was contested but not achieved. Unfortunately, 
such data are not widely available, if even in existence at all, and as such are not 
presented here. 
 
More than 
one diff. 
seat? 
Pre-parliamentary political experience Total 
Neither 
(%) 
Local  
(%) 
National 
(%) 
Both  
(%) 
(%) 
No 
Yes 
75.0 
25.0 
78.7 
21.3 
87.0 
13.0 
79.2 
20.8 
79.8 
20.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.2 Crosstabulation of pre-parliamentary political experience and more than 
one different seat previously contested, n=114; no differences were found to be 
significant (Chi-squared test), p=.890. 
 
Another point of interest here, and pertinent to debates surrounding the rise of career 
politicians, is that of localism. One accusation levelled against ‘career politicians’ is that 
they lack ties to the constituencies that they represent in the Commons. They are 
perceived to embark on selection tours in search of a seat which serves only as a 
conduit through which they can express their political ambitions as opposed to a 
geographically-bounded area of which they are ostensibly proud to be an elected 
representative (Childs and Cowley 2011). One way of measuring this process of 
‘shopping around’ for a seat is by looking at whether a candidate who has contested in 
excess of one parliamentary seat unsuccessfully did so in the same constituency, or 
instead has contested multiple seats. Overwhelmingly, as shown in table 5.2, it is the 
case that candidates are quite ‘loyal’ to seats they have contested unsuccessfully, with 
a large majority of 79.8% contesting the same seat more than once unsuccessfully prior 
to their eventual election in 1997. There is little variation across the types of political 
experience, with locally- and nationally-focused experience yielding almost identical 
patterns. There are no statistically significant relationships visible in the data. MPs with 
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neither local nor national-level political experience are more likely to have run in 
multiple seats. It may be that these candidates with no political experience might see 
this touring around, and blooding, as a process of initiation and a way to earn some 
recognition and respect within the party. For those with experience, it is possible that 
these candidates were perhaps running in seats where the party has asked them to, 
secure in the knowledge that they were likely to suffer a loss and had therefore 
struggled to find a willing sacrificial lamb – a further indicator of party loyalty. 
 
However, as shown in tables 5.1 and 5.2, there is no significant advantage or 
disadvantage to having a certain type of pre-parliamentary political experience when 
seeking selection as a parliamentary candidate. This is surprising, as one would expect 
local parties, who largely control candidate selection processes, to select candidates 
with local experience in greater numbers than candidates with no such experience. 
Counteracting this, however, are the other forces in play in these processes. As 
discussed in chapter three, the Labour party, for example, saw the central party 
leadership attempting to exert control over the candidate selection process in various 
formal and informal ways (Katz 2001; Russell 2005). Breaking the analysis down by 
party yields no significant differences across the different parties.26 The formalities of 
empirical data also do not allow the intricacies of processes such as these to be 
accounted for in full detail. Norris and Lovenduski (1995) highlight the complexity of 
these candidate selection processes, and the various backroom conversations and 
wrangling, which remain unseen and impossible to quantify, are perhaps the cause of 
the inconclusive outcomes seen here. 
 
Age at election 
Regardless of how many times you try to get into the Commons, if you have your eyes 
on a frontbench career, you would be advised to get in whilst young. All of the 
regression analyses presented in chapter four highlight the importance of age as a 
predictor of office attainment. The story here is clear – the younger the age at which 
you are first elected, the higher your chances of reaching a frontbench office. In fact, 
when considering the regression results, it is clear that in many ways age is the factor 
                                               
26
 Fisher’s exact test was used where sample size was too small for chi-squared tests. Tests were 
not run on smaller parties Scottish National Party, Ulster Unionist Party, or on the sole 
independent MP due to small sample sizes.  
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that matters, at least according to the statistics. But to interpret age on its own would 
be a fallacy – people are selected for, and elected to, parliament at a young age for a 
reason (i.e. it is not a random selection, and their age is unlikely to be the sole reason 
they were selected). As noted throughout the literature review and earlier chapters, 
selection by a constituency is often the result of precise manoeuvres through formal 
and informal processes, involving personal contacts, friends of friends, many hours on 
the phone, and calling in favours (Rush 1969; Budge and Farlie 1975; Bochel and 
Denver 1983; Gallagher 1985; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1997; Katz 2001; 
Gaunder 2007; Cheng and Tavits 2011; Lawless 2012). Again, it is not a random process. 
Therefore it is of interest to highlight the ways in which political experience interacts 
with selection, particularly the age at which people are selected. 
 
Research that discusses the prospects of women councillors challenging a 
parliamentary seat notes that, in many cases, these women will be older than their 
male colleagues taking the same step (Briggs 2000; Allen 2012, 2013). It is possible to 
generalise this assertion to all councillors, regardless of sex. As table 5.3 shows, those 
with local experience are more likely to have been elected to parliament at over the 
age of 40 than any other group, a difference that is highly statistically significant.  
 
Age at 
election (by 
decade) 
Pre-parliamentary political experience Total 
Neither 
(%) 
Local  
(%) 
National 
(%) 
Both  
(%) 
(%) 
Under-30 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
2.9** 
20.0** 
65.7** 
11.4** 
0** 
1.0** 
24.8** 
44.8** 
29.5** 
0** 
4.0** 
56.0** 
32.0** 
6.0** 
2.0** 
1.9** 
25.0** 
48.1** 
23.1** 
1.9** 
2.1 
30.6 
45.9 
20.7 
.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.3 Crosstabulation of pre-parliamentary political experience and election age 
by decade, n=242; ** differences significant at the .01 level (Chi-squared test), 
p=.002. 
 
It is impossible to separate out here whether such a difference is because those with 
local experience aren’t trying to be selected or whether they are trying but can’t be 
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selected. In any case, knowing this wouldn’t change the fact that many of them are not 
entering parliament at a young age, and are put at a relative disadvantage vis a vis 
career progression than their colleagues. That is, regardless of the hidden 
machinations, knowing what is shown in table 5.4 tells us something important about 
the role of local councillorship in the context of a political career. If being younger is a 
major career boost, as the regression analyses in the previous chapter would suggest, it 
is one whose use is dominated by those with certain types of political experience, 
namely national-level, over others – those rooted in local politics.  
 
The young professional politician - Yvette Cooper (Lab) 
Yvette Cooper entered the Commons at the age of 28, taking over the safe Labour seat 
of Pontefract, a seat she holds to this day. Her background was professionally political; 
she had been an economic researcher for Leader of the Opposition John Smith before 
going to work for Bill Clinton, then a presidential candidate, in 1992. Two more roles in 
research and journalism followed before her election in 1997. Once elected, she had to 
wait only two years before being promoted to a junior ministerial position in the 
Department of Health, a role swiftly followed by other roles in Health, the Lord 
Chancellor’s department, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, the position of Chief 
Secretary of the Treasury before taking her position as Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions 12 years after her first election. Since the 2010 General Election, and the end 
of the period studied for this thesis, she has maintained her position at the top of British 
politics, becoming Shadow Home Secretary under new Labour leader Ed Miliband. In 
many ways, Cooper is the ideal-type ‘professional’ politician – elected young and 
promoted fast. She has held a number of instrumental political occupations at the 
national level and has gained promotion after promotion. Her first promotion was to a 
junior ministerial position, shown by the data presented here to be an indicator of 
future success. 
 
In contrast to Yvette Cooper, for example, a local councillor may have a career outside 
of politics which commandeers much of their time, leaving politics as something they 
pursue on the side until such a point that they are able to cease their existing 
occupation and run for parliamentary office. As noted above, this is a pattern seen 
amongst women councillors, who are more likely to run for higher office once their 
primary caring commitments have largely finished, usually occurring when their 
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children reach a certain age (Briggs 2000; Allen 2013). However, as emphasised in 
chapter four, there are clear benefits to being elected at a young age, including initial 
promotions into higher office than other MPs, and the more obvious benefit of having 
longer in parliament if this is electorally possible and personally desirable.  
 
Majority 
Electoral majority is also shown to be a factor of influence across the regression 
analyses, with its influence differing depending on the position being focused on and 
also depending on which party the MP belongs to. For example, in terms of how it 
affects the attainment of cabinet-level positions, having a marginal majority (of less 
than 5% of the overall vote within a constituency) damaged Labour MPs chances of 
reaching Cabinet by up to 90%, whereas it damaged non-Labour MPs chances by only 
12%.  
 
The electoral majority (as a percentage of overall constituency vote) of an MP at the 
1997 general election was used as a measure of majority rather than also including the 
2001 and 2005 elections. The rate of attrition of MPs means that sample sizes would 
fluctuate across the three elections, and those MPs who remained would be naturally 
predisposed to reach higher office in greater numbers than those who did not (for 
whom higher office would no longer be an option). Additionally, it is likely that the 
electoral majority gained by an individual would not change beyond recognition across 
the three elections, with the possible exception of 2005 which saw the fallout from the 
Iraq war affect Labour’s electoral health. As such, majorities from the 1997 election are 
used throughout the thesis when using majority as an empirical variable.  
 
The phenomenon of safe seats is widespread within the British system, aided by the 
first past the post electoral system (Rush 1994, p.570). A safe seat is one which is 
almost entirely dominated by a single party and one which they are likely to retain 
regardless of national electoral performance. These seats are highly prized by 
prospective MPs as they guarantee a long stint on the Commons’ benches and are an 
ideal springboard from which to ascend to high office, be it governmental or internal 
party office. Another consequence of the safe seat phenomena is the de facto transfer 
of power for choosing an MP from the wider constituency electorate to the local 
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members of the dominant party, further entrenching the importance of the candidate 
selection process in assembling the Members of the House of Commons.  
 
Amongst other things, electoral majority is a measure of an MPs’ job security – that is, 
if an MP has a large majority, they are less likely to lose at the next election, and are 
therefore less likely to worry about such an eventuality. Having a ‘safe seat’, one 
traditionally won by one party, will also result in a long tenure should the MP want it. 
As such, it is the perfect base for a long and successful parliamentary career and would 
presumably be highly prized by prospective MPs. As noted above, it is common for MPs 
to run in unwinnable seats at first, a rite of passage of sorts, before graduating to seats 
which they have either a reasonable, good, or almost certain chance of winning.  
 
Electoral 
majority 
1997 GE (%) 
Pre-parliamentary political experience Total 
Neither 
(%) 
Local  
(%) 
National 
(%) 
Both  
(%) 
(%) 
1-5% 
6-10% 
Over 10% 
14.3 
22.9 
62.9 
21.0 
24.8 
54.3 
16.0 
24.0 
60.0 
19.2 
7.7 
73.1 
16.0 
24.0 
60.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.4 Crosstabulation of pre-parliamentary political experience and electoral 
majority at the 1997 election, n=242; no differences were found to be significant (Chi-
squared test), p=.241. 
 
Generally, a majority of less than 5% (of the overall vote) is considered marginal, one 
greater than 5 but less than 10 is considered neutral, but not safe, and a majority 
greater than 10% is deemed to be safe. Table 5.4 shows that there are no significant 
differences in electoral majority based on different types of pre-parliamentary political 
experience. In many ways, this is not a particular surprise – the dispersion of safe 
electoral seats amongst MPs will reflect their selection for those safe seats, and as seen 
above, these processes are intensely complicated, with various forces coming into play. 
Here, it is likely that for each MP with national-level political experience who was able 
to use this to secure a safe seat utilising their party contacts, there was a local stalwart 
in a safe seat being selected as the previous MP retired. Thinking specifically about the 
context of the 1997 election, it is also likely that seats which generally may have been 
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Labour seats, but only with a majority of between 5 and 10 per cent, saw Labour gains 
in line with rest of the country, shifting these majorities into ‘safe’ territory. 
Additionally, despite being so highly prized, table 5.4 shows that a majority of newly-
elected MPs sat in safe seats following the election – thus, they may be prized, but they 
are not necessarily rare. Charles Clarke, former Home Secretary, gained a large majority 
at the 1997 election, building on a history of local and national political experience. 
 
Sitting in a safe seat- Charles Clarke (Lab) 
Charles Rodway Clarke entered the Commons in 1997 as MP for Norwich South with a 
majority of over 10% aged 47. Clarke rose to national prominence in his twenties when 
he became President of the National Union of Students, this following a stint as 
President of Cambridge Students’ Union. From 1980, he served as a councillor in the 
London borough of Hackney and at the same time acted as Chief of Staff for Neil 
Kinnock for 11 years until 1992, who became leader of the Labour party during this 
period. As such, Clarke falls firmly into the ‘both’ category when it comes to pre-
parliamentary political experience, holding posts at both local and national level. 
Following his election to parliament, it took him only a year to gain promotion to the 
position of junior minister at the Department for Education and Employment. After only 
a year in this position, he took up a similar role at the Home Office, before becoming 
Minister with Portfolio in 2001 and then making the step up to Secretary of State level 
in 2002, this time back at the newly-fashioned Department for Education and Skills. 
Clarke took up his position as Home Secretary, one of the great offices of state, in 2004 
and remained there for two years. Clarke is a clear example of someone who combined 
different facets of political experience over his pre-parliamentary life, gaining national 
prominence and national-level contacts in his NUS role and his position alongside 
Kinnock, but also gaining local experience on a prominent London council. This profile, 
and reputation, likely left him with good contacts at the top of the party, as well as a 
fast promotional arc, despite being elected at a relatively higher age. Clarke left the 
Commons in 2010 having lost his seat by a few hundred votes. 
 
Out of the blocks - first promotions 
Once into the Commons, and the first cabinet and frontbench teams have been 
selected, new MPs will try to get to grips with the multiplicities of their new role in a 
process of parliamentary socialisation (Rush and Giddings 2011). Within a few years, 
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however, attention turns to promotions, rumours of reshuffles resulting in hours sat by 
the phone waiting for the party leader to call (King 2007; Mullin 2009). The question 
here is one of who gets promoted from the backbenches for the first time, when, and 
to which positions? 
 
First, do MPs with certain types of pre-parliamentary political experience move off the 
backbenches faster than those MPs with other types of experience? Does any 
recognition or personal connection afforded those who may have worked in close 
proximity to the party leadership within Westminster result in their speedy promotion? 
 
First 
promotion in 
first term? 
Pre-parliamentary political experience Total 
Neither 
(%) 
Local  
(%) 
National 
(%) 
Both  
(%) 
(%) 
No 
Yes 
16.7 
83.3 
46.7 
53.3 
41.7 
58.3 
30.6 
69.4 
37.2 
62.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.5 Crosstabulation of pre-parliamentary political experience and first 
promotion in first term, n=156; a chi-squared test found no significant differences, 
p=.054.  
 
Looking at whether or not an MP was first promoted from the backbenches in their 
first parliamentary term (in this case, prior to the 2001 general election), table 5.5 
shows that a majority of MPs were promoted within this time period, 62.8 per cent; 
perhaps the more interesting facet of this is the offices into which these promotions 
were. 
 
Does the office into which a first promotion occurs matter? Are some better 
springboards into even higher office than others?  Although not included in the 
regression analyses27, table 5.6 shows that there is a relationship between first 
                                               
27
 This variable was not included in the regression analysis as it is considered to be a post-
election characteristic that was not fixed at the time of election. This is not to say it does not 
have an effect (it does), but to have included it alongside characteristics such as sex or age 
would have diluted these fixed characteristics and diminished our ability to assess their relative 
importance. 
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promotions and ultimate highest offices. Indeed, this is a relationship which is both 
statistically significant and large in size.  
 
Highest office on scale First office on scale Total 
2 (%) 3 (%) 4 (%)  
2 – PSS, etc. 
3 – U/Secs of state, etc. 
4 – Min. of State, etc. 
5- Cabinet, etc. 
41.6*** 
19.5*** 
32.5*** 
6.5 
.0*** 
41.1*** 
35.7*** 
23.2 
.0*** 
9.1*** 
45.5*** 
45.5 
20.6 
25.8 
35.5 
18.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.6 Crosstabulation of first office on scale by highest office on scale n=155; *** 
differences significant at the .001 level (Chi-squared test), p=.000. 
 
As table 5.6 shows, the higher the office in which you start, the higher you are likely to 
go. This relationship is statistically significant at the .001 level. 41.6% of those MPs 
whose first promotion was to a PPS-level position never moved above it, with only 
6.5% of cabinet-level ministers starting at that point. Conversely, nearly half (45.5%) of 
those MPs first promoted into Minister of State-level roles ended up ascending to the 
Cabinet or equivalent. Despite some movement, it should be noted that almost half of 
all promoted MPs remain in the positions to which they are first sent – 41.6% of PPS’s 
stay there, 41.1% of Undersecretaries of state, and 45.5% of Ministers of state. Overall, 
an average of 42.7% of MPs do not ascend beyond their first non-backbench role, again 
underscoring the beneficial nature of an initial appointment to higher office.  
 
Promoted early, promoted high - Dominic Grieve (Cons) 
Dominic Grieve entered the Commons in 1997 as MP for Beaconsfield, a safe 
Conservative seat, following in the footsteps of his father who was a Conservative MP in 
the 1960s. Elected at the age of 41, Grieve had been a local councillor over ten years 
prior to the election in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham (1982-6), 
which in turn built on some experience in student politics, having been President of the 
Oxford University Conservative Association in 1977. His professional career was in the 
law, a field in which he had considerable success. He contested his first parliamentary 
seat without success in 1987, but did not contest the 1992 general election. Following 
his election, Grieve spent time in the select committee system before being promoted to 
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the position of Opposition Spokesman for Constitutional Affairs and Scotland in 1999. 
After moving from this role to a similar one in the Home Office in 2001, Grieve became 
Shadow Attorney General in 2003 and remained in position for six years, after which he 
became Shadow Secretary of State for Justice. Following the 2010 general election, 
Grieve became Attorney General. Grieve is in many ways an atypical Conservative, not 
having a business background and having experience of local politics in a formal sense, 
but this has not hampered his progress in the Commons.  
 
On this basis, being promoted in the first instance into a relatively high office will likely 
be of greater benefit to future progression than, say, becoming a PPS. This raises the 
question of whether or not these promotions are related to pre-parliamentary political 
experience.  
 
First office 
on scale 
Pre-parliamentary political experience Total 
Neither (%) Local (%) National (%) Both (%)  
2 – PSS, etc. 
3 – U/Secs of 
state, etc. 
4 – Min. of 
State, etc. 
30.4* 
52.2* 
 
17.4* 
 
62.1* 
31.0* 
 
6.9* 
36.8* 
34.2* 
 
28.9* 
55.6* 
36.1* 
 
8.3* 
49.7 
36.1 
 
14.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.7 Crosstabulation of pre-parliamentary political experience and first office 
promotion, n=242; * differences significant at the .05 level (Chi-squared test), p=.025. 
 
Table 5.7 shows that they do; that first promotions differ along the lines of political 
experience, and again, the patterns seem to favour the preferential career progression 
of those MPs with previous experience in national-level political life. As can be seen in 
the table, first progressions ranged across three points on the scale (laid out in figure 
3.3), from PPS roles and equivalent to Minister of State level, which is itself one level 
below the cabinet. No one in the 1997 cohort was promoted directly to a cabinet-level 
role, information that highlights the springboard nature of lesser roles. Just under half 
of MPs who were promoted at all during their time in the Commons first made the 
small step up from backbencher to PPS, the first promotion destination for 49.7% of 
the 155 who moved beyond the backbenches. But it was the destination for 62.1% of 
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MPs who possessed solely local council experience compared to only 36.8% of those 
with only instrumental experience, 55.6% of those who had both, and just 30.4% of 
those MPs who had neither. Turning to assess those who made the biggest leap shows 
a similar trend – 28.9% of those MPs with instrumental experience alone made it to the 
Minister of State level at their first promotion compared to only 6.9% of MPs with only 
local experience, 8.3% with both, and 17.4% with neither. These differences are 
statistically significant. In terms of those MPs who made it to the halfway point 
between these stages, the level of Undersecretary of State and equivalent, the spread 
is more even with the exception of the 52.2% of MPs with neither type of political 
experience making it to this stage at first promotion. A number of these individuals are 
what could be termed ‘business Tories’, who have had successful business and other 
professional careers. This phenomenon is discussed further below.  
 
First-term promotion - Oliver Letwin (Cons) 
Oliver Letwin was elected as the Member of Parliament for West Dorset 1997 on his 
third attempt. He unsuccessfully fought the elections of 1987 and 1992 in Hackney 
North and Hampstead and Highgate. He was only 41 years of age when elected, and 
held instrumental political experience of the most senior kind, having been a member of 
Margaret Thatcher’s policy unit in the mid-1980s. Outside of politics, his career 
combined academic posts both in the UK and the USA with roles in the private sector, 
including banking. Following his election, Letwin was appointed to the role of 
Opposition Spokesman in the area of Constitutional Affairs in 1998 before becoming 
Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury in 2000. His star continued to rise with further 
promotions in 2001 to the role of Shadow Home Secretary and in 2003 to the position of 
Shadow Chancellor. Since then, Letwin has taken more of a back seat in Conservative 
affairs, becoming the Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs before focusing primarily on electoral strategy in the lead up to the 2010 
General Election. Since the formation of the Coalition government this strategic 
oversight has continued in his role as Minister of State for Policy. Letwin’s career bears 
many of the hallmarks that could be expected of an MP with high-level instrumental 
experience. Once elected, his first promotion was to a junior ministerial position, and 
this was soon followed by a move to a string of cabinet-level roles. However, he is also 
atypical in that his time at the very top, at least in the most prominent positions, has 
been limited, and in that he failed to obtain a safe seat without contesting numerous 
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other, tougher, electoral challenges. In any case, though, Letwin has been at the top of 
British politics on both sides of the fence – advising lawmakers in the 1980s, and being 
one of them in the 2000s.  
 
Reaching the top…or not 
Finally, we come to the issue of the relationship between highest office achievement 
and pre-parliamentary political experience. Table 5.9 confirms that political experience 
interacts with other characteristics and variables and results in different career 
outcomes dependent on that experience. The patterns in table 5.8 are both highly 
statistically significant and large in size, delineating themselves along the lines of 
political experience. A higher percentage of those MPs with local experience only 
remained backbenchers for the duration of their time in parliament than any other 
group, and over 20% more than those MPs with just instrumental experience (44.8% to 
24.0% respectively). The opposite is true for the other end of the scale, with 30% of 
those MPs with national-level experience only making it to level 5 (Cabinet-level 
positions or equivalent) compared to just 2.9% of MPs with solely local experience. This 
divide is equally stark when including both of the top two levels in this analysis, with 
64% of instrumentally-experienced MPs making it to either of these stages compared 
to just 22.9% of their locally-experienced colleagues. 
 
Highest 
office on 
scale 
Pre-parliamentary political experience Total 
Neither 
(%) 
Local  
(%) 
National  
(%) 
Both  
(%) 
(%) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
31.4*** 
0*** 
31.4*** 
22.9*** 
14.3*** 
44.8*** 
18.1*** 
14.3*** 
20.0*** 
2.9*** 
24.0*** 
8.0*** 
4.0*** 
34.0*** 
30.0*** 
30.8*** 
17.3*** 
23.1*** 
17.3*** 
11.5*** 
35.5 
13.2 
16.5 
22.7 
12.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 5.8 Crosstabulation of pre-parliamentary political experience and highest office 
attainment, n=242; *** differences significant at the .001 level (Chi-squared test).  
 
Interestingly, it is the case that more of those MPs with neither of these types of 
experience made it to the very top than those with both, something that is perhaps 
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counter-intuitive – surely the more experience, the better? Apparently not: at least not 
in this case. 37.2% of those MPs with neither type of experience made it to either level 
4 or 5 compared to 28.8% of those MPs with both. Again, all of these differences are 
highly statistically significant. Indeed, both the local-only and ‘both’ categories are the 
only two which have a higher percentage of MPs remaining on the backbenches 
compared to making it to the top two levels. How to account for this? Many of these 
individuals are Conservative MPs with solid business or other professional 
backgrounds, such as Owen Paterson, Phillip Hammond, Archie Norman, Nick Gibb, 
Eleanor Laing, and Dominic Grieve. An example from the Liberal Democrats is Dr Evan 
Harris, who gained election having held prominent positions within the British Medical 
Association. For these individuals and their parties more broadly, political experience 
was seemingly seen as less essential in terms of getting on in the Commons.  
 
However, it is not the case that there weren’t some exceptions to the patterns laid out 
above, and in the previous chapter. Hazel Blears and Theresa May both entered the 
House of Commons in 1997. In a number of ways they are similar; they are both 
women in a male-dominated institution, they both entered parliament at the same age 
and since then, they have both ascended to the very top of their respective parties and 
governments. But perhaps the most notable characteristic they share is their political 
experience before becoming MPs. Both May and Blears were local councillors, and they 
are two of only nine ex-local councillors who did make it to the very top in the 1997 
cohort – in many ways, the odd ones out. 
 
From local to national, the odd one out - Hazel Blears (Lab) 
Blears entered the Commons as MP for Salford, a safe Labour seat, aged 41. Almost 
immediately, she became PPS to notable Blairite Alan Milburn, Secretary of State for 
Health at the time, and following this, held various junior ministerial posts in the 
Department of Health before becoming Labour Party Chair and Minister without 
Portfolio in 2006. Her career peaked ten years after her initial election when she 
became Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. In all, Blears held 4 
different roles between 1997 and 2010, and in many ways, she was an unlikely success. 
Her background in local politics (as opposed to national-level activity) marked her out in 
a cabinet dominated by those with instrumental experience. Additionally, although not 
‘old’ at the time of her election, she was not in the age group most destined for success 
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(those in their twenties and thirties at the time of being elected). Indeed, her first 
promotion was also insalubrious, only to the level of PPS, a stage which for many who 
make the same journey becomes their final destination. Overall, Hazel Blears was 
perhaps the odd one out in the higher echelons of British politics throughout the New 
Labour era, her devotion to the ideology of New Labour being a key driver behind her 
success.   
 
Finally, some MPs who, on paper, would be ideal candidates for high ministerial office, 
only had stuttering parliamentary careers, reaching only the level of PPS, or remaining 
on the backbenches altogether. MPs with national-level pre-parliamentary political 
experience that fit this profile include Diana Organ, Harold Best, Roger Casale, and 
Gordon Marsden. The most high-profile, however, is Oona King. 
 
Didn’t meet expectations – Oona King (Lab) 
Oona King was elected as MP for Bethnal Green and Bow with great expectations upon 
her. Becoming only the second black woman elected to the Commons, and doing so at 
the age of twenty-nine, saw King gain much media attention – talk of frontbench 
promotion soon followed. King, however, only ever made it as far as becoming a PPS. 
She was never a minister at any level of government. King’s pre-parliamentary 
background lies firmly in national politics. She worked as an assistant to Labour 
members of the European Parliament, including Glenys Kinnock, and was then a 
political organiser for a regional section of the GMB union. Despite these gleaming 
credentials, King’s ministerial career was a non-starter. In her diaries, now published, 
she reflects on an incident in late 1999 that she believes stymied her frontbench 
chances. Alastair Campbell, press secretary and all-round fixer for Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, asked King to include an attack on an opponent of the PM in a Commons speech 
of hers. She refused, after which Campbell suggested that she would remain a 
backbencher for the next five years as a result, this serving as a punishment for not 
obeying his word (King 2007, pp.115-116). The accuracy of this account is unclear, but it 
highlights that without the patronage and loyalty of those who control ministerial 
appointments, pre-parliamentary political experience may count for very little. 
 
Summary – what political experience helps when and why? 
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The findings presented above and in chapter four demonstrate the varying impact of 
different types of pre-parliamentary political experience on political career trajectories 
post-election in the House of Commons. It has been shown that political experience 
gained on the national level is generally related to the optimal outcomes in terms of 
political career progression than local experience. Here, these findings will briefly be 
summarised in graphical form, providing an easily interpretable reference for the 
reader, as well as highlighting once again the differential impact of political experience 
on political career trajectories in the UK parliament. Figure 5.1 summarises the 
empirical findings of the thesis, all original contributions to the existing scholarly 
literature.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Optimal type of political experience for preferential career outcome by 
career stage. 
 
Figure 5.1 highlights the ways in which national-level political experience acts as a 
boost to a successful political career, measured by frontbench office attainment. Two 
crucial points can be highlighted here, points which further underline the unique 
contribution this thesis and these findings make to the existing literature. First, the 
positive benefits of national-level experience compared to local experience only take 
hold following election to parliament, with figure 5.1 demonstrating that there is no 
difference in the outcomes for individuals with either type of experience in terms of 
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being selected for a parliamentary seat promptly, or in the electoral majority they hold 
upon election. Perhaps the sole pre-election difference is age, and it has been argued 
above that it is likely that age at the time of election is linked to the type of political 
experience held by a candidate. Second, developing this, these are findings that the 
existing literature, which does not link pre- and post-election patterns, would simply 
miss. Further to this, as underlined previously, by not distinguishing between these 
local and national types of pre-parliamentary political experience, the existing 
classification would additionally miss these findings in this way.  
 
Why are MPs who hold national-level pre-parliamentary political experience more 
heavily concentrated in the highest offices of state than their colleagues with local-
level political experience? Chapter two considered the question of why different types 
of political experience would provide different benefits across the course of a career, 
distinguishing between formal benefits such as knowledge of political process, informal 
benefits, primarily knowing the informal rules of the game as well as having numerous 
contacts across the political sphere, and then finally party loyalty, which could have 
been demonstrated in the course of gaining said experience (see figure 2.5 for a visual 
breakdown of this distinction). Additionally, chapter two distinguished between pre- 
and post-election stages, arguing that certain benefits might be of more use at certain 
stages of a career. 
 
Revisiting these ideas in light of the empirical analysis of the previous two chapters is 
illuminating. For example, it does seem that only national-level experience will have a 
significant positive relationship with career attainment, but even this is only visible 
after an individual has been elected; that is, when they have become an MP. Neither 
type of experience affects their pathway into that position in a formal sense, although 
the data suggests that having national-level experience is related to being elected at a 
younger age. As was shown in chapter four, being elected young is a massive boost to 
the likelihood of making it to the top of the parliamentary food chain, and thus is worth 
considering in more detail. As was discussed in chapter two, and above, it could be the 
case that the informal contacts being made by those young aspirant politicians working 
in national-level political occupations aid them in their attempts to find a parliamentary 
seat which they can contest, and in turn results in their election at a younger age. At 
the same time, there might be a better ideological fit between these young individuals 
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and the national party leadership than between the same group and local councillors, 
who are likely to have been elected at an older age. Thus, it would make sense for the 
leadership to want to promote these young acolytes into higher office than it would to 
promote individuals who perhaps did not agree with their policies or approach to the 
same extent. Moreover, it could be that the knowledge they had gained from their 
experience at the national level helped them to know what it took to gain promotion to 
the top roles. Indeed, it is likely a combination of these various elements. 
 
Conversely, why would their experience seem not to benefit those MPs with local-level 
pre-parliamentary political experience? Again, as noted above, this can be split into 
pre- and post-election impact. In terms of post-election benefits, these could be few 
and far between for those with local experience as local party operatives, namely local 
councillors, have previously been perceived by parties to be a liability in ideological 
terms, this being particularly true of New Labour under Tony Blair (Rush 2001; Shaw 
2001). On a more practical level, MPs have honed their political skills on the local level 
are going to have both formal knowledge and informal contacts which are 
concentrated at this level. Aside from interacting with the MP for their area, for 
example, many are going to have little direct experience of Westminster politics. 
Although many political skills are transferable, and indeed local councillors would 
already have experience of dealing with constituents who are their own, some of their 
skills and knowledge would be of little use in Westminster. They would have gained 
little knowledge of the workings of the House of Commons as an institution, for 
example, and there exists a literature which considers the ways in which new MPs 
adapt to the Commons from a sociological perspective (Searing 1985; Rush and 
Giddings 2011), though this does not consider how different routes into the Commons 
might affect behaviour once elected. The American literature on political amateurs 
argues that national-level politicians who have taken the step up from local politics are 
often less likely to succeed because they are saddled with the albatross of an existing 
legislative record (Canon 1990). Having passed laws, taken positions, and generally 
been a public political figure ties them to certain viewpoints which could possibly 
jeopardise their position relative to the national party leadership. Evidently, an 
individual who has worked in the backrooms of Westminster, potentially even for 
multiple MPs, is unlikely to have made as many public pronouncements about their 
views, and as such, can sidestep this problem, entering the Commons with a clean 
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sheet. Whether this is normatively a good thing is a different question, not one to be 
answered here, but it is easy to imagine outcry at the prospect of politicians who are 
tied to no particular viewpoint being prized above those who are more ideologically 
committed.28 Regardless of the precise dynamics behind this pattern, the previous 
chapter and this one have provided empirical evidence that pre-parliamentary political 
experience affects career trajectories in the House of Commons, and not always in a 
positive way. 
 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter utilised regression analyses to operationalise variables relating to 
pre-parliamentary political experience, themselves drawn from the conceptual 
groundwork of earlier chapters, and established that these factors did have an effect 
on political career trajectories post-election but that there were other factors, such as 
age at time of election and electoral majority, which had a larger effect. A consistent 
theme of chapter four, however, was the contention that it is likely that these factors 
are linked with one another and interrelated to a certain extent. 
 
This chapter developed these arguments and mapped the ways in which different types 
of pre-parliamentary political experience provide individuals with different interactions 
with these effects. For example, being young when first elected to the Commons was 
shown in chapter four to have a significant positive effect on overall career trajectory in 
parliament; this chapter has demonstrated that there are significant differences 
between the ages when elected of those MPs who hold political experience gained on 
the national level to those with local-level experience. In turn, this leaves them in a 
preferential position with regard to frontbench promotion. Conversely, the opposite is 
true of those MPs with locally-focused political experience. It has been shown that 
these MPs are elected at an older age than their colleagues, are not promoted at the 
same rate, with those who are promoted being promoted later in their parliamentary 
careers and into lower-ranked offices.  
 
The next chapter, chapter six, will draw on all the material presented thus far in the 
thesis, both conceptual and empirical, to outline the potential for the concepts and 
                                               
28
 This is an argument made by Colin Hay (2007, p. 119) who argues that this type of apoliticism 
is a by-product of neo-liberal economic arguments.  
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measures used in the thesis to be used in broader comparative studies of political 
careers.  
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Chapter Six –Political experience and the study 
of political careers in comparative political 
science 
 
Thus far, I have argued the case for incorporating pre-parliamentary political 
experience into the study of political careers in Britain. I have grounded this case in 
existing work at the same time as developing a new conceptual framework. The 
framework is supported by empirical evidence which validates its usage. The 
contribution I make lies in three main areas; a) I show that political experience gained 
pre-election affects career trajectory once elected, b) that political experience is not 
homogenous and can be differentiated along local-national lines, and that c) this 
differentiation results in divergent outcomes in career trajectory. In the British case, 
these are all original contributions to existing knowledge. 
 
In this chapter I develop the conceptual contributions of the thesis initially laid out in 
chapters two and three in the knowledge that these were supported and justified by 
empirical analysis. I ask how they could be applied to future comparative research on 
political careers, and consider the differential outcomes that such research might 
discover. This directly addresses the third research question posed in the introduction. I 
begin by outlining a chronology of political careers through which different types of 
political experience can be measured. Following this, I adapt the local-national 
distinction made earlier in the thesis for use in comparative work, underlining the 
broad applicability that such a distinction holds by drawing on existing international 
work. Having established the conceptual basis of the framework, I consider factors 
which will affect the ways in which political experience is both gained and deployed 
across different polities. Moving from the macro- to micro-level, the ways in which 
institutional design and political system, party type, and then individual-level 
characteristics, will affect the role of political experience in a system are considered.  
 
Towards a holistic comparative account of political careers 
The term political career variously invokes inter-institutional movement, intra-
institutional hierarchy, political ambition and candidate selection. Generally studies 
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focus on one of these elements, either ignoring the rest, or incorporating one or two 
parts of them intermittently. I argue here that actually, political careers are all of these 
things, and more, and that the study of any of the above elements on their own also 
requires a consideration of the others. That is, any approach needs to be holistic. 
Although research is often by necessity carried out on smaller case studies, such work 
should be contextualised fully. 
 
In addition to the split in focus detailed above, the comparative literature on political 
careers is notable in terms of both the European/US split, and again in terms of the 
split focus of these two respective areas. The European literature is largely concerned 
with legislatures and how politicians move between them and the US literature 
dedicated to patterns of entry and exit from institutions. Alongside this exists a 
considerable body of work which looks at intra-legislatorial activity, be it promotions, 
executive composition where relevant, retirements and exits of other kinds, more 
general behavioural studies relating to roll call voting and bill presentation, and then 
broader studies which examine candidate backgrounds in a number of ways such as in 
terms of sex, age, and so on. 
 
For the most part, these studies take the individual as the point of analysis, the 
proverbial chess piece, and it is rather the scale and scope of the board that changes 
across studies. The concept of a multi-level system is accepted almost universally, with 
almost all countries featuring some sort of inter-level movement. It is likely that most 
politicians will have involvement at various levels of a political system during the 
course of a political career.  
 
However, the focus on either inter-legislature movement or on intra-institutional 
trends of retirement, committee assignment, and so on, obscures the fact that in a 
system with multiple legislative institutions and people who move between them and 
within them, these things will affect each other. In short, this approach does not 
account for the effect of the legacy of experience in one legislature on progress in the 
next. Political experience is path dependent and cumulative. Hence I argue that 
accounts of political careers need to take political experience into consideration, and 
that this type of early engagement with politics may often set the path of trends that 
come to light at a later stage. 
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John R. Hibbing is a mainstay of US research on political careers and his numerous 
studies of congressional careers provide the basis for more recent work which looks at 
political careers in a broader way (Herrnson 1994; Lawless and Fox 2005). Hibbing is 
known for his longitudinal studies of the legislative careers of members of Congress 
(1991), but it is his later meditations on both the justification for, and future of, the 
study of legislative careers that I will briefly address here. In his article ‘Legislative 
careers: Why and how we should study them’, Hibbing identifies four guiding principles 
behind existing work on legislative careers. Firstly, ‘understanding legislator 
motivation’, essentially the problematic of political ambition – who runs for office, why, 
and who doesn’t? Secondly, ‘understanding a certain legislative body’, something he 
sees as a question of institutionalisation, ‘the complexity, boundedness, and stable 
structure of a body’. Thirdly, ‘understanding a certain socio-political system’, mainly 
who runs for office, and which offices they run for. Additionally he here identifies 
studies of post-legislative careers, arguing that these too form part of the opportunity 
structure of a socio-political system. Finally, ‘generalizing across socio-political 
systems’, which is comparative work looking at how different variables impact on the 
systemic outcomes visible – for example, what encourages more women to run for 
office?, how does the electoral system affect who runs for office?, and so on (Hibbing 
1991). In summary, Hibbing is keen to promote an institutional focus, seeing political 
career studies as a useful way into the issue of institutional change.  
 
Borchert (2011) proposes a synthesis of sorts between this institutional focus of, for 
example, Hibbing (1999) and those studies which focus exclusively on the legislative 
careers of individuals within a given legislature, such as Hibbing’s earlier longitudinal 
study of congressional careers (Hibbing 1991). Following such logic, I will first establish 
a chronology of political careers, emphasising that they begin prior to an individual 
entering a legislature, and that differences in experience, even at this preliminary 
stage, will affect later trajectories.  I therefore start by establishing various 
measurements of political experiences at different stages of a political career. Moving 
on from this, the second, and main, section of the chapter looks at how these various 
types of political experience will affect political careers at different stages dependent 
on the political system an actor exists within, the type of political party they are a 
member of, and then finally, their own personal characteristics. In this way, the 
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analysis moves from the macro to the micro level, from systemic to personal factors.  
The aim of the chapter is to provide a wide-ranging account of how comparative 
political science research could operationalise variables relating to political experience, 
and what findings could be expected as a result. 
 
What is political experience and when will it have an effect? 
In chapter two, it was noted that various studies of legislative behaviour and/or careers 
around the world utilise different conceptions of what political experience is, and how 
to measure it. What this literature lacks is a way of classifying these different types of 
political experience. It should be noted that although these definitions and 
operationalisations differ, none are ‘wrong’, as such, and it is useful to consider them 
alongside each other (as has been done in this thesis). Initially, it is possible to break 
down these different conceptions of political experience by their location in the 
(temporal) process of a political career. Adapting figure 3.1 is figure 6.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Measures of political experience by career stage.29 
 
As noted in chapter three, there is often different emphasis on the different stages of a 
career in various studies. For example, work on US congressional careers tends to focus 
on the electoral process as the source of experience in addition to legislatorial tenure, a 
                                               
29
 For the purposes of empirical application, it is assumed here that candidates at a given 
election are being studied (election x) and therefore electoral experience would have been 
gained at elections of any kind prior to election x. However, elected experience could be drawn 
from elections for party office (as detailed by Montero, 2007, for example) as much as from 
election for public office. In reality, the application of such a framework to empirical work would 
need to be moderated by the researcher using it. 
PRE-ELECTION 
Elected political 
experience 
Unelected political 
experience 
ELECTORAL 
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Vote share 
Personal vote (if 
applicable) 
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post-election factor (Hibbing 1991). Classifying various measures of political experience 
in this way also raises again the question of path dependency – is it not likely to be the 
case that many of the factors above, across all three stages, are linked? For example, as 
described in chapter two, having pre-legislative political experience of various kinds will 
provide an aspirant politician with different types of information, information which 
may go on to affect their choice of electoral contest, for one. In other words, if I am 
considering running for national office, and know people within my party who provide 
me with proprietary information that a certain parliamentarian is retiring from his safe 
seat soon for whatever reason, I will likely allow this to influence my subsequent 
choices in terms of selecting which seat to fight for selection (as a candidate) in. The 
key point here is that this would be prior to the electoral process, and borne of 
possessing a specific type of pre-legislative political experience. Thus, utilising a 
measure of political experience based on electoral factors alone is not necessarily 
measuring solely that.  
 
This thesis has made the case for acknowledging pre-legislative political experience as 
something worth considering in greater detail in legislative studies, and thinking about 
all types of political experience in a systematic way (as in figure 6.1) highlights why this 
is necessary. But within the ‘pre-election’ category, how should political scientists 
consider different types of political experience which occur prior to a candidate even 
entering the electoral process? Chapter two argued that distinctions between elected 
and unelected experience, local- and national-level experience, and between partisan 
and non-partisan experience were useful, certainly in the British example. To what 
extent can these be generalised to a broader series of cases? The key intervention that 
this thesis makes in this discussion is in many ways a basic one; simply to point out that 
not all political experience is the same, and not all political experience is, de facto, 
equal. It will have different effects at different points within a political career, and so 
far, this chapter has laid out a way of thinking about both the temporal aspect of this, 
as well as a framework for thinking in more detail about how political experience can 
differ. For the purposes of the latter, it has distinguished between elected and 
unelected experience, national and local level experience, and partisan or non-partisan 
experience shown in figure 6.2.30  
                                               
30
 Local is additionally referred to as ‘sub-national’ here, owing to the prominence of regional 
and state political bodies across Europe and the US. 
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Figure 6.2 Different types of political experience. 
 
Casting an eye over the examples of existing work presented in chapter three reveals 
these three distinctions to be in use, in some way, in scholarship on countries other 
than Britain. There is a divergence between politicians who gain political experience in 
an elected capacity, for example at local, regional, or state level, and those who gain 
their experience by working in politics in some way. For example, writing about the US, 
David Canon distinguishes between Congressmen and Congresswomen who had 
executive, legislative, legal, administrative/bureaucratic, or party experience (1990, 
pp.165-166). Similarly, Spanish politicians can gain political experience from an equally 
diverse series of positions, both elected and unelected, and at various levels of the 
national political structure (Montero 2007). Thus, a distinction can be made here 
between elected and unelected experience, national- or local-level experience, and 
then partisan or non-partisan experience. These different types of experience can be 
applied to the three stages detailed in figure 6.1. Experience is likely to have an impact 
at the different stages outlined in figure 6.1. For example, an individual’s pre-electoral 
experience of politics is likely to colour both their outlook as well as reflect their own, 
prior, perceptions of what politics is and how to be successful in it (Canon 1990, p.21-
22). Canon, building on Harold Laswell’s earlier work, contends that amateurs (those 
lacking prior political experience of any kind) are likely to be more ‘adaptable’ than 
their colleagues who have been in politics for the long haul, becoming political at a 
young age (1990, pp.22-24).  
 
Building on this, I will now consider where different political experience is likely to have 
different effects – under what political systems will local experience trump national-
level experience, and vice versa? Is being a political amateur the death knell for a 
candidacy in some countries but the catalyst for one in another? Are all of these 
processes different for men and women? In the following section of the chapter I will 
draw on the limited available evidence in the literature, as well as the findings of this 
Local (sub-national) National 
Elected Unelected Elected Unelected 
Partisan/non-partisan Partisan/non-partisan 
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thesis, to speculate as to where political experience might have differential impacts on 
career trajectories. 
 
Understanding where it will have an effect 
This section will move from the macro to the micro in terms of understanding the 
interaction of political experience and political careers, focusing on the individual level, 
the party level, and finally the system level. Underlying this approach are three 
contentions; 
 
1. Political experience will have a differential effect depending on the 
political system of a country, its structure and rules, and the nature of its party 
system; 
2. Political experience will have a differential effect by party (for reasons 
of ideology, age, and structure); 
3. Political experience will have a differential effect for individuals from 
different social and personal backgrounds. 
 
Thus, the effect of political experience will differ along these lines as well and it is 
through the prism of these three statements that this difference will be considered. 
 
1. By political system & institutional design 
The structure and nature of a political system will affect the ways in which different 
types of political experience affect career trajectories within it. It should be noted that 
it is taken as given that the system being studied is a democracy (i.e. that there does 
actually exist an opportunity structure which is at least formally open to the majority of 
citizens should they wish to run for public political office).  
 
As noted above, the multi-level nature of many political systems is now accepted 
within the literature, and it is acknowledged that politicians will often move between 
these various levels, or straddle them with memberships of institutions on multiple 
levels (Borchert and Stolz 2011). Building on this, Jens Borchert sees political careers as 
‘being shaped by the interplay of individual ambition and the institutional structure of 
opportunities’ (2011, p.117). That is, politicians have to want to progress in a career, 
and there has to be opportunity for them to do this, in order for it to happen, but that 
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‘the territorial structure of the state clearly does influence career chances and career 
decisions by providing one decisive dimension of the playing field’ (2011, p.124). 
Borchert acknowledges the role of path dependency here, with many individuals 
following in the footsteps of those who went before them (2011, p.118). At the heart 
of his argument is that the fact that political institutions at any level are filled with 
individuals who may have served in other office previously and may hold ambitions of 
serving in another in future will affect both the behaviour of these individuals and the 
institutions they inhabit (Borchert 2011, p.118).  
 
Borchert proposes two planks to studying political careers in multi-level systems – 
these are that institutional structures in given political systems will affect politicians’ 
career choices (based on the availability, accessibility, and attractiveness of different 
offices) and then in turn that these decisions will affect which institutions are linked 
with which in that polity. Going on to classify the different ideal types that the 
structure of a polity can be identified as, Borchert proposes that ‘there may be a clear 
hierarchy, there may be separate arenas largely sealed off from each other, or there 
may be a large playing field with very little hierarchy or a hierarchy that cuts across 
levels of government’, with this differing across federal and unitary systems, for 
example (2011, p.118, p.124).  
 
So how can the movement of individual politicians between various levels of a political 
system, and political career opportunity structure, be classified? Borchert describes 
systems as unidirectional, integrated, or alternative (Borchert 2011), essentially asking 
what are the ‘predominant direction of career movements’ in a state and highlighting 
the ‘institutional orientations’ on offer to politicians in each, be they legislative or 
executive (Borchert and Stolz 2011, p.272, p.275). It is clear that these institutional 
orientations are shifting, with regionalisation in previously exclusively unitary states 
(such as the UK) providing new career paths for politicians to follow if they wish 
(Keating and Cairney 2006; Borchert 2011). As a result, Borchert argues that ‘the 
prototypical polity that centres purely on the national capital and thus may be 
legitimately considered a one-arena game has virtually disappeared from the scene in 
all but the smallest democracies’ (2011, p.124).31 The extent to which sub-national 
                                               
31
 Despite this, it is possible to argue that although there are now more options available to 
aspirant politicians in the UK (e.g. the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, London Assembly 
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legislatures are professionalised will affect their standing in the national hierarchy: if 
they provide an income comparable to the time demands they place on members, they 
are likely to be more viable career options than if they are only semi-professionalised 
(Borchert 2011, p.124). For example, in Germany, regional and local legislatures have 
professionalised to a greater extent than the UK equivalent of local or county councils, 
and this in turn affects their membership and the ways that their members use them in 
the course of a political career. 
 
The location of the executive, and the link between legislative politics and executive 
politics, also differs across polities. If serving in a legislature from which the executive is 
drawn, and where both legislative and executive can be held concurrently, for many 
legislators, ‘to an extent, the ultimate career aim in almost all parliamentary systems is 
the executive, as this is a post that is generally held on top of the parliamentary 
mandate rather than instead’ (Borchert and Stolz 2011, p.275). The extent to which 
non-executive career paths within a legislature are developed will affect this rationale, 
however, as will the relative power of government and parliament (Borchert 2011, 
p.125). In the UK, for example, the select committee system is gradually becoming a 
serious alternative to an executive career, and thus there is, to a certain extent, a 
rationale for remaining in the House of Commons for a long time, even if only a 
backbencher (Benton and Russell 2012). Conversely, David Docherty highlights the fact 
that in Canada, although institutionally similar to the UK, the government is very large 
relative to parliament, and thus if an MP is not recruited into the executive relatively 
early in their career, there is little utility in them remaining there and accruing seniority 
(Docherty 1997; Borchert 2011). The US Congress offers a counterpoint to this to a 
certain extent, with clear executive and legislative separation resulting in a situation 
where legislators are generally unlikely to be considering a move from their legislative 
role to an executive one. Borchert notes that being a US secretary, in the cabinet 
appointed by the president, ‘has to be considered the dead-end of regular political 
careers in the USA’ (Borchert 2011, p.125). However, legislators may use their longevity 
in Congress to either make a step up from the House of Representatives to the Senate, 
or to mount a bid for governorship of their home state, probably a more powerful 
                                                                                                                               
and Mayoralty, Westminster is still the place to go for ambitious politicians, and there is only 
sporadic travel in the opposite direction (i.e. from Westminster to the sub-national parliaments 
and assemblies). 
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position, certainly in states such as California. Such regional positions are often the 
recruitment point for top executive roles – for example, US Presidents such as Bill 
Clinton (Arkansas), Ronald Reagan (California), and George W. Bush (Texas) held 
gubernatorial positions prior to entering the Whitehouse, and many German 
chancellors have been drawn from regional prime ministerial roles as opposed to the 
national legislature (Borchert 2011). 
 
The differential movement of politicians within political systems, even systems which 
are relatively similar to one another, will affect the way in which political experience is 
gained and the effect it has on career trajectory. Take, for example, a vertical system, 
one where politicians are attempting to head to the top of the pile, a national-level 
legislature, and where there exists a clear hierarchy of offices (Copeland and Opheim 
2011). In such a system, political experience is likely to be something pursued, gained, 
then moved on from – that is, it is unlikely that politicians will collect political 
experience cumulatively, but rather see it in distinct stages, dropping their affiliation to 
lesser offices once in place in more powerful ones. In Britain, for example, it is rare to 
see MPs with multiple mandates, very few holding other political office at the local or 
supra-national level alongside their parliamentary office. Partially, this is due to such a 
practice being discouraged by political parties, particularly the Labour party, but 
equally, politicians likely see no potential benefit in holding these dual mandates, as 
neither offer an equivalent status to the MP should he or she lose their seat. Equally, 
the same is true of the United States, another uni-directional system. 
 
Within such systems, once politicians have moved from local to national level political 
roles, experience shifts from holding, or seeking election to, multiple electoral offices, 
and becomes about intra-institutional longevity, about behaving in a way that is 
palatable to the gatekeepers of executive office, or other higher legislative office, as 
opposed to a broader electorate. As such, referencing figure 6.1, the gaining of 
experience shifts firmly into the post-election phase (barring general elections every 
few years), whereas in an integrated system such as that in the United States, 
experience will continue to be sought in the pre-election and electoral phases for 
longer, with candidates drawing experience from a multitude of sources.  
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The electoral cycle will also affect the ways in which political experience affects career 
trajectories. Firstly, knowledge of an upcoming election will provoke some sort of 
candidate selection effort. More subtle, however, will be the effect of prolonged 
periods in either government or opposition for a political party. Nicole Bolleyer, writing 
about cartel parties, notes that prolonged periods in opposition tend to result in 
substantial ‘organisation-building’ by parties, whereas periods in government result in 
the opposite (2009, p.562). Returning to the specific case study analysed in this thesis, 
the 1997 election saw the end of a long time in opposition for the Labour party – as 
such, by this point the party had developed a significant party membership as well as 
cultivated a notable presence in local politics. As a consequence, many of these local 
councillors then stood as parliamentary candidates and won.  
 
Other smaller considerations are also worth mentioning. Borchert notes that in many 
countries, the bureaucratic arm of the state is highly politicised and provides a ‘fall 
back in case of electoral defeat’ or an ‘additional de facto political office’ (2011, p.124), 
this being the case in France, Germany, and a number of South American countries. 
Evidently, in the UK, this is not a widespread phenomenon, with civil service neutrality 
remaining resolutely strong at the time of writing.  
 
Finally, the electoral system will also affect career choices, and how political experience 
is pursued and deployed. Distinguishing between the selectorate and the electorate, 
those who select candidates and those who can choose to elect them, respectively, 
Borchert notes that the selectorate can act as a ‘safety net between representatives 
and voters’ (2011, p.126). The insinuation here is that, dependent on the electoral 
system, a politician needs to keep different groups of people loyal to his or her 
candidacy and cause. For example, with a first-past-the-post system, or a closed list PR 
system, party selectorates, rather than the electorate, hold power over politicians, and 
thus the loyalty of a politician should be to either local or national party leadership 
(Borchert 2011, p.126). This will differ by party type, however, and this is something I 
will now address. 
 
2. By party type 
The relative utility of different types of political experience will differ dependent on 
party type, defined, inter alia, by the structure of the party, its ideology, and genealogy. 
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Political parties have been classified extensively over the past century, often in a 
disparate and unlinked fashion. As such, to attempt to discuss the implications of all of 
these different party types on political careers would be well beyond the scope of this 
thesis, let alone this chapter. Instead, I adopt the integrated classification of party types 
put forward by André Krouwel (2006) and briefly discuss how these five different 
models of political party might relate to the different types of political experience 
discussed earlier in the chapter. The key questions here are; (1) would certain party 
types be predisposed to value certain types of political experience over others?; and (2) 
what is the likely impact of this on individual-level political career trajectories? For the 
purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that we are analysing parliamentary systems 
where the executive is broadly drawn from within the national legislature. Other types 
of political institutional arrangements and their implications for political careers and 
political experience will be discussed at the end of this section of the chapter. 
 
Krouwel, surveying the vast literature which classifies political parties along various 
lines, identifies three core trends and then attempts to condense these into an 
integrated typology which addresses them simultaneously. He highlights work which 
focuses on organisational structure, using this as a tool of distinction (this includes, for 
example, Katz and Mair 1995), other work which looks at the ‘genera’ or origins of 
parties and uses this to differentiate them (Krouwel 2006, p.250), and then work which 
using more abstract measures including the function of a party, or its broad political 
goals. Building on these existing classifications, of which there are in excess of thirty, 
Krouwel argues that in reality, there is much crossover between a number of these, 
and it is possible to condense these multiple approaches and outcomes into five core 
‘species’ of party (2006, p.250). 
 
These are loosely structured elite-led cadre parties, mass parties, electoralist parties, 
cartel parties, and business firm parties (Krouwel 2006, pp.250-253). Of the five, only 
the final three, according to Krouwel, are still in action, with the cadre and mass parties 
dying out in the 1920s and 1950s, respectively. It should be noted, however, that these 
are ideal-typical party models, and as such, it is rare to find a perfectly congruent fit 
between the theory and reality. So what are these three remaining party types, and 
how will they affect the ways in which political experience will be used by politicians 
within them? 
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The existing literature doesn’t consider, in any systematic way, whether political career 
paths will differ by party type. Addressing this question provides an opportunity to 
unite the body of work studying political careers with the enormous canon focused on 
political parties. Additionally, it can help provide a toolkit that future research can 
employ on a comparative scale. The pros and cons of Krouwel’s framework will not be 
debated here. Rather, this framework will be adopted as a route into the study of how 
political careers and political parties interrelate, providing a way into this complex issue 
which compromises neither the main focus of this chapter, nor its bounded length.  
 
Firstly, there is the catch-all electoralist party, a party type which has been visible since 
1950 according to Krouwel. This party type has grown out of the previous ‘mass party’, 
which itself came into being extra-legislatively, although as Krouwel notes, the inventor 
of the term ‘catch-all’ party, Otto Kirchheimer, was rather non-specific in terms of 
defining the term or providing its identifying features in a systematic way (2006, 
pp.256-258). Broadly, the various models which Krouwel classifies as part of the catch-
all electoralist stable focus on elements such as the collapse of widespread party 
membership, the professionalisation of old party bureaucracies, and a process of de-
ideologisation, whereby parties attempt to broaden their electoral constituency to 
include large swathes of the electorate as opposed to traditional pitches made to 
certain sections of society (Krouwel 2006).  
 
The second party type still in existence is the cartel party, a classification popularised 
by Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1995). Krouwel, drawing on the work of Kirchheimer as 
well as Katz and Mair, identifies three types of cartelisation seen in systems containing 
cartel parties. First, inter-party cartelisation, whereby a small group of established 
parties move to exclude potential competitors from entering political competition; 
second is party-state cartelisation, a process which sees the boundaries between party 
and state shrinking, with politics becoming largely about the management of the state 
by politicians (this being the closest definition to the prominent Katz and Mair cartel 
thesis); third is a party-state cartel but with the addition of powerful interest groups, 
with parties attempting to gain the support of voters through these types of groups 
rather than by more traditional methods (Krouwel 2006, pp.258-259). In many ways, it 
is perhaps Kirchheimer’s work rather than Katz and Mair’s that is of note to the enquiry 
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of this thesis. Structurally, cartel parties are notable for being atomistic, with the 
parliamentary party, central office, and local grassroots party all being relatively 
autonomous (Krouwel 2006, p.260). 
 
Finally, there is the business-firm party model, a ‘recent phenomenon in Europe but 
not on the American continent’ (Krouwel 2006, p.260). This party type is split into two 
broad categories – where existing corporations are utilised for political purposes and 
those other cases where a new organisation is created specifically for a political 
purpose. An example of the former is Forza Italia, Italian politician Silvio Berlusconi’s 
political party (Krouwel 2006, p.60). These organisations are top-heavy, with no 
grassroots party really existing outside of elections at which time it may be rapidly 
assembled to act in a cheerleading capacity. For the most part, members of the party 
will also be politicians elected as part of it, sitting in parliament. A focus on 
personalities at the top of the party provides much free media publicity, but equally 
leaves the party vulnerable to the changing winds of public opinion – if the leader falls 
from grace, the party may rapidly follow (Krouwel 2006, pp.260-262).  
 
So would any of these broad party types either explicitly or implicitly privilege certain 
types of political experience? The development of these party types over time is 
perhaps a useful way to consider the interrelation of these two factors. For example, 
the origins of catch-all electoralist parties, which grew out of existing mass parties, 
highlights how the parties have shifted in terms of both organisation, as well as 
personnel. Mass parties relied heavily on grassroots members, and as these members 
drifted away for whatever reason, the catch-all electoralist party that has risen from 
their ashes has increasingly come to rely on political professionals to fulfil functions 
that previous would have been undertaken, in part, by members. Is it possible to paint 
this as a shift from the local to the national? At the same time, are cartel parties more 
likely to select candidates who have experience of national-level political 
administration, and are business-firm parties equally keen on those candidates with 
expertise from the top level of national, or even international, political life? 
 
With reference to figure 6.1, it is possible to consider the potential benefits to both 
parties and candidates at different stages of a political career. For example, for certain 
parties, candidates with certain types of experience will offer benefits at the electoral 
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stage, whilst others may be of greater use once elected to a legislature. Concurrently, 
for candidates, certain experience may aid their initial selection as a party candidate, 
whilst other types may not. To flesh out this discussion, I will again turn to the example 
of the UK. The British Labour party, arguably a catch-all electoralist party with roots as 
a mass party, is one which has seen intense debate surrounding candidate selection in 
recent decades, a debate discussed in detail in chapter two. At the crux of this debate 
is a local-national split, with actors at the centre of the party valuing different 
characteristics in parliamentary candidates to those at the periphery. A further variable 
which has been thrown into the mix more recently is that of localism, the desire of 
political parties to present ‘local’ candidates to the electorate, and seemingly the desire 
of the electorate to vote for these individuals, or at least the option to (Childs and 
Cowley 2011). Let us imagine a scenario in which an MP in a safe Labour seat retires for 
health reasons, leaving open a highly-prized route to parliament for one individual; in a 
case such as this, it is almost certain that whoever the local party selects as a candidate 
will become the next MP for the constituency in question. It is likely that the local party 
will be keen to select a local stalwart as a reward of sorts for good service, perhaps a 
local councillor or someone else who is perceived to share their views. At the same 
time, the national party may have designs on the seat in terms of ‘parachuting’ either a 
favoured adviser of a national-level politician, or relocating a senior MP who holds a 
precarious electoral position. However, they will also be conscious of the need to 
maintain the appearance that the candidate would be a good local MP. Childs and 
Cowley note the rise in the number of MPs claiming local links to the area which they 
represent, and it is possible that the ability to claim links on a wide range of areas, 
including having familial links to the area, or even having moved there recently, 
perhaps dilutes the argument in favour of selecting a local stalwart (2011). That is, why 
pick a local stalwart whose main virtue is being local when being local is something that 
can effectively be claimed by almost any candidate? Such developments open the door 
for candidates who haven’t got that type of local experience to circumvent the issue by 
claiming it in a more abstract way, however spuriously. 
 
Inherent in this scenario is the fact that nature of the Labour party, and indeed the 
modern British Conservative party, is the importance of members – although dwindling 
in number, neither party want to alienate the people who help maintain their political 
power. Thus, the party type, and the genealogy of this party type, influences the ways 
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in which political experience manifest across the various stages of a political career, 
from selection to election to promotion, from political cradle to political grave. Katz 
notes that candidate selection processes raise ‘central questions about the ideological 
and sociological identities’ of parties and that ‘different models of selection are likely to 
privilege different elements of the party and different types of candidates’ (2001, 
p.277). Following the selection and election stages, the power of political patronage 
shifts from membership to party leadership, again shifting the potential effect of 
experience on a political career, something discussed at length in chapter two. One of 
the key things to note here is the separation of these two groups – the selectorate at 
the local level is not the same group of people heading up the parliamentary party and 
the spheres of influence of these two groups differ.  
 
Would such effects be visible in a cartel party? Elements of the cartel ideal-type are 
visible in the three main parties in Britain, but it is possible to look further afield to 
assess this, as well as to speculate based on the body of theoretical work that exists on 
cartelisation. Katz observes that for MPs of a cartel party, there exists a ‘puzzle, 
whereby these individuals constitute both the party in public office as well as the party 
on the ground’, lying ‘midway’ between these two groups (2001, p.277). In terms of 
candidate selection processes, they are between a rock and a hard place. Thinking 
about political recruitment from the standpoint of a candidate hoping to enter elected 
politics through a cartel party, it seems that the best course of action is to ensure that 
you are attractive at best, and palatable at worst, to the national party leadership. Why 
this focus on the national rather than local party? Katz speculates that one way or 
another, the leaders of cartel parties are going to exert increasing power over 
candidate selection, either directly, through making procedural changes and limiting 
the actual choice of candidates put forward to local party groups, or indirectly, by 
expanding the selectorate to dilute the influence of local party activists (2001, pp.292-
294). Similarly, Nicole Bolleyer speculates that ‘party unity in public office risks erosion 
when organisational boundaries are fluid and national elites cease to influence 
candidate selection’ (2009, p.562)  In many ways, these actions are the response of 
party leaders to changing circumstances which, it seems to them, only they can see – 
their needs have changed, the needs of the members of the ground have not; they see 
politics increasingly in terms of technical expertise and state management and 
specialism in these is more highly-valued than, for example, local service or ideological 
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fervour (Katz 2001, p.288). Thus, as opposed to when attempting to enter politics 
through a catch-all style party, where popularity with both the local and national party 
was the key to electoral and political success, those prospective candidates for cartel 
parties might be forgiven for focusing their gaze solely on the national party, for that is 
the locus of power and influence within the party, both pre- and post-election.  
 
 Catch-all 
electoralist party 
Cartel party Business-firm party 
Pre-election 
(i.e. candidate 
selection) 
Local National National/personal link to 
leadership 
Post-election 
(i.e. political 
promotion) 
National National Personal link to 
leadership 
Figure 6.3 Optimal political experience for individual candidates in parliamentary 
systems by political career stage and party type. 
 
Klaus Detterbeck notes that the professionalisation of politicians, in the sense that 
politics is their sole/primary occupation and main source of income, breeds 
cartelisation, something also a core element of the Katz and Mair cartel thesis (Katz 
and Mair 1995; Detterbeck 2005, pp.188-189). I would also argue that it is likely to 
create a feedback loop of sorts, with politicians who hold positions of power within the 
party in public office keen to bring in more politicians who resemble themselves, 
perhaps even to strengthen their position collectively when negotiating their continued 
survival in political life. Katz writes that ‘there is a shared professional community so 
that members can easily recognise who does, and does not, belong’ (2001, p.288). 
Evidently, such attitudes will permeate both the perception and reality of political 
career trajectories within a party. 
 
It would be remiss not to mention ideology explicitly at this point, tricky a subject as it 
is, for it is highly likely that the ideology of parties, at least at their point of foundation, 
will affect the social composition and overall ethos of the organisation, in turn 
influencing its values. For example, the British Labour party had a long tradition of 
selecting working-class, local, candidates, a tradition that has fallen away in recent 
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decades. However, it is perhaps the recognition that this tradition did once exist within 
the party that it currently agonises over the political representation of such groups on 
the Labour benches.  
 
Thirdly, the business-firm party type – how will political experience play out in such a 
party? These parties seem to be less present in most Western European countries than 
the other party types discussed here, and as such will not act as the vehicle which many 
aspirant politicians use to further their careers. However, in one sense, the link 
between these parties and political experience can be drawn quite clearly – these 
parties are led from the top, often focusing heavily on the personality of the leader, 
and in this sense, having political experience on the national level, and expertise that 
will aid the party at the national level, will likely be the most useful. Surveying the 
literature, it is evident that candidate selection processes in these parties amount to 
little more than recruitment by the elite of the party (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, p.312). 
In the cases of the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) in Spain and Silvio Berlusconi’s 
Forza Italia (FI) in Italy, candidates were often drawn from commercial and business 
contacts held by firms and businesses related to the leader: for example FI utilised 
Fininvest, a financial company controlled by Berlusconi, to recruit electoral candidates 
(Hopkin and Paolucci 1999, p.324). In cases such as these, it is not even evident that 
political experience of any kind is a prerequisite to selection by a business firm party, 
with corporate, business, and commercial expertise being valued more highly (Krouwel 
2006, p.261).  
 
Before turning to how individual-level characteristics interact with political experience, 
I will briefly look at the US example as it offers a number of counterpoints to the 
Western European party models discussed above. The use of primaries means that 
although candidates are not prey to the stumbling blocks presented by more 
formalised party structures, as seen above, individuals face other barriers to candidacy, 
such as financial funding or lack thereof (Copeland and Opheim 2011, p.146). Gary 
Copeland and Cynthia Opheim note that although Members of Congress avoid 
selectorates in the traditional catch-all or cartel party sense, ‘the biggest check on the 
exercise of ambition by US politicians is the money-givers’, thus running for office 
becomes a question of fund-raising ability as much as anything else (2011, p.146). 
What are the implications of such a situation for political experience? Copeland and 
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Opheim posit that fund-raising ability is in some way linked to reputation-building in 
the sense that donors are probably more likely to give money to a candidate who they 
think can win (2011, p.146). There are parallels here with the Western European 
examples discussed above – in those cases, rather than financial support, party actors 
were giving logistical support and the general power of the party machine to a 
candidate. So how can candidates prove their credibility? Copeland and Opheim argue 
that the role of state legislator is the ‘most direct and reliable way for potential 
contributors to take their measure of a candidate’, with state legislators having ‘a track 
record that establishes relationships as well as one’s ability, credibility and reliability’ 
(2011, p.126). Returning to the various benefits of pre-parliamentary political 
experience detailed in figure 2.5, elements of formal political knowledge and informal 
political contacts (as well as party loyalty to a certain extent) are inherent in Copeland 
and Opheim’s description. Congress has also seen a growth in Members who have 
backgrounds in instrumental political occupations, national-level unelected roles which 
are mostly partisan, and evidence suggests that these candidates perform 
disproportionately well in elections (Herrnson 1994). Are they able to fundraise at the 
same levels as their colleagues from state legislatures? Paul S. Herrnson identifies two 
distinct benefits that these types of political staffers have over state or local legislators. 
Firstly, they are not tied to any specific policy decisions they may have made in the 
past, and as such, have ‘none of the negative baggage’ associated with this; secondly, 
there is less political risk for these staffers as they are not relinquishing one political 
office to run for a higher one: losing the election will likely damage them less (1994, 
p.140). Looking at electoral success in Congressional primaries, Herrnson finds that 
‘candidates who once for Congress as staff have a greater probability of winning a 
primary than any other type of candidate’ (1994, p.145). Could this be the result of 
superior fundraising? Not exactly – Congressional staff candidates do not raise as much 
money as their colleagues from state legislatures, but they do raise more than other 
types of candidate, such as political amateurs or other unelected party officials, and as 
such, are perceived to have a good chance of success in general, as opposed to 
primary, elections (Herrnson 1994, p.147). 
 
In summary, different party types, identified through differential structural, 
organisational, and ideological patterns, provide unique incentives which will affect 
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both the ways in which political experience is gained as well as deployed. In turn, this 
will result in differential outcomes for individuals across different parties.  
 
 
3. On an individual level 
The European literature discussed previously (Borchert 2011; Borchert and Stolz 2011, 
2011), although perhaps less institutionally-minded than the work of Hibbing, for 
example, still does not explicitly engage with the idea that institutions might work in 
different ways for different people dependent on personal characteristics. It is no 
longer a point of real contention to state that politics is experienced in different ways 
by different individuals, often along lines of sex, ethnicity, or other personal and social 
characteristics. Similarly, political experience will differ along such lines, with certain 
types of experience, or routes into politics, presenting themselves as more or less 
opportune for different people. Each individual wanting to enter political life will have 
to first contend with the systemic and party-level structures and processes outlined 
above. But even taking those as read, not all individuals can approach politics equally. 
 
For example, there is a significant body of research which highlights the ways in which 
women experience the political process in different ways to men, and how other 
individual-level differences manifest as political inequalities (Norris and Lovenduski 
1995; Puwar 2004; Lawless and Fox 2005; Krook 2009; Allen 2012; Lawless 2012). This 
work has highlighted, amongst other things, the fact that women are less likely to 
consider running for office than similarly-placed men, that once within the political 
system women are less likely to put themselves forward for higher office, that women 
will be treated differently to their male colleagues, and that women are in many cases 
less likely to reach the very top of political life than men. Although more limited in 
number, studies have also shown similar patterns to be in place for politicians from 
ethnic minority backgrounds (Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Puwar 2004; Durose et al. 
2012). 
 
Thinking about political experience, how will social characteristics such as these affect 
both the types of political experience that individuals are likely to gain as well as the 
effect it will have on their career? A useful way of conceptualising the relationship 
between these things is through the model of supply and demand first mentioned in 
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chapter one (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Taking again the example of women, it has 
been argued in the past that local politics, and in this case gaining political experience 
on the local level, is more conducive to women as it allows for an easier combination of 
political life with family life, offering closer proximity to home than a national-level 
political role (Briggs 2000; Allen 2012). Conversely, it is also possible to argue that non-
traditional, national-level, types of political experience may be women-friendly in other 
ways. Although in terms of proximity to home and working hours they may be 
disagreeable, these routes allow women to bypass potentially patriarchal structures 
such as those seen on local councils, for example (Briggs 2000). The national-level route 
into politics, embodied, inter alia, in working for an MP, requires the support of a sole 
gatekeeper (the MP in question) as opposed to navigating selection and election to a 
local council, which is then itself dominated by men (Allen 2012). Other examples here 
would include trade unions and constituency parties. In this way, political experience is 
gendered, and this possibility can be broadened to include ethnicity, disability, and so 
on. Again, experiences of politics will differ for different people, and by definition, so 
will the types of political experience that they gain. Thus, the supply of political 
experience has the potential to be stratified by other characteristics held by an 
individual (i.e. sex, age, ethnicity, and so on). Consequentially, if political parties are 
looking for certain types of candidates (see the previous section of this chapter), the 
demand for different types of political experience, or indeed individuals with differing 
characteristics, will alter accordingly.  
 
Say, for example, a political party wanted to professionalise its image and put the word 
out to local parties that selecting local party stalwarts was no longer encouraged, 
would this be good for women or ethnic minority candidates? Potentially yes. In cases 
where these debates have taken place, women candidates are often seen (rightly or 
wrongly) as the ‘professional’ choice, in opposition to the ‘local man’ (Childs and 
Cowley 2011). However, it is the case that women or ethnic minority candidates are 
less likely to have been local council stalwarts for a party, with both of these groups 
disproportionately leaving, for example, local council roles after just one term, with 
fewer white men doing the same (Allen 2012). A key point to make here is that 
changing political winds at the national level (i.e. changes in the preferences of parties 
for certain types of candidates) will create a feedback loop whereby certain types of 
political experience are deemed more desirable or effective for prospective candidates, 
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but as discussed here, not all prospective candidates will necessarily be able to gain 
such experience in the same way. Particularly at a time when these types of ‘political 
apprenticeships’ are increasingly essential to a political career, their differential effect 
will influence who makes it in politics and who does not.  
 
Turning to political careers and personal characteristics in the broader sense, certain 
parties are more likely to adopt equality-seeking measures which may rectify this 
imbalance to some extent. Across the globe, measures which either pursue greater sex 
equality in elected office, or guarantee it (such as electoral quotas), are more regularly 
seen in left-wing parties than liberal or conservative parties, although it would be a 
fallacy to suggest that right-wing parties never adopt such measures (Krook 2010). As 
such, it is fair to say that certain parties are perhaps more likely to be aware of the 
ways that individual-level characteristics can affect the ways in which political 
processes work in different ways for different people. As a result of this, they will put in 
place mechanisms which alter these processes in some way.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by presenting a systematic framework with which to analyse 
political experience and its effects, consisting firstly of a chronology of political careers 
(figure 6.1), and secondly of a distinction between various types of political experience, 
beginning with a distinction between national and sub-national experience before 
moving to further delineate elected and unelected experience as well as partisan and 
non-partisan roles (figure 6.2). 
 
In this chapter I have extended the empirical and conceptual developments made 
throughout the thesis and theorised as to how they could be applied to a broader 
comparative literature, the focus being on the transferability of the concepts. These 
concepts have been related to wider conceptual work in the field of the study of 
political parties, representation, gender and politics, and to the existing literature 
looking at multi-level political careers. In doing this, I have provided a conceptual 
framework which could be employed empirically to the study of political experience 
and political careers in any democratic country.  
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This exercise additionally underlines the original scholarly contributions of the thesis, 
highlighting the ways in which this work advances extant scholarship, but retains its 
links to it. In the following chapter, the conclusion of the thesis, I will consider the 
implications of this work to broader political science literatures, as well as its potential 
practical policy implications. Finally, I will acknowledge the limitations of the thesis and 
lay down markers for future research.  
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Conclusion 
 
The title of this thesis asks what the impact of pre-parliamentary political experience is 
on MPs career trajectories in the House of Commons. The existing literature in this field 
has only considered political experience as an adjunct to occupational experience, and 
has not systematically studied whether pre-parliamentary experience of the political or 
occupational kind affects post-election career attainment. In this thesis I have built on 
this literature by focusing firstly on the ways in which political experience, considered 
as a stand-alone category, can affect political careers, and secondly, by utilising original 
empirical data to link pre-election political experience and post-election parliamentary 
career paths. Centring on the focal research questions of ‘what is the impact of pre-
parliamentary political experience on political careers in the UK parliament’ and 
whether all experience has the same effect, in this conclusion I will restate the findings 
of the thesis, breaking these down into empirical findings, theoretical and conceptual 
contributions, and practical policy implications. Following this, I will turn to 
recommendations for future research whilst recognising the limitations of this study, 
prior to summarising the chapter, and thesis, at the end. 
 
The empirical contribution of the thesis 
The empirical findings of the thesis can be broken down into two parts. Firstly, and in 
answer to the focal research question of the thesis, it has been shown that pre-
parliamentary political experience does have an effect on political careers in the UK 
parliament at Westminster, and this is demonstrated across both chapter four and 
chapter five. Chapter four utilised regression analyses to highlight the effect relative to 
other variables, and it was demonstrated that although other factors had larger effects 
on career trajectories, pre-parliamentary political experience did have an effect on 
career path. 
 
Secondly, it has also been shown in chapters four and five that different types of 
political experience result in differential career path outcomes for MPs. That is, not all 
pre-parliamentary political experience has the same effect. Those MPs who hold pre-
parliamentary political experience gained at the local political level, primarily as a local 
councillor but also as a local party organiser, for example, were more likely to remain 
 174 
 
backbenchers or be promoted to lesser frontbench office than their colleagues whose 
pre-parliamentary political experience was gained at the national level, for example 
working for an MP, being a special adviser to a leading politician, or working in the 
head office of a political party. These individuals were significantly more likely to attain 
cabinet-level frontbench positions, as well as other roles which lay higher in the 
hierarchy of parliamentary positions outlined in chapter three. Chapter five 
demonstrated that different types of political experience interacted with other effects, 
such as age at time of election, to produce differential career outcomes. These findings 
are both original contributions to the literature, building on existing work by 
demonstrating the differential effects of different types of political experience, and by 
showing that pre-election experience affects post-election career trajectory.  
 
The theoretical contribution of the thesis 
The conceptual work of the thesis takes place in chapters two and three, and is 
revisited and developed further in chapter six, which considers how the concepts that 
are empirically applied to the British case in chapters four and five could hold wider 
relevance for international comparative work.  
 
Earlier work by Cairney (2007), amongst others, classifies pre-parliamentary experience 
in two ways; brokerage roles, which are conducive to the pursuit of a political career, 
and instrumental roles that have a direct link to politics. This work is based on the idea 
that certain occupations would provide individuals with more of the resources required 
to run for parliament, including flexible career paths, high levels of remuneration and 
other more abstract skills such as public speaking experience and so on (Norris and 
Lovenduski 1995). Cairney’s brokerage-instrumental classification includes various 
types of political experience in the single instrumental category, including being a local 
councillor and working for an MP (2007). This thesis has challenged these conceptual 
formations of pre-parliamentary experience in two ways.  
 
Firstly, this thesis has made the case that political experience should be considered as a 
stand-alone category rather than being subsumed into occupational classifications. This 
is in part due to the fact that much political experience is gained in addition to a further 
full-time occupation pursued by an aspirant MP. For example, Tony Blair was involved 
for a time in the local politics of the London Labour party, but throughout his 
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occupation was as a lawyer. Thus, by focusing on occupation, and subsuming political 
experience into this classification, this existing framework was only measuring a small 
amount of the political experience of MPs, primarily full-time paid political roles. 
Secondly, this existing classification tacitly assumes that all types of pre-parliamentary 
political experience are the same, by including them all in a homogenous ‘instrumental’ 
category. Again, this thesis has challenged this by delineating between various types of 
political experience which lie broadly along a split between experience gained on the 
local level and experience gained on the national level. This distinction is elucidated in 
chapters two, three, and six, with the latter arguing that such a split would have 
relevance to both individual case studies of countries other than Britain as well as 
comparative studies.  
 
In these ways, the thesis makes a conceptual contribution to the existing literature by 
developing it, as well as raising the possibility of using these concepts in future work. 
Not only do the conceptual contributions increase the accuracy of the existing 
frameworks, they increase their scope, allowing for future comparisons of the relative 
influence of occupation and political experience. The empirical findings support the 
conceptual contentions made within the thesis, and as such, should inform future work 
in this area. In many ways, the thesis supports the findings of existing work by itself 
finding that pre-parliamentary experience is indeed something worth studying, but 
furthermore it develops this work, conceptually and empirically.  
 
The wider implications of the thesis 
The thesis holds wider implications for other work and policy, both within the academy 
and beyond. The practical and policy implications lie in the areas of candidate selection 
for political parties and in the process of frontbench promotions. The model of supply 
and demand, outlined in chapter one, suggests that certain groups of society are more 
or less likely to hold political office (or various other offices) for reasons of either 
supply, i.e. there is not enough of said group standing for office, or demand, whereby 
the gatekeepers of that office do not want to select them (Norris and Lovenduski 
1995). In reality, these dynamics often operate in the form of a feedback loop, where 
supply and demand closely influence each other. In other words, if a lot of members of 
a group are involved in politics, they may seek to bring in others like them (a demand-
side bias), whilst individuals who are not in that group may see politics as something 
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that is not for people like them (thus in turn creating a supply-side bias). As knowledge 
of these dynamics grows, interventions can be made which shift them, correcting any 
bias which favours certain groups over others. Perhaps the most notable example of 
such an intervention is that of sex quotas, now used widely across the globe (Krook 
2010). The original findings of this thesis could also be used as the basis for a similar 
intervention, though this time at the parliamentary level when selecting individuals for 
frontbench promotion. Although unlikely to result in any sort of quota in the short-
term, the findings could cause politicians and those interested in politics more broadly 
to pause for thought, and to consider more carefully whether the concentration of 
political power in the hands of those with similar political experiences is either 
desirable or healthy.  
 
Furthermore, it raises questions regarding the selection of those with local council 
experience for parliamentary elections. If this number continues to fall, as would seem 
to be the case based on available longitudinal data, will the patterns identified within 
this thesis be compounded in years to come? 
 
In terms of academic work, the thesis taps into wider concerns relating to public 
engagement with politics, which in turn have been linked to changes in the structure, 
membership, and purpose of political parties (Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2001; Jun 
2003; Mair 2006; Webb 2009). The British population dislike their politicians. In fact, 
they consistently rank them as their least favourite and least trusted of all the 
professions - in 2011, polling firm IPSOS Mori found that only 14% of Britons would 
trust politicians to tell the truth. For context, this figure stands at 55% for the ordinary 
man or woman in the street, 34% for trade union officials, 74% for professors, and an 
unparalleled 88% for doctors. The only group who came close to being as 
untrustworthy as politicians were journalists, with just 19% of the public finding them 
trustworthy. 
 
Beyond the British case, a large number of authors identify symptoms of political 
disengagement on a widespread scale across advanced Western democracies (Norris 
1999; Mair 2006; Stoker 2006; Hay 2007; Flinders 2012). Measuring this 
disengagement, these authors focus on tumbling electoral turnouts, falling levels of 
party membership, discontent with politics as reflected in opinion polling, and 
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additionally identify a broad malaise surrounding modern politics in advanced 
democracies.32 Flinders notes that ‘’politics’, for the many rather than just a few, has 
become a dirty word conjuring up notions of sleaze, corruption, greed, and inefficiency’ 
(2012, p.vii).  
 
Colin Hay (2007), Gerry Stoker (2006), and Matthew Flinders (2012), amongst others 
(such as Norris 1999), seek explanation for the trends they have identified. Broadly, 
explanations (which could also be colloquially referred to as ‘blame’) tend to focus on 
either the electorate, who are turning away from politics, or the political system and 
politicians, presumably a (or the) cause of this turn. Hay identifies these as arguments 
of demand and supply, respectively, and notes that much of the literature places the 
emphasis on demand-side explanations which focus on the shortcomings of, or changes 
in, the electorate which are mooted to have led to the disaffection that is the status 
quo (2007, p.158).33 
 
The explanations for this broad disenchantment that these authors do differ, but all can 
be characterised as defences of politics (Flinders even includes this phrase in the title of 
his work, echoing Bernard Crick’s 1962 work, In Defence of Politics). That is, they are 
generally of the opinion that politics is good, and the levels of attack that it is currently 
under are disproportionate to any wrong for which it may be culpable.34 For Stoker, 
politics is constructed in such a way that criticism is, to a large extent, inevitable, with a 
slightly naïve electorate expecting too much and therefore never being satiated by 
what comes to pass as a result of any political activity they do participate in (2006, 
pp.82-83). Additionally, he sees the fact that politics is conducted by a small group of 
individuals, and then reported to the public in a way that belittles any potential 
achievements and ‘commentary that can enlighten, but more often confuses’; as a 
result, ‘the average citizen is alienated from politics and far from convinced of its value’ 
                                               
32
 A full summary of this diagnosis is available in Hay (2007), Chapter One ‘Political 
Disenchantment’, or in Mair’s ‘Hollowing Out’ (2006) article. 
33
 Hay goes on to problematize this distinction is his concluding remarks, stating that it is ‘a little 
too simple and a little too neat’ and that in reality, the situation is more complex (2007, p159-
160). 
34
 Arguably, this is hardly a surprise considering that these are books written by political 
scientists, a section of society inevitably more invested in politics than most. 
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(Stoker 2006, p.202). Stoker and Flinders are both keen to emphasise that politics can’t 
solve every problem that living in a democratic society presents, and that people need 
to be more realistic about what politics, and politicians, can achieve (Stoker 2006, 
chapter four; Flinders 2012, chapter two).  
 
Hay lays the blame for disaffection more squarely at the door of neo-liberal economic 
thinking, to a greater extent than either Stoker or Flinders (Hay 2007, pp.97-99). 
Negative perceptions are causing the current crisis of participation in politics, but these 
negative perceptions are both projected onto politicians by a cynical electorate in 
addition to being projected onto themselves by an increasingly enfeebled set of 
politicians who perceive their own agency as being sapped by assumptions of public 
choice theory and globalisation (Hay 2007, p.158). He writes that ‘the contemporary 
condition of political disaffection and disengagement is perhaps better seen as the 
result of an unfortunate series of cumulative, mutually reinforcing, yet largely 
unintended consequences, in which public choice theoretical assumptions have 
undoubtedly played a crucial role’ (Hay 2007, p.158). 
 
Recognition for the influence of the activity of political parties on this situation is 
notable by its absence – Flinders, Hay, and Stoker all note that depoliticisation, the 
process by which politicians hand off powers they previously held to supposedly 
independent bodies, has weakened the hand of political actors, but none of the 
authors find politicians particularly culpable for the situation politics finds itself in 
(Stoker 2006, pp.204-205; Hay 2007, chapters three and four; Flinders 2012, chapter 
three). However, parties have changed over time, in structure and function, and this is 
surely going to have an effect on the ways in which individuals engage with political life 
(Katz and Mair 1995; Krouwel 2006; Mair 2006). Peter Mair writes; 
 
Previously, and probably through to at least the 1970s, 
conventional politics was seen to belong to the citizen, 
and something in which the citizen could, and often did, 
participate. Now, it has become part of an external world 
which people watch from outside: a world of political 
leaders, separate from that of the citizenry. It is the 
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transformation of party democracy into ‘audience 
democracy (2006, p44). 
 
The professionalisation of political activism, noted by Stoker in particular (2006, 
chapter six), is a clear pre-cursor to the patterns identified in this thesis, with more and 
more individuals involved in politics in a professional capacity prior to becoming 
elected politicians. This would seem to be intensifying as the overall number of people 
engaged with politics is falling, as evidenced by the authors mentioned above. As was 
noted in chapters one and two, political parties are the gatekeepers of political office, 
effectively screening who becomes a national-level politician and who does not. Have 
the patterns identified in this thesis, the concentration of specific groups of political 
involved individuals in the top offices of state, compounded disenchantment with 
politics?  
 
Realistically, this is unlikely to be the case, and to suggest that it is would be hasty. 
However, arguably this thesis has shown that political parties are increasingly selecting, 
and promoting, their own to the heights of British politics; it would appear to be the 
case that getting to the top of political life from the outside, having started on the local 
level, is more difficult than if you are already integrated into that national-level political 
culture. This occurs as part of processes that parties themselves control, from 
candidate selection, training, outreach, and so on, and then the party leadership who 
control intra-parliamentary promotional patterns.  
 
To return to the model of supply and demand in the context of the findings of this 
thesis, parties can control both the supply of candidates with certain types of political 
experience as well as the demand for this experience at various stages of a political 
career. Making no normative judgement above and beyond the contention made in the 
introduction that a concentration of power in the hands of a group based on any single 
characteristic is undesirable, political parties could nonetheless change the processes 
outlined in the thesis to ensure that this concentration does not become a permanent 
fixture of British political life.  
 
In terms of normative judgements, a further question is how, or if, these patterns link 
to theories of representation, at a time of record political disenchantment. Taking the 
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cue from Paul Webb (2009), who asks whether the failings of political parties in 
modern Britain are real or imagined, it can be asked whether the proliferation of 
politicians with national-level professionalised political backgrounds, and their 
subsequent concentration in high political office, affects the representative relationship 
between the public and their politicians? Understanding the issues of representation 
that stem from the rise of professional politicians utilising traditional accounts is 
difficult. In the past, accounts of representation were delineated along the lines of 
trustee and delegate, amongst others, underpinned by the notion that there were 
secure interests of the represented that could be known by the representative. This 
notion carried over into modern accounts, which focused more on ‘presence’, their 
argument developed to posit that not only should the interests of historically 
disadvantaged groups be represented politically, but that they should be represented 
by individuals from those groups (Phillips 1998). This work continued to consider the 
interests of these groups as definitively knowable. When talking of the substantive 
representation of women (SRW), at least until relatively recently, feminist scholars 
would often consider women’s interests to be fairly transparent, certainly in areas 
considered to be naturally gendered such as abortion rights.  
 
Such existing frameworks which focus on representation as both the descriptive 
representation and substantive representation of groups do not map easily onto the 
concern present here, that of professional politicians. Firstly, they do not dominate the 
legislature, even if the impression given is otherwise35, and in any case it is also hard to 
claim that non-professional politicians are a historically underrepresented group who 
require presence in the legislature to right previous wrongs. Additionally, it is not 
entirely clear that there would be obvious collective interests on either side. There is 
perhaps potential to argue that professional politicians are in some way predominantly 
a single social class, but even in this case, it is likely going to prove hard to separate 
such a class out from that seen in the rest of the legislature – as a norm, political 
                                               
35
 An interesting question here relates to the distinction of legislature and government. For 
example, would it be acceptable to have a representative legislature but not a representative 
government? Such questions require further untangling that there is simply not space to do 
justice to here. 
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legislatures in the modern era have been dominated by the middle class.36 As such, it is 
hard to construct this question (of whether there is a representative issues related to 
the over/under representation of groups and interests caused by professional 
politicians) in a traditionally recognisable way. 
 
This leads to the question of whether or not this is actually a unique problem that we 
are dealing with here? It has been argued that all representatives are by definition 
unrepresentative (Voet 1992). At base level the one characteristic held by all elected 
representatives is that their interest in politics is sufficient enough to cause them to run 
for office – because representatives are not chosen by lot. This comes ahead of 
characteristics like sex, ethnicity or class amongst others. This is a catch-22, because of 
course such an interest in politics is a necessary condition of them becoming a 
representative. Thus, it is the unbridgeable gap between the politicians and the public, 
and professional politicians are arguably the very embodiment of it. Rather than being 
a new ‘crisis’ of representation, it is perhaps instead the case that professional 
politicians simply serve to highlight this already existing divide – by virtue of the 
extremity of their involvement with politics, they draw out what was already there, the 
gap reflected in both their own presence as well as the unhappiness of the public.  
 
Is such a divide inevitable, given the practice and nature of modern political life? 
Professional politicians do not break democratic criteria in a formal sense. For example, 
they face election; they have to act within the law, and so on. To quote David Plotke, 
‘the opposite of representation is not participation. The opposite of representation is 
exclusion. And the opposite of participation is abstention’ (1997, p19). Urbinati adds 
that, ‘participation is not an alternative to representation. It is a way to check that 
representation is working’ (Landemore 2007). However, as this thesis has 
demonstrated, participation is something limited by various social resources, and 
differs along the lines of various personal characteristics. Whether or not the patterns 
this thesis identifies will simply reinforce these disparities is something that should be 
of interest, and perhaps concern, to political scientists.  
 
Limitations of the thesis and recommendations for future research 
                                               
36
 It is worth noting that the opposite of a professional politician is not a working class politician, 
however defined. 
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The limitations of this thesis are threefold, and are in many ways by-products of the 
methodological approach adopted throughout. First, the thesis focuses on a specific 
time period, naturally precluding analysis of a broader political era. Centring its 
attention on the period 1997-2010, and specifically on those MPs elected at the 1997 
general election, the analysis inevitably excludes those MPs who do not fall under 
these criteria. Second, certain elements of parliamentary careers were excluded from 
the analysis for both practical and theoretical reasons, the result of which is that the 
thesis focuses primarily on frontbench careers rather than the tentatively developing 
backbench career path. Thirdly, the thesis is a single-country case study and as such 
offers no comparative purchase. 
 
Future research, whilst drawing on the empirical and conceptual contributions of the 
thesis as discussed above, can develop these limitations. Most obviously, future work 
can utilise a similar cohort approach which looks, for example, at those MPs elected at 
the general elections of 2001, 2005, and so on. Such an approach will provide the 
opportunity to assess whether the effects seen in this thesis are individual to the 
cohort, or indeed are common across multiple samples. Longitudinal analysis of an 
extended time period could also occur, in addition to studies of individual 
governments, prime ministers, and so on. In short, such an approach would result in 
multiple opportunities for future research and analysis in the field of political careers. 
 
This work, in the British case, could also incorporate measures of backbench career 
progression, most notably the development of select committees as a genuine venue 
for backbench activity (Benton and Russell 2012). Including variables in the analysis 
which account for such activity could shed further light on the divide between those 
MPs with local and national political backgrounds as highlighted in this thesis. 
Additionally, it raises questions regarding the idea of a ‘stalled career’. As discussed in 
chapter five, the parliamentary careers of some individuals never take off despite the 
odds stacked in their favour. Similarly, what of the permanent backbencher who 
chooses such a career path? Future research should consider these issues in greater 
detail. 
 
The conceptual contribution of the thesis, stated most explicitly in chapter six, could be 
utilised in future comparative work which assesses the political experience of 
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legislators in various countries and across various political systems. The distinctions 
made between national- and local-level political experience, partisan and non-partisan 
experience, and between elected and non-elected experience, could be applied to 
work on both parliamentary and presidential political systems, and can elucidate 
existing work which looks at inter-institutional movement across multi-level political 
systems, looking not only at inter-institutional movement, but also at intra-institutional 
career progression (Borchert and Stolz 2011). Chapter six, in particular, provides a 
conceptual framework which could be applied to multiple international cases with little 
adaptation required.  
 
Conclusion 
Building on a literature which holds an interest in the social and personal backgrounds 
of British parliamentarians, in this thesis I have developed this work by arguing for a 
more detailed focus on political experience. I have argued that the existing literature 
considered this as an extension of occupation, and subsumed multiple types of political 
experience into falsely homogeneous categories. Instead, I have distinguished broadly 
between pre-parliamentary political experience gained on the local level, for example 
as a local councillor, and that gained on the national level, such as working for an MP or 
in the head office of a political party. This distinction has been operationalised 
empirically and tested on original longitudinal data which details the political careers of 
those MPs elected for the first time at the 1997 election, collected by the author. 
Empirically, I have demonstrated that pre-parliamentary political experience does 
affect career trajectories in the House of Commons, with MPs who have political 
experience gained on the national level more likely to enter parliament at a younger 
age, and be promoted faster and into positions which act as more effective 
springboards to higher office than their colleagues whose political experience is on the 
local level. The development of this distinction of different types of political experience 
as a stand-alone classification is an original contribution to scholarly knowledge. The 
extension of this distinction to comparative work has been discussed, and a conceptual 
framework provided. In this thesis I have contributed to knowledge in the field of 
political careers, and have done so in a way that makes these developments easy to 
implement into future scholarship in this area.   
 
 
 184 
 
Bibliography 
 
Allen, Nicholas, and Jonathan Dean. 2008. No (Parliamentary) Gender Gap Please, 
We're British. The Political Quarterly 79 (2): pp.212-220. 
Allen, Peter. 2012. Falling Off the Ladder: Gendered Experiences of Councillor 
Turnover. The Political Quarterly 83 (4): 711-713. 
Allen, Peter. 2012. "Last in, first out–Gendered patterns of local councillor dropout," 
British Politics. 
http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/06/11/pa.gss030.abstract. 
Allen, Peter. 2012. Linking Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience and the Career 
Trajectories of the 1997 General Election Cohort. Parliamentary Affairs 
Advance Access. 
Allen, Peter. 2013. Gendered Candidate Emergence in Britain: Why are More Women 
Councillors Not Becoming MPs? Politics Online Advance Access. 
Ashe, Jeanette, Rosie Campbell, Sarah Childs, and Elizabeth Evans. 2010. ‘Stand by your 
man’: Women's political recruitment at the 2010 UK general election. British 
Politics 5 (4): 455-480. 
Bale, Tim. 2010. The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron. Cambridge: Polity. 
Barnes, John, and Richard Cockett. 1994. "The Making of Party Policy." In Conservative 
Century: The Conservative Party since 1900, eds. Anthony Seldon and Stuart 
Ball. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 348-382. 
Bedford, Michael, ed. 1998. Dod's Parliamentary Companion 1998, 166th Year, New 
Parliament Edition. London: Vacher Dod Publishing. 
Beer, Samuel H. 1982. Modern British Politics. London: Faber and Faber. 
Belchem, John. 1990. Class, Party and the Political System in Britain 1867-1914. Edited 
by M.E.  Chamberlain and James Shields of Historical Association Studies. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Benton, Meghan, and Meg Russell. 2012. Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary 
Oversight Committees: The Select Committees in the British House of 
Commons. Parliamentary Affairs Advance Online Access. 
Berlinski, Samuel, Torun Dewan, and Keith Dowding. 2007. The Length of Ministerial 
Tenure in the UK 1945-97. British Journal of Political Science 37 (2): 245-262. 
 185 
 
Berlinski, Samuel, Torun Dewan, and Keith Dowding. 2012. Accounting for Ministers: 
Scandal and Survival in British Government 1945-2007. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Best, Heinrich; , Valerie;  Cromwell, Christopher; Hausmann, and Michael  Rush. 2001. 
The Transformation of Legislative Elites: The Cases of Britain and Germany 
since the 1860s. The Journal of Legislative Studies 7 (3): 65-91. 
Birch, A.H. 1979. Representative and Responsible Government: An Essay on the British 
Constitution. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
Bochel, John, and David Denver. 1983. Candidate Selection in the Labour Party: What 
the Selectors Seek. British Journal of Political Science 13 (1): 45-69. 
Bogdanor, Vernon. 2009. The New British Constitution. Oxford: Hart. 
Bolleyer, Nicole. 2009. Inside the Cartel Party: Party Organisation in Government and 
Opposition. Political Studies 57: 559-579. 
Borchert, Jens. 2001. "Movement and Linkage in Political Careers: Individual Ambition 
and Institutional Repercussions in a Multi-Level Setting." Presented at the ECPR 
Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble. 
Borchert, Jens. 2011. Individual Ambition and Institutional Opportunity: A Conceptual 
Approach to Political Careers in Multi-level Systems. Regional and Federal 
Studies 21 (2): 117-140. 
Borchert, Jens, and Klaus Stolz. 2011. Institutional Order and Career Patterns: Some 
Comparative Considerations. Regional and Federal Studies 21 (2): 271-282. 
Borchert, Jens, and Klaus Stolz. 2011. Introduction: Political Careers in Multi-level 
Systems. Regional and Federal Studies 21 (2): 107-115. 
Borchert, Jens, and Jurgen Zeiss, eds. 2003. The Political Class in Advanced 
Democracies: A Comparative Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Briggs, Jacqui. 2000. What’s in it for women? The motivations, expectations and 
experiences of local female councillors in Montreal, Canada and Hull, England. 
Local Government Studies 26 (4): 71-84. 
Buck, J. Vincent;, and Bruce E. Cain. 1990. British MPs in Their Constituencies. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 15 (1): 127-142. 
Budge, Ian, and Dennis Farlie. 1975. Political Recruitment and Dropout: Predictive 
Success of Background Characteristics over Five 
British Localities. British Journal of Political Science 5 (2): 35-68. 
 186 
 
Cairney, Paul. 2007. The Professionalisation of MPs: Refining the 'Politics-Facilitating' 
Explanation. Parliamentary Affairs 60 (2): 212-233. 
Canon, David T. 1990. Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United 
States Congress. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Carnes, Nicholas. 2012. Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class 
in Congress Matter? Legislative Studies Quarterly 37 (1): 5-34. 
Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom, and Jason M. Roberts. 2007. Candidate Quality, the 
Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress. American Political 
Science Review 2007 (2): 289-301. 
Celis, Karen, and Sarah Childs. 2008. The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of 
Women: New Directions. Parliamentary Affairs 61 (3): 419-425. 
Celis, Karen, and Sarah Childs. 2012. The Substantive Representation of Women: What 
to Do with Conservative Claims? Political Studies 60: 213-225. 
Cheng, Christine, and Margit Tavits. 2011. Informal Influences in Selecting Female 
Political Candidates. Political Research Quarterly 64 (2): 460-471. 
Childs, Sarah. 2008. Women and British Party Politics. London: Routledge. 
Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. 2008. Critical Mass Theory and Women's Political 
Representation. Political Studies 56: 725-736. 
Childs, Sarah, and Paul Webb. 2012. Sex, Gender and the Conservative Party. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Childs, Sarah;, and Philip Cowley. 2011. The Politics of Local Presence: Is there a Case 
for Descriptive Representation? Parliamentary Affairs 59 (1): 1-20. 
Clark, Greg, and Scott Kelly. 2004. Echoes of Butler? The Conservative Research 
Department and the Making of Conservative Policy. The Political Quarterly 75 
(4): 378-382. 
Copeland, Gary, and Cynthia Opheim. 2011. Multi-level Political Careers in the USA: The 
Cases of African Americans and Women. Regional and Federal Studies 21 (2): 
141-164. 
Cowley, Philip. 2012. Arise, Novice Leader! The Continuing Rise of the Career Politician 
in Britain. Politics 32 (1): 31-39. 
Cracknell, Richard. 2010. "Social background of MPs." In, ed. House of Commons 
Library. London: House of Commons Library. 
Criddle, Byron. 1987. "MPs and Candidates." In The British General Election of 1987, 
eds. David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh. New York: St. Martin's Press. 191-210. 
 187 
 
Criddle, Byron. 1992. "MPs and Candidates." In The British General Election of 1992, 
eds. David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 211-
230. 
Criddle, Byron. 1997. "MPs and Candidates." In The British General Election of 1997, 
eds. David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 186-
209. 
Criddle, Byron. 2001. "MPs and Candidates." In The British General Election of 2001, 
eds. David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 182-
207. 
Criddle, Byron. 2005. "MPs and Candidates." In The British General Election of 2005, 
eds. Dennis Kavanagh and David Butler. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 146-
167. 
Criddle, Byron. 2010. "More Diverse Yet More Uniform: MPs and Candidates." In The 
British General Election of 2010, eds. Dennis Kavanagh and Philip Cowley. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 306-329. 
Dahlerup, Drude. 1988. From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian 
Politics. Scandinavian Political Studies 11 (4): 275-298. 
Detterbeck, Klaus. 2005. Cartel Parties in Western Europe? Party Politics 11 (2): 173-
191. 
Docherty, David C. 1997. Mr Smith Goes to Ottowa: Life in the House of Commons. 
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 
Dowding, Keith, and Patrick Dumont, eds. 2009. The Selection of Ministers in Europe: 
Hiring and Firing. London: Routledge. 
Durose, Catherine, Ryan Combs, Christina Eason, Francesca Gains, and Liz Richardson. 
2012. 'Acceptable Difference': Diversity, Representation and Pathways to UK 
Politics. Parliamentary Affairs 66 (2): 246-267. 
Durose, Catherine;, Francesca; Gains, Liz; Richardson, Ryan; Combs, and Christina 
Eason. 2011. Pathways to politics. London: Equality and Human Rights 
Commission. 65. 
Elliott, Amber. 2010. "http://www.totalpolitics.com/articles/3853/missing-you-
already.thtml." http://www.totalpolitics.com/articles/3853/missing-you-
already.thtml (March 11th 2012). 
 188 
 
Escobar-Lemmon, Maria, and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2005. Women Ministers in 
Latin American Government: When, Where, and Why? American Journal of 
Political Science 49 (4): 829-844. 
Escobar-Lemmon, Maria, and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2009. Getting to the Top: 
Career Paths of Women in Latin American Cabinets. Political Research 
Quarterly 62 (4): 685-699. 
Evans, Elizabeth. 2008. Supply or Demand? Women Candidates and the Liberal 
Democrats. British Journal of Politics & International Relations 10 (4): 590-606. 
Evans, K., and H. Aston. 2011. National Census of Local Authority Councillors 2010. 
Slough: NFER. 
Fairbrother, Linda. 2011. "Luciana Berger MP meets wpradio.co.uk reporter Linda 
Fairbrother in our “New Faces” series." http://www.wpradio.co.uk/index2.html 
(4th April 2011). 
Farlie, Dennis, Ian Budge, and Galen Irwin. 1977. Political Recruitment and Drop-Out: 
The Netherlands and the United States. British Journal of Political Science 7 (4): 
465-492. 
Fisher, Justin;, and Paul Webb. 2003. Political participation: the vocational motivations 
of Labour party employees. British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 5 (2): 166-187. 
Flinders, Matthew. 2012. Defending Politics: Why Democracy Matters in the Twenty-
first Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2004. Entering the Arena? Gender and the 
Decision to Run for Office. American Journal of Political Science 48 (2): 264-280. 
Frankland, Gene E. 1977. Parliamentary Career Achievement in Britain and West 
Germany: A Comparative Analysis. Legislative Studies Quarterly 2 (2): 137-154. 
Gaines, Brian J. 1998. The Impersonal Vote? Constituency Service and Incumbency 
Advantage in British Elections, 1950-92. Legislative Studies Quarterly 23 (2): 
167-195. 
Gallagher, Michael. 1985. Social Backgrounds and Local Orientations of Members of the 
Irish Dail. Legislative Studies Quarterly 10 (3): 373-394. 
Galligan, Yvonne. 2007. "Women in Politics." In Politics in the Republic of Ireland, eds. 
John; Coakley and Michael Gallagher. Oxford: Routledge/PSAI Press. 
 189 
 
Gaunder, Alisa. 2007. "Running for National Office in Japan: The Institutional and 
Cultural Constraints Faced by Women Candidates." Presented at the Stanford 
Conference on Electoral and Legislative Politics in Japan, Stanford University. 
Gay, Oonah. 2005. MPs Go Back to Their Constituencies. The Political Quarterly 76 (1): 
57-66. 
Gibson, Rachel, Wainer Lusoli, and Stephen Ward. 2008. Nationalizing and Normalizing 
the Local? A Comparative Analysis of Online Candidate Campaigning in 
Australia and Britain. Journal of Information Technology & Politics 4 (4): pp.15-
30. 
Greenwood, John. 1988. Promoting Working-Class Candidature In The Conservative 
Party: The Limits of Central Office Power. Parliamentary Affairs 41 (4): 456-484. 
Harrison, Lisa. 2009. Selecting Women Candidates: A Critical Evaluation. Journal of 
Liberal History (62): 36-47. 
Hay, Colin. 2007. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity. 
Heitshusen, Valerie, Gary Young, and David M. Wood. 2005. Electoral Context and MP 
Constituency Focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom. American Journal of Political Science 49 (1): 32-45. 
Herrnson, Paul S. 1994. Congress's Other Farm Team: Congressional Staff. Polity 27 (1): 
137-156. 
Hibbing, John R. 1991. Contours of the Modern Congressional Career. The American 
Political Science Review 85 (2): 405-428. 
Hibbing, John R. 1999. Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them. 
Legislative Studies Quarterly 24 (2): 149-171. 
Hill, Michael. 2013. Arrogant Posh Boys? The Social Composition of the Parliamentary 
Conservative Party and the Effect of Cameron's ‘A’ List. The Political Quarterly 
84 (1): 80-89. 
Hopkin, Jonathan, and Caterina Paolucci. 1999. The business firm model of party 
organisation: Cases from Spain and Italy. European Journal of Political Research 
35: 307-339. 
Isaby, Jonathan. 2010. "Does it matter that only three of the 23 Cabinet ministers have 
been councillors?"  (September 7th 2010). 
Jackson, Nigel, and Darren Lilleker. 2011. Microblogging, Constituency Service and 
Impression Management: UK MPs and the Use of Twitter. The Journal of 
Legislative Studies 17 (1): 86-105. 
 190 
 
Jalalzai, Farida. 2008. Women Rule: Shattering the Executive Glass Ceiling. Politics and 
Gender 4 (2): 205-231. 
James, Simon. 1999. British Cabinet Government. 2 ed. London: Routledge. 
Jennings, Ivor. 1957. Parliament. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Judge, David. 1973. Backbench Specialization - A Study in Parliamentary Questions. 
Parliamentary Affairs 27: 171-186. 
Jun, Uwe. 2003. "Great Britain: From the Prevalence of the Amateur to the Dominance 
of the Professional Politician." In The Political Class in Advanced Democracies, 
eds. Jens; Borchert and Jurgen  Zeiss. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 164-186. 
Kam, Christopher, and Indridi Indridason. 2009. "Cabinet dynamics and ministerial 
careers in the French Fifth Republic." In The Selection of Ministers in Europe: 
Hiring and firing, eds. Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont. Oxford: Routledge. 
41-57. 
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex 
Ratios and Responses to Token Women. The American Journal of Sociology 82 
(5): 965-990. 
Karam, Azza, and Joni Lovenduski. 2005. "Women in Parliament: Making a Difference." 
In Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, eds. Julie Ballington and Azza 
Karam. Stockholm: International IDEA. 
Katz, Richard S. 2001. The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party 
Democracy. Party Politics 7 (3): 277-296. 
Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 1995. Changing Models of Party Organization and 
Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party Politics 1 (5): 5-28. 
Kaufman, Gerald. 1997. How to be a Minister. London: Faber and Faber. 
Kavanagh, Dennis. 1992. Changes in the Political Class and its Culture. Parliamentary 
Affairs 45 (1): 18-32. 
Keating, Michael;, and Paul  Cairney. 2006. A New Elite? Politicians and Civil Servants in 
Scotland after Devolution. Parliamentary Affairs 59 (1): 43-59. 
Kenny, Meryl. 2009. "Gendering institutions: the political recruitment of women in 
post-devolution Scotland." PhD  University of Edinburgh. 
Kenny, Michael. 2009. Taking the Temperature of the Political Elite 2: The Professionals 
Move In? Parliamentary Affairs 62 (2): 335-349. 
King, Anthony. 1983. The Rise of the Career Politician in Britain - And Its Consequences. 
British Journal of Political Science 11 (3): 249-285. 
 191 
 
King, Oona. 2007. House Music. London: Bloomsbury. 
Krook, M. L. 2009. Beyond Supply and Demand: A Feminist-institutionalist Theory of 
Candidate Selection. Political Research Quarterly 63 (4): 707-720. 
Krook, Mona Lena. 2010. Quotas for Women in Politics. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana Z. O'Brien. 2012. All the President's Men? The 
Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers Worldwide. The Journal of Politics 74 
(3): 840-855. 
Krouwel, André. 2006. "Party Models." In Handbook of Party Politics, eds. Richard S. 
Katz and William Crotty. London: Sage. pp.249-267. 
Landemore, Helene. 2007. "Is representative democracy really democratic? Interview 
of Bernard Manin and Nadia Urbinati." 
http://www.booksandideas.net/IMG/pdf/20080327_manin_en.pdf (August 
30th 2012). 
Lawless, Jennifer L. 2012. Becoming a Candidate. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Lawless, Jennifer;, and Richard Fox. 2005. It takes a candidate: Why women don't run 
for office. New York City: Cambridge University Press. 
Lazarus, Jeffrey. 2008. Why Do Experienced Challengers Do Better Than Amateurs? 
Political Behavior 30 (2): 185-198. 
LGA. 2008. One Country, Two Systems?,. London: Local Government Association. 
Lovenduski, Joni. 2005. Feminizing Politics. London: Polity. 
Mair, Peter. 2006. Ruling the Void? The Hollowing of Western Democracy. New Left 
Review 42: 25-51. 
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent 
Women? A Contingent "Yes". The Journal of Politics 61 (3): 628-657. 
McGuinness, Feargal. 2010. Social Background of MPs. London: House of Commons 
Library. SN/SG/1528. 
McIlveen, Robert. 2009. Ladies of the Right: An Interim Analysis of the A‐List. Journal of 
Elections, Public Opinion & Parties 19 (2): 147-157. 
Mellors, Colin. 1978. The British MP: A socio-economic study of the House of Commons. 
Farnborough: Saxon House. 
Montero, Alfred P. 2007. The Limits of Decentralisation: Legislative Careers and 
Territorial Representation in Spain. West European Politics 30 (3): 573-594. 
 192 
 
Mullin, Chris. 2009. A View From The Foothills: The Diaries of Chris Mullin. London: 
Profile. 
Mullin, Chris. 2011. Decline & Fall: Diaries 2005-2010. London: Profile. 
Mullinger, James. 2011. "Sadiq Khan exclusive!" GQ. 
Murray, Rainbow. 2010. Linear Trajectories or Vicious Circles? The Causes and 
Consequences of Gendered Career Paths in the National Assembly. Modern & 
Contemporary France 18 (4): 445-459. 
Norris, Pippa. 1997. Anatomy of a Labour Landslide. Parliamentary Affairs 50 (4): 509-
532. 
Norris, Pippa. 1999. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Norris, Pippa, ed. 1997. Passages To Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced 
Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. 1997. "United Kingdom." In Passages to power: 
Legislative recruitment in advanced democracies, ed. Pippa Norris. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 158-186. 
Norris, Pippa;, and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class 
in the British Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Norton, Philip. 1994. The Growth of the Constituency Role of the MP. Parliamentary 
Affairs 47 (4): 705-720. 
Norton, Philip. 2007. Four Models of Political Representation: British MPs and the Use 
of ICT. The Journal of Legislative Studies 13 (3): 354-369. 
O'Malley, Eoin. 2009. "Constructing and maintaining Irish governments." In The 
Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and firing, eds. Keith Dowding and 
Patrick Dumont. Oxford: Routledge. pp. 179-193. 
Oborne, Peter. 2007. The Triumph of the Political Class. London: Pocket Books. 
Party, Labour. 2008. "The Labour Party Rule Book 2008." In, ed. Labour Party. London. 
pp.100. 
Pattie, Charles J., and Ron J. Johnston. 2004. Party knowledge and candidate 
knowledge: constituency campaigning and voting and the 1997 British General 
Election. Electoral Studies 23: 795-819. 
Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence: Political Representation of Gender Race 
and Ethnicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 193 
 
Phillips, Anne. 1998. "Democracy and Representation: Or, Why Should it Matter Who 
our Representatives Are?" In Feminism and Politics, ed. Anne Phillips. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 26. 
Phillips, Anne. 1998. The Politics of Presence: Political Representation of Gender Race 
and Ethnicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Phillips, Anne. 2012. Representation and Inclusion. Politics and Gender 8 (4): 512-518. 
Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Los Angeles, California: 
University of California Press. 
Pitre, Sonia. 2003. Women's Struggle for Legislative Power: The Role of Political Parties. 
Atlantis 27 (2): 1-14. 
Plotke, David. 1997. Representation is Democracy. Constellations 4 (1): 19-34. 
Puwar, Nirmal. 2004. Space Invaders: Race, Gender and Bodies Out of Place. London: 
Berg. 
Real-Dato, José, and Miguel Jerez-Mir. 2009. "Cabinet dynamics in democratic Spain 
(1977–2008)." In The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and firing, eds. 
Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont. Oxford: Routledge. pp. 101-124. 
Riddell, Peter. 1993. Honest Opportunism. London: Phoenix. 
Rush, Michael. 1969. The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates. London: Thomas 
Nelson & Sons Ltd. 
Rush, Michael. 1994. Career Patterns in British Politics: First Choose Your Party…. 
Parliamentary Affairs 47 (4): 566-582. 
Rush, Michael. 2001. "Parallel but Separate: Political Recruitment at Three Levels in the 
UK." Presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble. 
Rush, Michael;, and Philip Giddings. 2011. Parliamentary Socialisation: Learning the 
Ropes or Determining Behaviour? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Russell, Meg. 2005. Building New Labour: The Politics of Party Organisation. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Saward, Michael. 2006. The Representative Claim. Contemporary Political Theory 5: 
297-318. 
Scarrow, Susan E., Paul Webb, and David M. Farrell. 2001. "From Social Integration to 
Electoral Contestation." In Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. 
Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 194 
 
Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1966. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United 
States.  of American Politics Research Series. Illinois: Rand McNally. 
Searing, Donald. 1985. The Role of the Good Constituency Member and the Practice of 
Representation in Great Britain. The Journal of Politics 47 (2): 348-381. 
Searing, Donald. 1994. Westminster's World: Understanding Political Roles. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Seyd, Patrick, and Paul Whiteley. 2004. British Party Members: An Overview. Party 
Politics 10 (4): 355-366. 
Seyd, Patrick;, and Paul Whiteley. 1992. Labour's Grass Roots: The Politics of Party 
Membership. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Shaw, Eric. 2001. New Labour: New Pathways to Parliament. Parliamentary Affairs 54 
(1): 35-53. 
Steinmo, Sven. 2001. "The New Institutionalism." In The Encyclopedia of Democratic 
Thought, eds. B. Clark and J. Foweraker. London: Routledge. pp.462-5. 
Stoker, Gerry. 2006. Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Telegraph. 2008. "Politics needs real people." In The Telegraph. London. 
Voet, Rian. 1992. Political Representation and Quotas: Hannah Pitkin's Concept(s) oof 
Representation in the Context of Feminist Politics. Acta Politica 27 (4): 389-403. 
Ward, Stephen, and Wainer Lusoli. 2005. ‘From weird to wired’: MPs, the internet and 
representative politics in the UK. The Journal of Legislative Studies 11 (1): 57-
81. 
Ware, Alan. 1996. Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Webb, Paul. 2009. The Failings of Political Parties: Reality or Perception? 
Representation 45 (3): 265-275. 
Webb, Paul;, and Justin; Fisher. 2003. Professionalism and the Millbank Tendency: The 
Political Sociology of New Labour’s Employees. Politics 23 (1): 10-20. 
Whiteley, Paul, and Patrick Seyd. 2002. High-Intensity Participation: The Dynamics of 
Party Activism in Britain. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 
Wilson, D;, and C Game. 2006. Local Government in the United Kingdom. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Yule, Jean. 2000. Women councillors and committee recruitment. Local Government 
Studies 26 (3): 31-54. 
 195 
 
Ziliak, Stephen T., and Deirdre N. McCloskey. 2008. The Cult of Statistical Significance: 
How the Standard Error Cost Us Jobs, Justice and Lives. Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press. 
 
 
